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
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
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THE  
REFORMED GRAMMAR.



THE  
REFORMED GRAMMAR,  
OR  
PHILOSOPHICAL TEST OF  
ENGLISH COMPOSITION ;

WRITTEN FOR THE

Assistance of Teachers and Satisfaction of Learners,

BY

GERALD MURRAY.

*Price, Bound, Four Shillings.*



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1847.





## PREFACE.

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THE Author's aim in publishing the present work, is to excite in youth a passion for grammatical knowledge, to facilitate its acquisition, to multiply the number of those who study the English language critically and with pleasure, to raise learners from the degradation of being mere senseless parrots, to the dignity of rational youth, by substituting the exercise of reason for the slavish abuses of the memory. How the work will answer the design teachers will decide. The author knows their independence and impartiality, and confidently submits his humble efforts to their unbiased decision. He owns no man's grammatical infallibility, and is convinced that the present work must have its imperfections.

The author of a school book, who familiarizes learners with the misapplication of words, who sterilizes their minds by unmeaning assertions, poisons genius, renders ignorance impregnable, knowledge inaccessible, and prepares victims for imposition in later years. As the interests of learners will be best promoted by the earliest exposure of the errors in all books for their

## PREFACE.

Instruction, the author invites the strictest investigation into the truth of what he has written.

Much of the argumentative matter, and many of the quotations from other grammars, which the establishment of his system renders indispensable in this edition, will, after a short time, be unnecessary. He can then supply schools with a *small, cheap, and useful book*. He flatters himself the present work will prove, that its title is appropriate, and that he is not unworthy of the very kind encouragement which he has received from the Noblemen, Ladies, and Gentlemen, who have honoured him by adding their names to his list of subscribers.

The reader, whose veneration for the old classification of words, renders any change disagreeable, may use the old names; yet, in this work, he has the advantage of rational definitions and rules which he perfectly understands, while the pupil has considerably less than half the work, which other grammars require.

THE AUTHOR.

25, Rue d'Angoulême, Faubourg St-Honoré.

Paris, May 1st, 1847.

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# ENGLISH GRAMMAR.

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ENGLISH GRAMMAR is a constructive code, and true test of the English Language.

Grammar gives us a *systematic knowledge* of the nature, power, and arrangement of words and letters, and of the use of accents, pauses, and emphasis, which correct speaking and writing require.

There are three kinds of Grammar, namely, Universal, Theoretical, and Practical.

Universal Grammar is that which treats of the immutable principles common to all languages.

Theoretical Grammar is that which gives us a critical and philosophical knowledge of the language.

Practical Grammar is that which gives us a mere practical knowledge of the language.

The English language is two-fold ; namely, spoken and written.

The spoken language is that which is composed of sounds and addressed to the ear.

The written language is that which is composed of marks and addressed to the eye.

The spoken language is the primitive, and approaches nearer to perfection than the written, having the advantages of attitude, gesture, the striking and expressive action of the eyes, the changes and modulations of the voice ; which may be high or low, bold or plaintive, quick or slow, sharp or soft. The judicious and economical use of elementary sounds, universally and strictly observed in correct speaking, constitutes its greatest superiority, and forms not only one of the

most essential requisites of a refined and elegant delivery, but also one of the greatest difficulties we meet with in speaking or studying English.

The written language has no concomitant superiority over the spoken, nor does it possess any beauty not to be found in the latter : yet the written has contributed more to civilization and social happiness than the spoken, in consequence of the facility with which we can disseminate and transmit our ideas unimpaired to posterity : but these are subsequent advantages in the written, and the want of them is the only defect in the spoken language.

The preceding observations show, that both languages mutually assist each other; that is, an accomplished reader remedies all the defects of the written language, and the written language removes the subsequent disadvantages of the spoken.

To conclude, both languages have the same letters, syllables, words, and pauses; but the letters that represent a syllable or word to the eye, are generally very different from those which convey the same to the ear.

Grammar is divided into four parts.

### FIRST PART OF GRAMMAR.

The first part of grammar defines and classes the letters, and shows how to convert them into words.

Letters are the elementary sounds into which all the words of our language are resolvable.

A letter is an articulate elementary sound that forms an indivisible part of a word.

“ An articulate sound is the sound of the human voice formed by the organs of speech.

“ The organs of speech are the tongue, the palate, the teeth, the lips, nose, and larynx.

“ A concise account of the origin and formation of the sounds emitted by the human voice, may perhaps, not improperly be here introduced. It may gratify the ingenious student, and serve to explain more fully the nature of articulation, and the radical distinction between vowels and consonants.

“ Human voice is air sent out from the lungs, and so agitated or modified in its passage through the windpipe and larynx as to become distinctly audible. The windpipe is that tube which, on touching the forepart of your throat externally, you feel hard and uneven. It conveys air into the lungs for the purpose of breathing and speech. The top, or upper part, of the windpipe is called the larynx, consisting of four or five cartilages, that may be expanded or brought together by the action of certain muscles which operate all at the same time. In the middle of the larynx there is a small opening, called the *glottis*, through which the breath and voice are conveyed. This opening is not wider than one tenth of an inch, and therefore the breath transmitted through it from the lungs must pass with considerable velocity. The voice thus formed is strengthened and softened by a reverberation from the palate and other hollow places in the inside of the mouth and nostrils; and as these are better or worse shaped for this reverberation, the voice is said to be more or less agreeable.

“ If we consider the many varieties of sound which one and the same human voice is capable of uttering, together with the smallness of the glottis; that the same diameter must always produce the same tone, and, consequently, that to every change of tone a correspondent change of diameter is necessary; we must be filled with admiration at the mechanism of these parts, and the fineness of the fibres that operate in producing effects so minute, so various, and in their proportions so exactly uniform.

“ For it admits of proof, that the diameter of the human glottis is capable of more than sixty distinct degrees of contraction or enlargement, by each of which a different note is produced; and yet the greatest diameter of that aperture, as before observed, does not exceed one-tenth of an inch.

“ Speech is made up of articulate voices; and what we call articulation is performed not by the lungs, windpipe, or larynx, but by the action of the throat, palate, teeth, tongue, lips, and nostrils. Articulation begins not till the breath, or voice, has passed through the larynx.

“ The simplest articulate voices are those which proceed

from an open mouth, and are by grammarians called vowel sounds. In transmitting these, the aperture of the mouth may be pretty large, or somewhat smaller, or very small, which is one cause of the variety of vowels; a particular sound being produced by each particular aperture. Moreover, in passing through an open mouth, the voice may be gently acted upon by the lips, or by the tongue and palate, or by the tongue and throat; whence another source of variety in vowel sounds.

“ Thus ten or twelve simple vowel sounds may be formed, as may be seen in the following table of vowel sounds; and the learner, by observing the position of the mouth, lips, tongue, etc., when they are uttering the sounds, will perceive that various operations of these organs of speech are necessary to the production of the different vowel sounds; and that by minute variations they may all be distinctly pronounced.

“ TABLE OF SIMPLE VOWEL SOUNDS.

Letters denoting the simple sounds.			Words containing the simple sounds.
a	as	heard in	fate.
a	as	in	fall.
a	as	in	fat.
a	as	in	far.
e	as	in	me.
e	as	in	met.
i	as	in	pine.
i	as	in	pin.
o	as	in	no.
o	as	in	not.
o	as	in	move.
u	as	in	mule.
u	as	in	tub.
u	as	in	bull.
y	as	in	yet, my.
CONSONANTS.			
b	as	in	bay, tub.
d	as	in	day, sad.
f	as	in	off, for.
v	as	in	van, love.

Letters denoting the  
simple sounds.Words containing the  
simple sounds.

g	as	in	egg, go.
h	as	in	hop, ho.
k	as	in	kill, sake.
l	as	in	lap, all.
m	as	in	my, mum.
n	as	in	no, on.
p	as	in	pin, nap.
r	as	in	rap, cry.
s	as	in	so, lass.
z	as	in	zed, buzz.
t	as	in	top, mat.
w	as	in	wo, will."

All children who have learned their letters know that there are twenty-six of them, and that their collective name is alphabet.

Letters are divided into vowels and consonants.

A vowel is a letter formed by the position of the organs, without any action of one of them on another; as, *a*, *o*, etc.

A consonant is a letter formed by the position of the organs, and the action of one of them on another; as, *d*, which is formed by the action of the tongue on the palate.

The vowels are *a*, *e*, *i*, *o*, *u*, and *y*.

The remaining twenty letters are consonants.

As there can be no word or syllable without a vowel, let any grammarian who says that *w* is a vowel, point out any word or syllable in which it is the *only* vowel.

We can give as many examples as may be required, in which any of the foregoing vowels is the only one in the syllable; as, *fat*, *pet*, *pit*, *pot*, *put*, *fly*, etc.

The reader will easily perceive by a slight glance at any of our pronouncing dictionaries, that writing and speaking, or orthography and pronunciation, are very different in their constituent letters. We do not wonder that grammarians, who overlook this difference, and confound one language with

the other, should differ in opinion and draw absurd conclusions.

Mr. Walker, in his pronouncing dictionary, page 22, says, "that *w* and *y* are consonants when they begin a word, and vowels when they end one, is generally acknowledged by the best grammarians; and yet Dr. Lowth has told us that *w* is equivalent to *oo*; but if this were the case, it would always admit of the particle *an* before it: for, though we have no word in the language which commences with these letters, we plainly perceive that, if we had such a word, it would readily admit of *an* before it, and consequently that these letters are not equivalent to *w*. Thus we find that the common opinion with respect to the double capacity of these letters is perfectly just."

Doctor Lowth, in his Introduction to English grammar, page 3, says, "*y* is always a vowel, and *w* is either a vowel or a diphthong."

Mr. Lindley Murray says, in page 18 of his English grammar, "it is generally acknowledged by the best grammarians that *w* and *y* are consonants when they begin a syllable or word, and vowels when they end one. That they are consonants, when used as initials, seems to be evident from their not admitting the article *an* before them, as it would be improper to say *an walnut*, *an yard*, etc., and from their following a vowel without any hiatus or difficulty of utterance, as, *frosty winter*, *rosy youth*. That they are vowels in other situations appears from their regularly taking the sound of other vowels; as *w* has the exact sound of *u* in *saw*, *now*, *few*, etc., and *y* that of *i* in *hymen*, *fly*, *crystal*."

Messrs. Walker and Murray assert that *w* and *y* are consonants when they are initials; because we cannot use the article *an* before them, and that they are vowels in other situations, because they take the sounds of other vowels. If the initial *w* and *y* are consonants, merely on account of their not admitting the article *an* before them, the initial *e*, *o*, and *u* in the words *euchology*, *eucrasy*, *eugh*, *eulogy*, *euphrasy*, *eue*, *such a one*, *union*, *useful*, and many other similar words, must be consonants for the same reason.

If we take the written word *swry*, which is pronounced *yu-re*, and examine it according to the opinions of these writers, we shall find that the initial *e* is pronounced *y*; but initial *y* they say is a consonant; therefore *e* in this word is a consonant, or it is a consonant because it does not admit the article *an* before it.

Again, if we examine the written word *walk*, which is pronounced *wawk*, we find *l* takes the sound of *w*; but *w* they say is a vowel when it does not begin a word or syllable, hence *l* takes the sound of a vowel, and by their reasoning must be a vowel.

How respectable and distinguished writers could advance as truth conclusions drawn only from unexamined and traditional assumptions is not our duty to explain; yet we may here opportunely observe, that what the ear *hears*, and not what the eye *sees*, constitutes vowels and consonants in composition. In the written word *swry*, the ear hears *yu-re*, in which there is no initial *e*. How absurd then to say that *e* is either a vowel or consonant in a word of which it forms no part! In like manner the *l* in the word *walk* is neither vowel nor consonant, as it is only *seen* and not *heard*. The foregoing absurdities have arisen from confounding writing with pronunciation. Nothing can be more ridiculous than to speak of the vowels and consonants of the *written language*.

Without impropriety, the vowels may be considered as the pure original notes of the English language, and the consonants as their elementary variations. Every consonant is formed by varying the beginning or ending of a vowel; as, *b*, *c*, *d*, *g*, *p*, *t*, and *v* are formed by varying the beginning of the vowel *e*, and *f*, *l*, *m*, *n*, and *s* are formed by varying the end of the same vowel. The other consonants are formed by similar variations.

Spelling is the art of resolving words into their constituent syllables, and then these syllables into their constituent letters.

A syllable is one of the divisions into which a word is divided by a correct and deliberate speaker.



“English spelling is attended with much uncertainty and perplexity. But a considerable part of this inconvenience may be remedied by duly attending to the general laws of formation; and for this end the learner is here presented with a view of such general maxims in spelling primitive and derivative words, as have been almost universally received.”

RULE I.

“Monosyllables ending in *f*, *l*, or *s*, preceded by a single vowel, double the final consonant; as, *staff*, *mill*, *pass*, etc. The only exceptions are, *of*, *if*, *as*, *is*, *has*, *was*, *yes*, *his*, *this*, *us*, and *thus*.”

RULE II.

“Monosyllables ending in any consonant but *f*, *l*, or *s*, and preceded by a single vowel, never double the final consonant, excepting *add*, *ebb*, *butt*, *egg*, *err*, *inn*, *bunn*, *purr*, and *buzz*.”

RULE III.

“Names ending in *y*, preceded by a consonant, are rendered plural by changing the *y* into *ies*: as, *spy*, *spies*; *fly*, *flies*.”

RULE IV.

“Verbs and adjectives ending in *y*, preceded by a consonant, are varied by changing *y* into *i*: as, *carry*, *carrieth*, *carries*, *carried*, *carrier*, *happy*, *happier*, *happiest*, etc. As the English language does not admit of double *i*, the imperfect participle is always an exception; as, *carrying*.”

RULE V.

“*Y*, preceded by a vowel, in such instances as the foregoing, is not changed; as, *boy*, *boys*, *I cloy*, *they cloyed*, etc.; except *lay*, *pay*, and *say*; from which are formed *laid*, *paid*, and *said*, and their compounds, *unlaid*, *unpaid*, and *unsaid*.”

RULE VI.

“Words ending in *y*, preceded by a consonant, upon assuming an additional syllable beginning with a consonant, commonly change *y* into *i*; as, *happy*, *happily*, *happiness*; but when *y* is preceded by a vowel, it is rarely changed in consequence of the additional syllable; as, *coy*, *coyly*; *boy*, *boyish*, *boyhood*; *annoy*, *annoyer*, *annoyance*; *joy*, *joyless*, *joyful*.”

## RULE VII.

“Monosyllables, and words accented on the last syllable, ending in a single consonant preceded by a single vowel, double that consonant when they take another syllable beginning with a vowel; as, *wit*, *witty*; *thin*, *thinnyish*; to *abet*, an *abettor*; to *begin*, a *beginner*, etc. But if a diphthong precedes, or the accent is on the preceding syllable, the consonant remains single; as, to *toil*, *toiling*; to *offer*, an *offering*; *maid*, *maiden*.”

## RULE VIII.

“Words ending in any double letter but *ll*, and taking *ness*, *less*, *ly*, or *ful*, after them, preserve the letter double; as, *harmlessness*, *carelessness*, *carelessly*; *stiffly*; *successful*, *distressful*, etc. But those words which end in *ll*, and take *ness*, *less*, *ly*, or *ful*, after them, generally omit one *l*; as, *fulness*, *skillless*, *skillful*.”

## RULE IX.

“*Ness*, *less*, *ly*, and *ful*, added to words ending in silent *e*, do not cut it off: as, *paleness*, *guileless*, *closely*, *peaceful*; except in a few words; as, *duly*, *truly*, *awful*.”

## RULE X.

“*Ment*, added to words ending in silent *e*, generally preserves the *e* from elision; as, *abatement*, *arrangement*, *incitement*. The words *judgment*, *abridgment*, *acknowledgment*, *lodgment*, and *argument*, are deviations from the rule. These deviations have the merit of omitting an unnecessary letter without altering the pronunciation of the original words. Like other terminations, *ment* changes *y* into *i*, when preceded by a consonant; as, *accompany*, *accompaniment*; *merry*, *merriment*.”

## RULE XI.

“*Able* and *ible*, when incorporated into words ending in silent *e*, almost always cut it off; as, *blame*, *blamable*; *cure*, *curable*; *sense*, *sensible*; but if *c* or *g* soft comes before *e* in the original words, the *e* is then preserved in words compounded with *able*; as, *change*, *changeable*; *peace*, *peaceable*.”

## RULE XII.

“When *ing* or *ish* is added to words ending in silent *e*, the

*e* is almost universally omitted; as, *place, placing; lodge, lodging; slave, slavish; prude, prudish; blue, bluish; white, whitish.*"

#### RULE XIII.

"Compound words are generally spelled in the same manner as the simple words of which they are formed; as, *glass-house, skylight, thereby, hereafter*. Many words ending in double *l* are exceptions to this rule; as, *handful, dunghil, withal, also.*"

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Here the pupil should be prepared for the following examination : —

1. What is English grammar?
2. Into how many parts is grammar divided?
3. What does the first part of grammar teach? or what is the subject of the first part of grammar?
4. What is a letter?
5. How are letters divided?
6. What is a vowel?
7. What is a consonant?
8. Name the vowels.
9. Name the consonants.
10. How is a vowel formed?
11. How is a consonant formed?
12. What is spelling?
13. What is a syllable?
14. What final consonants must be doubled in monosyllables, if preceded by a single vowel; and what are the exceptions? (Rule 1.)
15. What final consonants are not doubled in monosyllables, if preceded by a single vowel; and what are the exceptions? (Rule 2.)
16. How are names ending in *y* preceded by a consonant rendered plural? (Rule 3.)
17. How are assertives or descriptives ending in *y* preceded by a single consonant varied; and what are the exceptions? (Rule 4.)

18. What words ending in *y* can be varied without changing it into *i*? (Rule 5.)
19. What are the exceptions? (Rule 5.)
20. What words double the final consonant, if we annex a syllable beginning with a vowel; and what words do not? (Rule 7.)
21. Is a final *e* mute to be retained if we annex *ness*, *less*, *ly*, or *ful*, to the word; and what are the exceptions? (Rule 9.)
22. Is a final *e* mute to be retained if we annex *ment* to the word; and what are the exceptions? (Rule 10.)
23. Is a final *e* mute to be retained when we annex *able* or *ible*; and what are the exceptions? (Rule 11.)
24. Is it retained if we annex *ing*; and what are the exceptions? (Rule 12.)
25. How are compound words generally spelled; and what are the exceptions?

## ANSWERS TO THE FOREGOING QUESTIONS.

1. See the definition of English grammar.
2. Into four parts.
3. See the beginning of part the first.
4. See the definition.
5. Into vowels and consonants.
6. See the definition of a vowel.
7. See the definition of a consonant.
8. *A*, *e*, *i*, *o*, *u*, and *y*.
9. The other twenty letters of the alphabet are the consonants.
10. A vowel is formed by the position of the organs without any action of one of them on another.
11. A consonant is formed by the action of one of the organs on another.
12. The definition of spelling will answer this question.
13. See the definition of a syllable.
14. The answer to this question may be inferred from the first rule in spelling.

15. The answer to this question may be easily inferred from the second rule.
16. See the third rule.
17. See the fourth rule.
18. See the fifth rule.
19. See the fifth rule.
20. See the seventh rule.
21. See the ninth rule.
22. See the tenth rule.
23. See the eleventh rule.
24. See the twelfth rule. *See, flee, singe*, are exceptions.
25. See the thirteenth rule.



## SECOND PART OF GRAMMAR.

The second part of Grammar shows the classification, modification, and the English derivation of words, and defines each class.

A correct sentence is a well-formed question or answer ; as, What are you doing? I am writing a letter.

This definition must be evident, if we consider that every sentence I can address to another, requires an answer, or does not ; the one that requires a reply is a question, and that which does not, is an answer to some question that has been asked or might have been asked.

Of what is a history or any other work composed? Of answers to all the questions which an inquisitive and intelligent person can ask concerning the subject, in that order which is most agreeable, instructive, and best accords with good taste.

There are two kinds of sentences ; namely, simple and compound.

A simple sentence is that which forms but one question or answer ; as, Has James said his lesson? She has come.

A compound sentence is that which consists of two or more questions or answers ; as, James has said his lesson and finished his writing.

Words are the articulate sounds by which we convey our ideas.

A word of one syllable is a monosyllable ; one of two syllables a dissyllable ; one of three syllables a trisyllable ; and one of four or more syllables a polysyllable.

A primitive *word* is that which is derived from no English word ; as, *ear*, *have*, *go*, *fly*.

A derivative word is that which is derived from

another English word; as, *careful*, which is derived from *care*; and *kindly*, from *kind*.

There are in English *eight sorts* of words; namely, the *Name*, the *name Descriptive*, the *name Substitute*, the *Assertive* or *Interrogative*, the *sentence Descriptive*, the *requisite Link*, the *Link*, and the *Exclamation*.

#### ON THE NAME, OR SUBSTANTIVE.

A Name is a *word* used to express any *thing* of which we speak; as, *England*, *anger*, *book*.

Names are either *particular* or *common*.

A particular name is that by which we *particularize* one of a class or species of things; as, *Maria*, *Spain*, *London*; or it is that of which there is no class; as, *God*, *sun*, *equator*.

A common name is that by which we represent a class or species, and that can be indiscriminately applied to any individual of that class; as, *animal*, *fish*, *tree*.

#### ON INDIVIDUAL AND PLURAL NAMES.

Every name is either an individual or a plural name.

An individual name is the name of any one thing; as, a *boy*, a *book*, a *hen*.

A plural name signifies more things than one; as, *boys*, *books*, *hens*.

An individual name is converted into a plural one by adding *s* to it; as, *boy*, *boys*.

#### EXCEPTIONS.

To pluralize individual names ending in *x*, *ch* soft, *sh*, *o*, or *s*, we add *es*; as, *box* *boxes*; *church*,

*churches*; *lash*, *lashes*; *rebus*, *rebuses*; *hero*, *heroes*.

To *junto*, *tyro*, *grotto*, *portico*, *solo*, and *quarto*, and those ending in *io*, we only add *s*; as, *folio*, *folios*.

The final *y* of individual names preceded by a consonant, we change into *ies* in the plural; as, *fly*, *flies*; but we add *s* only when it is preceded by a vowel; as, *key*, *keys*.

The individual termination *f* or *fe*, is changed into *ves* for the plural; as, *loaf*, *loaves*; *wife*, *wives*.

We only add *s* to the termination *ff*, and to the word *brief*, *dwarf*, *fife*, *grief*, *gulf*, *handkerchief*, *hoof*, *mischief*, *proof*, *reproof*, *scurf*, *strife*, *turf*, and *wharf*.

Other individual names become plural by changing *a* into *e*; as, *man*, *men*; *woman*, *women*; *alderman*, *aldermen*, etc.

The word *ox* and *child* form *oxen* and *children*; *brother* makes *brothers* or *brethren*; *foot* makes *feet*; *goose*, *geese*; *tooth*, *teeth*; *penny*, *pence*, or *pennies* when the coin is meant; *die*, *dice* (for play), and *die*, *dies* (for coining).

#### ON SEX.

Sex is a distinction made by nature in living objects.

There are two sexes; namely, *male* and *female*.

The name of every living object which is *known* to be a male, is a male name; as, a *man*, a *ram*, a *cork*.

The name of every living object which is *known* to be a female, is a female name; as, a *woman*, a *cwe*, a *hen*.



There are other names which may be used for either male or female ; as, *relative, friend, parent, servant, neighbour.*

The names of living objects whose sex is unknown to us, we are obliged to rank with the names of no sex ; as, “ I bought an *eel* for a shilling, and *it* weighed four pounds.”

What is here said of sex is only applicable to individual names of the third person, as the substitutes for all other names have no forms to distinguish sex.

The speaker is the first in the current of the conversation, the person or persons addressed, the second, and the person or thing spoken of, the third.

As inanimate objects have no sex, sex is not an accident of the word *table, hat, anger, or vice.* Consequently, to assert what every reader already knows ; namely, that *table, hat, anger, or vice,* is not *male* or *female,* is unnecessary.

The only exceptions are those names which are figuratively used ; as, “The *sun* shot forth *his* golden rays.” “The *moon* appears, and *she* shines, but the light is not *her* own.”

#### ON THE SUBJECT AND REQUISITE.

Every name in a sentence is either a subject or a requisite.

The word by which we express the subject of an assertive or interrogative is a *subject*, and that used to express the person or thing which the subject and assertive require to form a definite assertion, is called a *requisite.* The explanatory object joined to a simple sentence by a requisite link is also called a requisite ; as, *Maria* wanted money on *Saturday.*

In the preceding sentence, *Maria* is the subject of the assertive *wanted*, and *money* is the requisite which the subject *Maria*, and assertive *wanted*,

require to form a definite assertion, and *Saturday* is the requisite of the requisite link *on*.

The appellation *subject* and *requisite* will appear appropriate, if we reflect that they rest on the same authority as all official appellations; as, *general, judge, consul*, which are all acquired through the performance of the duties attached to these situations.

#### ON THE NAME DESCRIPTIVE, OR ADJECTIVE.

A name descriptive is a word used to describe the thing *named*; as, a *sweet* cake, a *large* apple, *four* spoons.

Here, *sweet* is descriptive of the taste of the cake, *large* of the size of the apple, and *four* of the number of the spoons.

There are two kinds of descriptives; namely, *mutable* and *immutable*.

The mutable descriptive is that whose meaning is variable; as, *long, large*.

As the *length, size, goodness, and sweetness* of things evidently vary; *long, large, good, sweet*, are mutable descriptives.

Some mutable descriptives contradistinguish the *class* to which the thing *named* belongs; as, "He is an *honest* man."

In this example, *honest* contradistinguishes the class to which the man belongs, or of which he is an individual, from the class of dishonest men to which it is *opposed*.

The distinction made by every mutable class-descriptive has its opposite, or is opposed to some thing or things different; as, a *long* nail, a *large* apple, a *good* book, *sour* fruit, a *brown* coat. In these examples, *long* is opposed to *short*, *large* to *small*, *good* to *bad*, *sour* to *sweet*, and *brown* to other colours.

Each of the opposite classes consists of a variety. Is not there a variety of long and short nails, of large and small apples, of good and bad books, of sweet and sour fruit, and of different colours?

In the class of long nails, we can compare the length of the nail A to that of B, and say that A is longer than B; and with as much propriety say, that B is shorter than A. If the length of the nail A, be separately compared to the length of B and C, we can say that A is longer than either B or C, or than any one, of any other number, to which A has been separately compared; and of the same number, we can truly say, H is shorter than any one of them. Again, if A be associated with two others, and compared to each of them, we can say that A is the longest of the three, or of any other greater number which includes it, and to each of which it has been compared; and of the same number, we can as truly say, that H is the shortest. Hence, although you cannot say that any one in the long class is short, yet you can correctly say, that one is shorter and another the shortest. You cannot say that any one in the class of short nails is long, yet you can say that one is longer, and that another is the longest. How those writers who call *shorter* and *longer* the comparative, and *shortest* and *longest* the superlative, and tell you that the *comparative* increases or lessens the *positive* in signification, and that the *superlative* increases or lessens it to the highest or lowest degree, can apply their reasoning and definitions to the foregoing examples, or indeed to any other, we do not understand. How can you increase or decrease a *positive* (as they call it), where there is no *positive*, much less increase or decrease it to the highest or lowest degree? The fact is, the three significations of the descriptive are perfectly independent of each other; and the thing spoken of in each case is totally different.

There are three kinds of mutable descriptives; namely, the *class*, the *comparative*, and the *superlative*.

The *class* descriptive is used to mark the class to which the thing or things named belong; as, He is a *rich* man; these are *delicious* apples.

The comparative descriptive is used to mark the difference between the things compared; as, James

is *richer* than William; Thomas is *stronger* than any of his brothers.

The superlative descriptive is used to distinguish one or more things above all the rest; as, Peter is the *tallest* man in the company; they are my *best* friends.

The following class descriptives become comparative descriptives by annexing *r* or *er*, and superlative descriptives by annexing *st* or *est* to the end of them:

1st. All monosyllables; as, *kind, kinder, kindest*.

#### EXCEPTIONS.

*Good, better, best; bad, worse, worst; little, less, least; much or many, more, most; near, nearer, nearest, or next; late, later, latest, or last; old, older or elder, oldest or eldest; and perhaps a few others.*

2nd. Dissyllables accented on the last; as, *polite, politer, politest*.

This rule has been given without exception by almost all the writers on English grammar; yet it is far from being general. We are sure, that *contenter, forlornier, opaquer, infirmer*, and a great many others, cannot be pleasing to the ear of a well-educated Englishman.

Indeed, *more* and *most* can be employed without impropriety before any dissyllable; and in the above and many other dissyllables accented on the last, *more* and *most* are preferable.

3rd. Dissyllables ending in *y*; as, *happy, happier, happiest; pretty, prettier, prettiest*.

4th. Dissyllables ending in *ble*; as, *able, abler, ablest*.

5th. The signification of all other mutable descriptives not here enumerated is changed by prefixing *more* or *most*; as, *agreeable, more agreeable*.

To conclude the subject of mutable descriptives, we may observe, that each of the numerous other shades of difference in signification expressed by a plurality of descriptives or by any other means, belongs to some one of the three kinds already defined.

The following are examples of this kind:—

“Socrates was much wiser than Alcibiades.” “Snow is a great deal whiter than this paper.” “The Deity is infinitely greater than the greatest of his creatures.” What is expressed in each of these examples but a difference between two things compared? therefore they are comparative descriptives.

“Epaminondas was by far the most accomplished of the Thebans.” This is evidently a superlative descriptive. *Blackish*, and some other descriptives of the same termination, are evidently class descriptives.

The immutable are those by which we mark invariable distinctions; as, a *supreme* being, a *perfect* machine, a *right* understanding, a *Manchester* gentleman, *Ellen's* frock.

In the last two examples, does not the word *Ellen's* describe the frock as well as the word *Manchester* describes the gentleman? *Ellen's* is descriptive of the person to whom the frock belongs, and *Manchester* of the town to which the gentleman belongs. *Ellen's* makes no sense until you join the word *frock*, nor does the word *Manchester* until you join *gentleman*. As the duty which a word performs, determines what kind of word it is, consequently, two words discharging similar or like duties must be of the same kind, let them be ever so different in form. Why then not call both descriptives?

As the immutable descriptives are invariable in signification, so are they in form. We cannot say, more or most *undermost*; *squarer* or *squarest*; a *sea-er* fish, a *sea-est* fish.

*The* is used to distinguish the name of some thing or things *previously known*, or made known in the *sentence*; as, “*the* sun;” “*the* man who

wilfully takes the life of another, deservedly forfeits his own." It is sometimes used before a sentence descriptive; as, "*the* more we study nature, *the* more are we obliged to admire the infinite wisdom, goodness, and power of God."

*A*, or *An*, is used before the name of an unknown individual of a class or species of things.

*A* is used before any word of which the initial sound is *y*, or any consonant; as, *a yard*, *a man*, *such a one*, *a ewry*, *a useful book*.

One is pronounced	.	.	.	.	Wun.
Ewry	.	.	.	.	Yu-re.
Eulogy	.	.	.	.	Yu-lo-je.
Useful	.	.	.	.	Yuseful.

The preceding examples show, that the ear, and not the eye, or, in other words, that pronunciation and not orthography, must decide when to use *a* and *an*.

*An* is used before any word of which the initial sound is *a*, *e*, *i*, *o*, or *u* short; as, *an ounce*, *an elegant coach*, *an uncle*.

There is no impropriety in writing, nor is there any difficulty in reading, *a historical account*. The only reason that can be given for using *an* before *historical*, and similar words, is, that the accent is on the second syllable, which gives the *h* a certain indistinctness, but not so much as to prevent the use of *a* before it. The accent on the second syllable does not suppress the initial *h*, therefore, to convert *a* into *an*, is improper.

These unnecessary deviations form an uncalled for addition to our overgrown catalogue of real and unavoidable exceptions. The generality of writers and speakers who use *an* before the aspirated *h* of words accented on the second syllable, read *an historical account* as if written *an istorical account*, which is certainly a vicious pronunciation that cannot be avoided, without a forced and unnatural stop between the descriptive *an* and the name to which it relates.

“ The descriptive *a*, or *an*, and *the*, are omitted before names that imply the different virtues, vices, passions, qualities, sciences, arts, metals, herbs, etc.; as, “ Prudence is commendable; falsehood is odious; anger ought to be avoided.”

The reason is evident from what has been said of the use of *a* or *an*, and *the*.

*My*, *thy*, *his*, *her*, *our*, *your*, *their*, *each*, *every*, *either*, *this*, *that*, *these*, *those*, *same*, *some*, *other*, *any*, *all*, *such*, *many*, etc., are not name substitutes, or pronouns as most writers on the subject consider them to be. We address those who hold that these words are pronouns, in *their own* language, and ask if *my* is a pronoun, must not it have three cases? What are these cases? How are we to know them? What governs them? Give us examples to show the different duties the word *my* performs in a sentence. If it be invariable in its application, it can have no cases, and therefore cannot be a pronoun. Every pronoun in the language can be used as the subject of a finite verb, or as the object of an active verb or a preposition; but *my*, as a pronoun, cannot be used as either. How then can it be a pronoun? *My* can be used as the subject of a finite verb; as, “*My* is an adjective.” In this example *my* is the subject of the verb *is*; and it can be used as the object of an active verb; as, “*I have written the word my.*” In this last example *my* is the object of the verb active *have written*. In both these examples *my* is a name, and every word in the language can be made a name in like manner; that is, by speaking of it. But what relation has *my* a name to *my* a descriptive? *O*, *and*, *is*, *of*, and *generally*, are names in the following examples, because they are spoken of. “*O* is an interjection, *and* is a conjunction, *is* is a verb, *of* is a preposition, and *generally* is an adverb.”

What has been said of *my* in the foregoing observations is equally applicable to *thy*, *his*, *her*, *our*, *your*, *their*, or to any of the descriptives associated with *my* in the last paragraph, when they relate to a name expressed or implied.

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## ON THE NAME SUBSTITUTE, OR PRONOUN.

A name substitute is a word used instead of a name ; as, “ James was delighted when *I* gave *him* the book.”

Some substitutes are used instead of names not previously mentioned ; as *I* in the foregoing example ; others are used for names before mentioned in the sentence ; as *him*, which is substituted for the name *James*.

If the substitute has a form to indicate the accidents of the name, that form must be used. *He* or *him* is used for a male name, and *she* or *her* for a female name.

If the substitute has two forms, one coinciding with the subject and one with the requisite, the subject form can only be used as a subject, and the requisite form as a requisite.

There are two kinds of substitutes ; namely, *personal* and *name* substitutes.

The *personal* are those used instead of the names of persons. The following is a list of them :

## INDIVIDUAL SUBSTITUTES.

<i>First person.</i>	<i>Second person.</i>	<i>Third person.</i>
<i>Subjects</i> — I.	Thou.	He, she.
<i>Requisites</i> —Me.	Thee.	Him, her.

## PLURAL SUBSTITUTES.

<i>First person.</i>	<i>Second person.</i>	<i>Third person.</i>
<i>Subjects</i> — We.	Ye or you.	They.
<i>Requisites</i> —Us.	You.	Them.

## INDIVIDUAL AND PLURAL.

<i>Subjects</i> — Who.	That.
<i>Requisites</i> —Whom.	That.



*I, me, we, us, who, whom, thou, thee, you,* and *ye*, are confined to persons, except when figuratively used; as,

Proud fool, (replied the goose) 'tis true,  
Thy corn a fluttering levee drew;  
For that *I* join'd the hungry train,  
And sold *thee* flatt'ry for thy grain.  
But then, as now, conceited ape,  
*We* saw *thee* in thy proper shape.—GAY.

*He, him, she, and her*, are used for the names of persons and animals.

*They, them, and that* are used for the names of persons, things, and animals.

The personal *who* may be used for any of the other personals when explanation is necessary; as, “*I who* have served you so long and faithfully, now claim your protection.” Its person, and when it is *individual* and when plural, can only be ascertained by the antecedent, as it has not a form to coincide with each of the accidents.

The substitutes for all names, except the names of persons, are name substitutes.

*He, him, she, her, they, them, and that*, when used for the names of animals or things, are name substitutes, and personal substitutes when used for the names of persons.

*It* is used instead of the name of an animal or thing, and is invariable.

*What* is a double substitute when used instead of *the thing which*, or *the thing that*; as, “*What* I wanted, has arrived.” In the foregoing sentence, the word *what* must be considered as two distinct substitutes, or as a double substitute. *What* and its compounds, *whatever* and *whatsoever*, are the only words in the English language used in this double capacity. In the above sentence *what* is the

requisite of the assertive *wanted*, and it is also the subject of the assertive *has arrived*. The part of the signification that relates to the word *thing*, is the subject of the assertive *has arrived*; and the part of it that relates to the word *which*, is the requisite of the assertive *wanted*.

#### ON THE ASSERTIVE, OR VERB.

An assertive or interrogative, is a word which, with or without its auxiliaries, requires *only* a *subject* to form an assertion or interrogation; as, *I dined; have you dined? I may dine.*

The meaning of an assertive is varied, and the time or transit to which the assertion relates, is denoted by auxiliaries, or by the modification of the principal assertive used. When a word of this class is used to assert, we call it an assertive, and when to interrogate, we call it an interrogative; but as every interrogative may be used to assert, we shall henceforth (for brevity's sake) call it an assertive, whether it is used to assert or interrogate.

Every modification of an assertive expresses a different signification of it.

Our ancestors, not finding the possible variations of the principal assertive equal to the necessary number of significations, have given us only two forms of it to distinguish time, but to express the remaining necessary distinctions of times, transits, and significations, they have happily employed auxiliaries, that become part of the assertive itself, which enables us to express a greater number of meanings than is possible by modifications of the principal assertive, and greater, perhaps, than can be expressed by the assertives of any other language having fewer auxiliaries. To illustrate this truth, we need only cite the fact, that we can, by one of our assertives thus constructed, and the personal substitute *I, thou, he, she, we, you, they*, and the word *if* and *not*, express one thousand six hundred different significations. Which of my readers, even of those who may differ with me respecting the number of these

varied significations, will not rather have a thousand pounds himself than that either the person he speaks to, or speaks of, shall have it? Or who does not know the difference between what *another* possesses and what he possesses *himself*? Who, then, can deny the difference between the words *have*, *hast*, and *has*? *Have* is used to express what I possess myself, *hast* what the person spoken to, and *has* what the person spoken of, possesses.

There is a similar difference of meaning between we *have*, you *have*, and they *have*, although the form of the assertive remains unchanged. The same number of significations can be expressed by the forms of the assertive coinciding with any other transit or time as by those coinciding with the passing transit. Each of the following forms conveys a different

	1	2	3	4
meaning; namely, I write, I am writing, I wrote, I was writing,				
5	6	7		
I have written, I have been writing, I had written, I had been				
8	9	10	11	
writing, I shall write, I shall be writing, I will write, I will				
12	13	14		
be writing, I shall have written, I shall have been writing, I				
15	16	17	18	
may write, I may be writing, I can write, I can be writing, I				
19	20	21		
might write, I might be writing, I could write, I could be				
22	23	24	25	
writing, I would write, I would be writing, I should write, I				
26	27	28		
should be writing, I may have written, I may have been writing,				
29	30			
I must have written, I must have been writing, I might have				
31	32	33		
written, I might have been writing, I could have written, I				
34	35			
could have been writing, I would have written, I would have				
36	37	38		
been writing, I should have written, I should have been writing.				

We have here 38 different affirmative meanings of the assertive, which, when multiplied by seven, as there are seven personal substitutes used as subjects, make 266 affirmative mean-

ings; but each of these 266 can be negatively expressed, consequently we then have 532 meanings; each of these interrogatively expressed makes the number 1064, and the same 532 expressed by prefixing the link *if* to each of them, we then have 1064 and 532, which make in all 1596, to which, if we add the four meanings, *write thou, be thou writing, write you, be you writing*, we then have 1600 different meanings, as before stated. This result sufficiently proves we have no cause to regret that our principal assertives have not as many modifications as the assertives of some other languages. Their place has been supplied by auxiliaries, which more usefully and extensively diversify the significations of our assertives, and render their full exposition more simple, uniform, and complete than the assertive exposition of any other language. That there are no two of the 1600 meanings exactly alike, must be evident to any one who will critically examine and compare them; consequently, this difference of meaning will always exist, into whatever classes they may be divided.

All the forms of the assertive that are used to assert, command, ask, or deny the *same thing*, may justly be classed together, whatever the subject, time, or transit may be.

If what is here said of the classification of the different meanings of the assertive *write* is consistent, it is equally consistent of the classification of the different meanings of every other assertive in the language.

The primitive form of an assertive is that which admits the word *to* before it; as, *to write, to go, to give*; hence, *write, go, and give* are primitive forms.

Every assertive, except the defective, may be used to express three different classes of meanings; namely, the primitive, the auxiliary, and the link meaning.

The primitive meaning is that expressed by the primitive forms of the assertive; as, *I write, he wrote, they have written*.

The auxiliary meaning is that new meaning which the auxiliary *shall, will, may, can, might, could, would, should, must, or let, etc.*, gives to any assertive to which it is prefixed; as, *I may write, they might have written, they must write.*

The difference between the primitive and auxiliary signification is very evident. In the sentence, *I write*, which expresses the primitive meaning, I assert that the subject *I*, *writes*; whereas in the sentence, *I may write*, I only assert of the subject *I*, the *future possibility of writing*, which differs widely from asserting that I know how to write, as in the first sentence. A similar difference of meaning exists between any assertive expressing the primitive meaning, and the same assertive preceded by the auxiliary *shall, will, may, can, might, etc.*

The link meaning, is that which the link imparts to the assertions it connects; as, *if he go I shall stop at home.*

As a cord conveys the electric fluid from one body to another, so does the link *if* impart contingency to the assertions it unites. *He shall go* is a positive assertive sentence; *I shall stop at home* is another; but when I say, *if he shall go, I shall stop at home*, or *I shall stop at home if he shall go*, the link *if* not only converts the two sentences into one, but also destroys the assertion, *he shall go*, and consequently the sentence, which it converts into a kind of sentence descriptive, explanatory of the new meaning of the assertion, *I shall stop at home*. *I shall stop at home* is a positive assertive sentence, as before stated; but connected with the phrase, *if he shall go*, it ceases to be positive, and becomes a conditional assertive sentence; because it is then influenced by the contingent phrase, *if he shall go*, the condition upon which I assert that *I shall stop at home*; therefore, *my stopping at home* is neither more nor less certain than *his going*; that is, the link *if* makes the two assertions equally contingent. No link imparts a new meaning unless it connects two assertions,

and renders one of them descriptive or explanatory of the other; as, "Envy pursues merit, *as* the shade pursues the substance." If we separate these two sentences, by taking away the link *as*, we easily perceive that the first expresses a positive and absolute meaning, and that the second does the same, so that each of the sentences is a perfect assertive and independent sentence. Unite the two assertions by the link *as*, and you will as easily perceive that the first of them, *Envy pursues merit*, ceases to be absolute and independent, and becomes dependent and limited. The second assertion, *the shade pursues the substance*, by the effect of the link *as*, which unites it to the first sentence, ceases to be assertive and independent, and, consequently, to be a sentence. It is converted into a species of sentence descriptive that defines and limits the manner in which envy pursues merit.

There are two classes of assertives; namely, subject assertives, and requisite assertives.

A subject assertive requires only a subject to form a sentence; as, *I have dined, I sleep*.

A requisite assertive requires a subject and requisite; as, *she knows me, I saw him*.

In the sentence, *I have dined*, which only consists of the subject *I*, and the assertive *have dined*, *have dined* is a subject assertive, because its signification only requires a subject to form a definite assertion. In the sentence, *she knows me*, *she* is the subject, and *knows* the assertive; but *she knows* is not a definite assertion, because what she *does know* is not stated, and yet it is as requisite to complete the meaning of the sentence, as two extremities are to a finite straight line. A finite straight line cannot exist without two extremities, nor can the assertive *knows*, or any other requisite assertive, be used without a requisite expressed or understood, to which the speaker limits the signification of the assertive employed. In the example we have given, *me* is the requisite. The subject *I*, and the assertive *have dined*, make a perfect sentence; but the subject *she*, and the assertive *knows*, do not make a sentence. Why do they not make a sen-

tence? Because they have no definite meaning, unless we state what she does know.

The *subject* and *assertive* are essential parts of every simple sentence; because every simple sentence must have a subject and assertive either expressed or implied; but of all sentences in which we employ requisite assertives, the essential parts are the subject, the assertive, and the requisite.

To suppress any one of these three parts destroys the sentence, which shall evidently appear from the following examples taken from the sentence, *she knows me*: first suppress the subject, *she*, and you destroy the sentence, because the remainder, *knows me*, makes no sense. Secondly, suppress the assertive, *knows*, and the same consequence follows; as *she me* makes neither a sentence nor common sense. Thirdly, suppress the requisite, *me*, and the remainder, *she knows*, is as imperfect as either of the other two remainders. Any of the other words in a sentence may be suppressed and yet leave an assertion.

#### ON TIME.

Time is the universal measure of universal existence.

Universal existence signifies animate, inanimate, and immaterial existence.

As space is the universal container of all *material objects*, so is time the universal container of *all existence*; and as the exact space in which any material object is contained, declares its quantity of matter, so does the exact time in which any thing existed, declare the measure of that existence.

Space is infinite, and so is time.

As space is measured by lines, so is time by motion.

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## ON THE DIVISIONS OF TIME.

Nature and art have already divided time so as to answer all the necessities and utilities of life; namely, into centuries, reigns, years, months, days, hours, minutes, seconds, springs, summers, autumns, winters, mornings, evenings, etc.; but as each of these divisions is as well known to the peasant and mechanic, as to the grammarian and philosopher, our remaining duty is evidently no more than to class them, to define each class, and then distinctly to point out the form of the assertive coinciding with it. The following preliminary observations may help to remove some of the difficulties which too frequently attend the study of this part of grammar.

*Observation the 1st. Yesterday, last Saturday, and June 1830, are past times; and to-morrow, next Saturday, and June 1860 are future times; these are truths to which all mankind bear willing testimony.*

2nd. That there is an eternity of time past, and an eternity of time to come, we have the acquiescence of all who believe in God. How can you believe that God has no beginning, and deny that there is an eternity of time past? or how can you believe that God has no end, and deny that there is an eternity of time to come?

3d. That *to-day, this week, this month, this year, this century*, or any other division or period of time, containing the transit or passage of the future into the past, is, by that *transit*, divided into a past and future time.

4th. That the past division is constantly increasing, and the future is as constantly decreasing, and shall so continue until its transition into the past is completed, and the whole period that before consisted of a past and future, becomes one undivided past. The only exception is the future eternity, which cannot run wholly into the past.

Let us illustrate the last two observations by an example. Is not *to-day* divided into a past and future time? That is, is not there a part of *to-day* past, and a part of it to come?



Does not the past part of it constantly increase, and the future part as constantly decrease, until the whole of the future part runs into the past, which we then call *yesterday*? What is here said of to-day may as truly be said of this week, this month, this year, this century, etc., because the same *transit instant* that divides to-day into a past and future time, divides this week, this month, this year, this century, this minute, this second, and every other passing period or division of time, even eternity itself, into a past and future also: and, as time is continuous, the same instant that begins the future, must end the past, and yet be no part of either the past or future. Any of our readers, to whom the foregoing part of this observation may not appear perspicuous, has only to look at his watch or clock, and test what we say by its practical application to the passing hour. Let us suppose when he looks, that he sees the hour-hand between two and three, and the minute-hand exactly at five; that is, the passing hour, which is pointed out by the hour-hand, began exactly at two, and shall end at three. It is divided into a past and future; and the minute-hand, which is the representative of the *transit instant*, shows that the past part is twenty-five and the future thirty-five minutes; that is, the past part and the future part together make sixty minutes, or the entire thing divided: consequently, there can be no such time as that which some grammarians call the present time. Let us suppose there is such a time as the present. This present time must be contained in the passing hour, because the time before the passing hour is past time, and the time after it is future time, and past time or future time cannot be present time: hence the present time, is neither before nor after the passing hour. It must be contained in the passing hour, if there is such a time. For the same reason as above, the present time cannot be in the past part of the passing hour; that is, it cannot be in the twenty-five minutes, because they are past time, nor can it be contained in the thirty-five minutes, because they are future time, therefore the present time is not contained in their sum, which is the passing hour; and we have before proved, it is not contained in any time

before or after the passing hour; hence, it is no part of any time, which was required to be proved.

We shall conclude these observations by stating, that the principal use of a watch or clock is to show the past part of the forenoon or afternoon. The hour-hand shows the past complete hours, the minute-hand shows the past complete minutes of the passing hour, and the second-hand shows the past complete seconds of the passing minute. The second-hand partly corrects the inaccuracy of the minute-hand, and the minute-hand that of the hour-hand. But how can we know the past part of either without knowing the *transit instant*, or boundary between the past and future? We can by no other means know it, nor can we look at a good watch or clock without knowing this *transit instant*, or boundary. Each of the hands represents a boundary between a past and future time. The second-hand represents the *transit instant*, or boundary, between the past and future seconds of the passing minute. The minute-hand represents the *transit*, or boundary, between the past and future minutes of the passing hour; and the hour-hand the boundary between the past and future hours of the passing fore or afternoon. Notwithstanding the perpetual transition of future time into past, renders a mathematically accurate representation of the *transit instant* impossible, yet, if utility or the affairs of life hereafter require a more exact representation than that which is now made by our time-pieces, our watch and clock-makers will soon furnish means of showing it.

The construction of our language, shows that our ancestors designed only *three different classes of times*, and *three transits*: namely, the class of *detached past* times, the class of *attached past* times, and the class of *future* times.

One of each class we shall briefly call the detached, the attached, and the future.

The transits are: the passing, the past, and the future transit.

The reader may here ask, how does the construction of our

language show, that the forms of our assertives relate to these three times and transits and to no other? Our reply is to be found in an attentive perusal and critical examination of the definitions and transits themselves, and in the just and consistent agreement which that perusal and examination must discover between the forms of our assertives and the said *times* and *transits*. We may add that the time, or point of time, with which any assertive in the language coincides, must be some one of these we have named.

The *passing transit* is that instant that ends the *past* and begins the *future*; as *now*, the *instant pointed out by a true time-piece*.

The *detached past time* is a past time detached from the future by some other interval; as, *yesterday*, *last January*, the *ninth century*.

Yesterday is a past time, by observation the first: it is detached from the future by the past part of to-day; hence it is a detached past time.

Each of the other examples will be found to correspond to the definition as well as yesterday.

(See *Observation 1st.*)

The *attached past time* is the past part of a passing time; as the past part of *this day*, *week*, *month*, *year*, or *century*.

Is not this day, week, year, or century, a passing time? Is not the past part of each attached to the future part of the same? By the definition, they are attached past times.

(See *Observation 2nd.*)

The *past transit instant*, is the final instant of any detached past time; as, *noon*, *five o'clock*, *midnight*.

Was not noon the final instant of the morning? five o'clock the final instant of the fifth hour? and midnight the final instant of yesterday?

The *future time* is that which begins now or hereafter; as, the future part of *this day, month, year, etc.*; or *to-morrow, next Sunday, May 1860, the twenty-fifth century, etc.*

The *future transit* is the instant that ends any future time; as, *noon, midnight, six o'clock.*

Shall not *noon* be the final instant of this morning? *six o'clock* the final instant of the sixth hour? and *midnight* the final instant of this day?

#### ON THE FORMS OF THE ASSERTIVE.

The number of assertives in the English language is about four thousand three hundred. Of these, four thousand one hundred and twenty-four are regular assertives, one hundred and sixty-nine are irregular, and seven defective. Of the entire number of assertives, there are four thousand two hundred and ninety-seven that have primitive forms; and of these there are four thousand two hundred and eighty-two that have forms corresponding to the detached time of the primitive meaning, each of which differs from the primitive form of the same assertive; as, primitive form, *love*, detached form, *loved*; primitive form, *go*, detached form, *went*, etc. There are eighteen of the primitive forms that correspond to the detached past time; namely, *beat, bid, burst, cast, cost, cut, eat, hit, hurt, let, put, set, shred, shut, spread, spit, split, and thrust*. Of these eighteen, *bid, eat, and spit* have other forms that correspond to the detached past time. (See the list of irregular assertives.)

A *regular assertive* is that of which the perfect participle and the form coinciding with the detached past time are the same, and are formed by adding *d*, or *ed*, to the primitive form; as, from *to love* is formed *loved*; and from *to walk* is formed *walked*.

An *irregular assertive* is that of which the detached time and perfect participle are not formed

by adding *d*, or *ed*, to the primitive form ; as, *write*, *wrote*, *written*, *go*, *went*, *gone*.

The *defective assertives* are those by which we cannot denote as many meanings as we can by the other assertives, and that cannot be varied to coincide with as many times and transits. They are : *can*, *may*, *shall*, and *will*, with their variations, *could*, *might*, *should*, and *would* ; and *must*, and *quoth*, which have no variation. You cannot say, *to can*, *canning*, etc.

All the other defective assertives will be found equally deficient with respect to forms.

Every primitive assertive may be varied without auxiliaries to coincide with the passing transit, the detached past time, and to represent the perfect and imperfect participle ; as, *write*, *writest*, *writes*, which coincide with the passing transit ; *wrote*, *wrotest*, which coincide with the detached past time ; *written*, the perfect participle ; and *writing*, the imperfect participle.

The *participle* is that form of the assertive by which we denote the finished or unfinished signification of the assertive, without respect to any particular time, transit, or subject.

When the participle is annexed to any modification of the assertive, *to have*, or *to be*, used as an auxiliary, then the auxiliary and participle constitute a complex assertive which relates to a particular subject, and coincides in form with a particular time or transit.

### *On the Auxiliary Assertives.*

Auxiliary assertives are those used to denote the time or transit of the principal assertive, or to diversify its primitive signification. They are : *do*, *did*, *have*, *had*, *let*, *must*, *am*, *was*, *be*, *been*, *will*, *shall*, *may*, *can*, *might*, *could*, *would*, and *should*.

1st. *Do*, and its detached form, *did*, are, by an idiom of the language, used as auxiliaries, to mark and strengthen an assertion which is opposed to an actual or supposed denial; as, “*I do speak* the truth; *I did send* him.”

2ndly. To interrogate: as, *Do you write? Did you write?*

3rdly. To reply to a direct interrogation; as, “*I do*, or *I do not write*; *I did*, or *I did not write*.”

The assertives, *to be*, and *to have*, are the only exceptions which we know. We cannot say, *I do am*, *I did have*.

#### LET.

*Let*, as an auxiliary, is used to invite; as, “*Let us pray. Let us judge candidly. Let us respect the laws.*”

When the subject of the complex assertive, of which *let* is an auxiliary, is a substitute of the first or third person, we, by an idiom of the language, use the requisite form of the substitute, instead of the subject form; as, *Let us judge candidly*, etc. *Us*, in this and all similar sentences, is used instead of *we*.

How the foregoing anomaly originally crept into our language, and how long prescription has consecrated the propriety of its present application, is easy to conceive.

*Let* is used as a principal and auxiliary. In both cases, it is invariably followed by the same form of any other assertive. How, then, in the infancy of our language, when learning was confined to the few, and the learning of nineteen in every twenty of that few, did not include grammar, was the great bulk of the people to know when to use *let* as a principal assertive and when as an auxiliary? This was the only means

by which they could infallibly determine, whether to use *us* or *we* after *let*. To expect either guidance or instruction from the learned, whose dominion then depended on the ignorance of the people, was vain. They had no other alternative to escape from ridicule and uncertainty, but to unite in the general application of *us*, and the total rejection of *we*, after the word *let*.

*Let* is a principal, when you can substitute *permit*, *allow*, or *suffer*, in its stead without destroying the sense; as, “*Let me go*,” that is, permit me to go. *Let* always relates to future time.

#### HAVE.

The auxiliary *have*, prefixed to the perfect participle, marks the attached past time of the primitive or link signification; as, they *have written*; if I *have seen* him.

*Have*, when preceded by another auxiliary, does not always coincide with the attached past time; as, they *shall have written*, which is the form of the assertive coinciding with the future transit.

The auxiliary *had*, prefixed to the perfect participle, marks the past transit of the primitive or link signification; as, I *had written* at noon; If they *had finished* at four.

#### MUST.

The auxiliary *must*, denotes necessity, and can only be used before that form of the assertive which coincides with the passing transit. When it is the only auxiliary it coincides with future time; as, I *must go*; They *must write*: but, when used with another auxiliary, it may coincide with either past or future time; as, “I *must have written*

that letter this year;" which evidently denotes past time. "I *must have finished* at twelve to-night;" which coincides with the future transit.

When other auxiliaries are used with *must*, the context declares the time.

The assertive *to be*, *to know*, and perhaps a few others, may be construed so as to form exceptions; as, "She *must now* be thirty years old." "She *must know* her lesson well at present." *Must* when prefixed to the auxiliary *have*, coincides with the attached past time; as, "*I must have written*," etc.

#### MAY.

*May* implies possibility, and every complex assertive of which it forms a part, or is an auxiliary, only expresses that possibility; as, "I *may write*; I *may have written*."

The complex assertive, *may write*, in the preceding examples, of which *may* forms a part, or is the auxiliary, is simply used to express the possibility of writing in some future time. The complex assertive, *may have written*, of which *may* forms a part, or is an auxiliary, is used to express the possibility of having written in some *attached past time*.

Every complex assertive, of which *may* is the only auxiliary, coincides with future time; as, "I *may write* a letter; I *may go*: consequently the auxiliary *may*, not only changes the meaning of the assertive *write*, but also converts the form of the assertive coinciding with the passing transit into that coinciding with future time.

When *may* is prefixed to the form of the assertive coinciding with the attached past time of the



primitive signification, it changes the meaning, but the new complex assertive coincides with the attached past time, the same as it did before *may* was prefixed; as, “*I may have written* that letter this year.”

*May* can only be used before the primitive form of the principal assertive, or before the auxiliary *have*. *May* has the same exceptions as *must*, with respect to future time. (See page 38.)

#### MIGHT.

*Might* also implies possibility, and is a modification of *may*. The complex assertive, formed by prefixing the word *might* to the primitive form of the assertive, coincides with the detached past time; as, “*He might do it yesterday.*”

*Might*, prefixed to the auxiliary *have*, coincides with the past transit; as, *I might have written* at his departure.

#### CAN.

*Can* implies capability; and every complex assertive of which it forms a part, or is an auxiliary, is used to express that capability; as, *I can write* to him; *I can give* it.

*Can*, prefixed to the form of the assertive coinciding with the passing transit, is used to denote future time, as in the preceding examples. For the exceptions, see the auxiliary *may* and *must*.

*Can* is only prefixed to the primitive form of the assertive, and always denotes future time; as, *I*

*can* write. No complex assertive of which *can* is an auxiliary can coincide with past time. Yet all writers on English grammar declare the contrary, and give us what they call *the potential mood, perfect tense*, in their conjugation; namely, *I may or can have written; I may or can have given; I may or can have built.*

We insist, that, *I can have written to him; I can have given him the books; or I can have built a house in the past part of this week, month, day, or century*, is an absurdity, and consequently each example is bad English.

*Can*, may be prefixed to the auxiliary *have* and coincides with the future transit; as, *I can have finished my work at noon.*

If we are asked, why cannot we say, *He can have written*, as well as, *He may have written*? we answer, because the *capability* of writing in a past time cannot *now exist*; and the possibility of having written *can* and *does exist*. As man is *always placed in the passing transit*, that is, *in the boundary between past and future time*, he has never done any thing, nor *can* he ever do any thing in any *past or future* time. Every thing that has ever been done, has been done in the boundary between the past and future; and every thing that will ever be done, must also be done in that boundary which will hereafter *separate* the past from the future, and then be a passing transit.

#### COULD.

*Could* is used as a modification of *can*. When it is prefixed to the passing transit they form a complex assertive, that coincides with the detached past time; as, "*I could write yesterday.*" But

the complex assertive, formed by prefixing the word *could* to the auxiliary *have*, coincides with the passed transit; as, “*I could have seen him at noon; or, at his departure.*”

Why cannot we assert the capability of writing in the attached past time as well as in the detached? Because, by the complex assertive, formed by prefixing the auxiliary *could* to the primitive form of the assertive, we only declare that the capability of writing in some detached time *did exist* in that time; as “*I could write yesterday,*” which is perfectly consistent; but, to assert that I *can* write in any past time, whether attached or detached, after that time *has expired*, is the inconsistency; as, I *can have written* yesterday; I *can have built* a house this year; that is, in the past part of this year.

#### WILL.

*Will* implies volition or exemption from restraint, and is used as a principal or auxiliary assertive; as, “*He wills his entire property to his wife and children.*” “*She will go to the country next week.*”

Every complex assertive, of which *will* is the only auxiliary, coincides with future time; as, “*He will write.*”

A complex assertive, of which *will* is the only auxiliary, is used;

1st. To assert the speaker’s future *free-agency*; as, “*I will write; we will go.*”

2ndly. To assert or ascertain the future free-agency of personal subjects of the second or third person; as, “*You will write; Will you write? He will go; Will he go?*”

3rdly. To assert the speaker's conjectural predictions; as, "This horse *will suit* me; James *will succeed*."

4thly. To ascertain the conjectural predictions of others; as, "*Will* you *have* time." "*Will* the packet *arrive* before 12 o'clock."

The complex assertive, formed by prefixing *will* to the auxiliary *have*, coincides with the future transit; as, "He *will* have done at four o'clock."

#### WOULD.

*Would* is used as a modification of *will*. It implies volition, but coincides with a different time or transit.

*Will* always coincides with a future time or transit; and *would* with a past, when properly applied.

The complex assertive, formed by prefixing *would* to the primitive form of the assertive, coincides with the detached past time; as, "He *would write* yesterday."

When it is prefixed to the auxiliary *have*, the compound assertive coincides with the passed transit; as, "She *would have written* at her brother's departure, if she was not prevented."

#### SHALL.

*Shall* differs from *will*, and intimates that the subject is influenced by some cause.

Every complex assertive, of which *shall* is the only auxiliary, coincides with future time; as, "I

*shall repay* you five pounds on Sunday." "If he go, I *shall stop* at home."

A complex assertive, of which *shall* is the only auxiliary, is used,

1st. To predict the speaker's *influenced* agency ; as, "If he go, I *shall stop* at home."

2nd. To assert or ascertain the future *influenced* agency of personal subjects of the second or third person ; as, "You *shall write* ; *shall* he come?"

3. To assert the speaker's positive predictions of things ; as, "If equals be added to equals, the sums *shall be equal*." "Every tree that bringeth not forth good fruit, *shall be cut* down, and *shall be cast* into the fire." — Matt. vii. 19. etc.

4. To ascertain the positive predictions of others ; as, "What *shall* I do to be saved?" "When *shall* I come?"

The complex assertive, formed by prefixing *shall* to the auxiliary *have*, coincides with the future transit ; as, "Shall I *have* done when you come? I *shall have* finished at four o'clock."

#### SHOULD.

*Should* has the same relation to *shall*, that *would* has to *will*. Every complex assertive, of which *should* is an auxiliary, coincides with the same time or transit, as if the same complex assertives had the auxiliary *would* instead of *should*.

#### EXPOSITION OF ASSERTIVES.

The *exposition* of an *assertive* is a methodical

arrangement of its different forms which coincide with its varied *significations*, *subjects*, *times*, and *transits*.

The following forms of the assertive *to write*, indicate an imperfect *requisite*, and coincide with the prefixed *significations*, *subjects*, *times*, and *transits*. The requisite in each of the examples in the following exposition is *a letter*, and it is called an imperfect requisite, because it cannot be finished when we are only in the act of writing it, which is the thing asserted in each of the examples following: —

#### EXPOSITION OF THE ASSERTIVE, *To write*.\*

Imperfect participle, *writing*. Perfect participle *written*.

#### PRIMITIVE UNFINISHED SIGNIFICATIONS.

##### PASSING TRANSIT.

1. I am writing	} a letter.	1. We	} are writing	} a letter.
2. Thou art writing		2. You		
3. He is writing		3. They		

\* All our writers on Grammar tell us that, I write, thou writest, or he writes, is the present of the verb active *to write*. We insist that "I *write* a letter to my uncle *now*, thou *writest* a letter to my uncle *now*, or he *writes* a letter to my uncle *now*," is bad English; and that "I write, thou writest, or he writes," is not *the present of the verb active to write* (as they call it), but the passing transit of the *inactive* verb *to write*. When we say, "I write, thou writest, or he writes," we do not assert that the subject is in the act of writing, we only assert that the subject is *capable* of writing, or is in the *habit* of writing. Hence, to assert of the subject he, the *habit* or *capability* of writing, we say, *he writes*, but to assert of the same subject the act of writing, we must say, *he is writing*. The preceding observation shows why you can correctly say, *he writes English now*, and why you cannot say, *he writes a letter now*.

1. I write	}	a letter.	1. We	}	write	}	a letter.
2. Thou writest			2. You				
3. He writes			3. They				

This form of the assertive is used to express a habit, custom, or general truths, but not particular acts.

## DETACHED PAST TIME.

1. I was writing	}	a letter.	1. We	}	were writing	}	a letter.
2. Thou wast writing			2. You				
3. He was writing			3. They				

## ATTACHED PAST TIME.

1. I have been writing	}	a letter.	1. We	}	have been writing	}	a letter.
2. Thou hast been writing			2. You				
3. He has been writing			3. They				

## FUTURE TIME.

2. Be writing thou	}	a letter.	2. Be writing ye or you	}	or	}	a letter.
or			or				
Do thou be writing			Do you be writing				

## AUXILIARY SIGNIFICATIONS.

## FUTURE TIME.

1. I will be writing	}	a letter.	1. We	}	will be writing	}	a letter.
2. Thou wilt be writing			2. You				
3. He will be writing			3. They				

## DETACHED PAST TIME.

1. I would be writing	}	a letter.	1. We	}	would be writing	}	a letter.
2. Thou wouldst be writing			2. You				
3. He would be writing			3. They				

*Shall, may, can, should, might, could*, can be employed in the same manner as *will* and *would* in the last two examples.

## LINK SIGNIFICATIONS.

## PASSING TRANSIT.

1. If I am writing	}	a letter.	1. If we	}	are writing	}	a letter.
2. If thou art writing			2. If you				
3. If he is writing			3. If they				

## DETACHED TIME.

1. If I was writing	} a letter.	1. If we	} were writing	} a letter.
2. If thou wast writing		2. If you		
3. If he was writing		3. If they		

## ATTACHED PAST TIME.

1. If I have been writing	} a letter.	1. If we	} have been	} a letter.
2. If thou hast been writing		2. If you		
3. If he has been writing		3. If they		

The future of the primitive signification cannot be converted into the link significations, as it is only used to command, entreat or exhort.

The auxiliary significations can be converted into link significations as well as the primitive, by prefixing the link *if*, or any other that destroys the *assertion*, and converts the sentence into a species of sentence-descriptive, explanatory of the signification of the other assertive which the link unites ; as,

## FUTURE TIME.

<i>Person.</i>	<i>Individual.</i>		<i>Person.</i>	<i>Plural.</i>	
1. If I be writing *	} a letter.		1. If we	} be writing	} a letter.
2. If thou be writing			2. If you		
3. If he be writing			3. If they		

## DETACHED PAST TIME.

1. If I would be writing	} a letter.	1. If we	} would be	} a letter.
2. If thou wouldst be writing		2. If you		
3. If he would be writing		3. If they		

The following forms of the assertive *to write*, denote a perfect or finished *requisite*, and correspond to the prefixed *significations*, *subjects*, *times*, and *transits*. A finished requisite cannot be united in construction with the passing transit.

## PRIMITIVE FINISHED SIGNIFICATIONS.

## DETACHED PAST TIME.

1. I wrote	} a letter.	1. We	} wrote	} a letter.
2. Thou wrotest		2. You		
3. He wrote		3. They		

The auxiliary *will* is understood in this time.



## ATTACHED PAST TIME.

<i>Person.</i>	<i>Individual.</i>		<i>Person.</i>	<i>Plural.</i>	
1. I have written		} a letter.	1. We	} have written	} a letter.
2. Thou hast written			2. You		
3. He has written			3. They		

## PAST TRANSIT.

1. I had written	} a letter.	1. We	} had written	} a letter.
2. Thou hadst written		2. You		
3. He had written		3. They		

## FUTURE TIME.

2. Write, write thou	} a letter.	2. Write, write ye or you	} a letter.
or		or	
Do thou write		Do you write	

## AUXILIARY SIGNIFICATIONS

Denoting a perfect or finished requisite.

## FUTURE TIME.

1. I will write	} a letter.	1. We	} will write	} a letter.
2. Thou wilt write		2. You		
3. He will write		3. They		

## FUTURE TRANSIT.

1. I will have written	} a letter.	1. We	} will have written	} a letter.
2. Thou wilt have written		2. You		
3. He will have written		3. They		

## DETACHED PAST TIME.

1. I would write	} a letter.	1. We	} would write	} a letter.
2. Thou wouldst write		2. You		
3. He would write		3. They		

## PAST TRANSIT.

1. I would have written	} a letter.	1. We	} would have written	} a letter.
2. Thou wouldst have written		2. You		
3. He would have written		3. They		

All the foregoing primitive and auxiliary significations of the assertive *to write*, which denote a perfect or finished requisite, can be converted into link significations, without making any *change* in the forms of the assertives themselves, by simply prefixing the link *if*, or any other that destroys the assertion. See the definition of the link signification, page 28.

The subject assertive to *Go*, is modified in the following manner.

Imperfect participle, *Going*

Perfect participle, *Gone*

Compound participle, *Having gone*.

# PRIMITIVE UNFINISHED SIGNIFICATIONS.

## PASSING TRANSIT.

*Person. Individual.*

*Person. Plural.*

1. I am going
2. Thou art going
3. He is going

- |            |          |
|------------|----------|
| 1. We are  | } going. |
| 2. You are |          |
| 3. He is   |          |

The form

1. I go
2. Thou goest
3. He goes

1. We go
2. You go
3. They go

is used to express a habit.

## DETACHED PAST TIME.

1. I was going
2. Thou wast going
3. He was going

- |         |               |
|---------|---------------|
| 1. We   | } were going. |
| 2. You  |               |
| 3. They |               |

## ATTACHED PAST TIME.

1. I have been going
2. Thou hast been going
3. He has been going

- |         |                    |
|---------|--------------------|
| 1. We   | } have been going. |
| 2. You  |                    |
| 3. They |                    |

## FUTURE TIME.

2. Be going thou
- or
- Do thou be going

2. Be going you
- or
- Do you be going.

# PRIMITIVE FINISHED SIGNIFICATION.

## DETACHED PAST TIME.

1. I went
2. Thou wentest
3. He went

- |         |         |
|---------|---------|
| 1. We   | } went. |
| 2. You  |         |
| 3. They |         |

## ATTACHED PAST TIME.

1. I have gone
2. Thou hast gone
3. He has gone

- |         |              |
|---------|--------------|
| 1. We   | } have gone. |
| 2. You  |              |
| 3. They |              |

## AUXILIARY UNFINISHED SIGNIFICATION.

## FUTURE TIME.

*Person. Individual.*

1. I shall be going
2. Thou shalt be going
3. He shall be going

*Person. Plural.*

- |         |                   |
|---------|-------------------|
| 1. We   | } shall be going. |
| 2. You  |                   |
| 3. They |                   |

## DETACHED PAST TIME.

1. I should be going
2. Thou shouldst be going
3. He should be going

- |         |                    |
|---------|--------------------|
| 1. We   | } should be going. |
| 2. You  |                    |
| 3. They |                    |

## AUXILIARY FINISHED SIGNIFICATIONS

## FUTURE TIME.

1. I shall go
2. Thou shalt go
3. He shall going

- |         |             |
|---------|-------------|
| 1. We   | } shall go. |
| 2. You  |             |
| 3. They |             |

## DETACHED PAST TIME.

1. I should go
2. Thou shouldst go
3. He should go

- |         |              |
|---------|--------------|
| 1. We   | } should go. |
| 2. You  |              |
| 3. They |              |

Instead of "He *should* have gone," we more properly say, "He *ought* to have gone."

The foregoing finished and unfinished, primitive and auxiliary significations of the assertive *to go*, except, "*Do thou be going*," and "*Do you be going*," are converted into link significations, by merely prefixing the link *if*, as has been already shown in displaying the significations of the assertive *to write*, which see.

The *subject* assertive *to be*, is modified or varied in the following manner to coincide with the prefixed meanings, subjects, times, or transits.

## TO BE.

Imperfect or continuous participle, *Being*.

Perfect or finished participle, *Been*.

Compound participle, *Having been*.

## PRIMITIVE UNFINISHED SIGNIFICATION.

## PASSING TRANSIT.

*Person. Individual.*

1. I am happy
2. Thou art happy
3. He is happy

*Person. Plural.*

- |         |   |            |
|---------|---|------------|
| 1. We   | } | are happy. |
| 2. You  |   |            |
| 3. They |   |            |

## PRIMITIVE FINISHED SIGNIFICATIONS.

## DETACHED PAST TIME.

- |                    |         |   |             |
|--------------------|---------|---|-------------|
| 1. I was happy     | 1. We   | } | were happy. |
| 2. Thou wast happy | 2. You  |   |             |
| 3. He was happy    | 3. They |   |             |

## ATTACHED PAST TIME.

- |                         |         |   |                  |
|-------------------------|---------|---|------------------|
| 1. I have been happy    | 1. We   | } | have been happy. |
| 2. Thou hast been happy | 2. You  |   |                  |
| 3. He has been happy    | 3. They |   |                  |

To say, *I had been sick, I had been sorry, I had been angry*, is not good English; consequently, the assertive *to be*, has no form to coincide with the passed transit.

## FUTURE TIME.

- |                    |                    |
|--------------------|--------------------|
| 2. Be thou content | 2. Be you content  |
| or                 | or                 |
| Do thou be content | Do you be content. |

## AUXILIARY SIGNIFICATIONS.

## FUTURE TIME.

- |                     |         |   |                |
|---------------------|---------|---|----------------|
| 1. I shall be able  | 1. We   | } | shall be able. |
| 2. Thou shalt able  | 2. You  |   |                |
| 3. He shall be able | 3. They |   |                |

## DETACHED PAST TIME.

- |                           |         |   |                  |
|---------------------------|---------|---|------------------|
| 1. I should be happy      | 1. We   | } | should be happy. |
| 2. Thou shouldst be happy | 2. You  |   |                  |
| 3. He should be happy     | 3. They |   |                  |

All the foregoing significations of the assertive *to be*, can be converted into link significations, the same as the various significations of the assertive *to write*, and *to go*; yet as it has

some peculiarities which do not belong to any other assertive in the language, we think a full display of its primitive and auxiliary link significations, is indispensable.

### PRIMITIVE LINK SIGNIFICATIONS.

#### PASSING TRANSIT.

- |                      |            |              |
|----------------------|------------|--------------|
| 1. If I am happy     | 1. If we   | } are happy. |
| 2. If thou art happy | 2. If you  |              |
| 3. If he is happy    | 3. If they |              |

#### DETACHED PAST TIME.

- |                       |            |               |
|-----------------------|------------|---------------|
| 1. If I was happy     | 1. If we   | } were happy. |
| 2. If thou wast happy | 2. If you  |               |
| 3. If he was happy    | 3. If they |               |

#### ATTACHED PAST TIME.

- |                            |            |                    |
|----------------------------|------------|--------------------|
| 1. If I have been happy    | 1. If we   | } have been happy. |
| 2. If thou hast been happy | 2. If you  |                    |
| 3. If he has been happy    | 3. If they |                    |

### THE FOLLOWING ARE THE AUXILIARY LINK SIGNIFICATIONS.

#### FUTURE TIME.

- |                            |            |                   |
|----------------------------|------------|-------------------|
| 1. If I shall be happy     | 1. If we   | } shall be happy. |
| 2. If thou shalt be happy. | 2. If you  |                   |
| 3. If he shall be happy.   | 3. If they |                   |

or

- |               |               |                              |
|---------------|---------------|------------------------------|
| 1. If I be    | 1. If we be   | } that is,<br>if I shall be. |
| 2. If thou be | 2. If you be  |                              |
| 3. If he be   | 3. If they be |                              |

The assertive *to be*, and a few others, have no forms coinciding with the past or future transit, or with the detached past time of the *link auxiliary signification*.

Every one properly says, *I will be* there at one o'clock; and not, *I will have been* there at one o'clock.

### PECULIARITIES OF THE ASSERTIVE *to Be*.

1st. It is the only assertive in the language of which the primitive form, and the form coinciding with *I*, in the passing transit of the primitive signification are not the same. *Be* is

the primitive form, but we cannot say, *I be*; we must use the passing transit, and say, *I am*.

2nd. It is the only one of which any form coinciding with the subject *I*, is not the same, as the form coinciding with a plural subject of the same time, transit, and signification. Thus, we say, *I am*, but we cannot say, *we am*, we must say, *we are*.

#### THE FOLLOWING ARE THE IRREGULAR ASSERTIVES.

Passing transit.    Detached past time.    Perfect participle.

Abide	abode	abode
Am	was	been
Arise	arose	arisen
Awake	awoke R*	awaked
Bear, to bring forth	bore	born
Bear, to carry	bore	borne
Beat	beat	beaten
Begin	began	begun
Bend	bent	bent
Bereave	bereft	bereft
Beseech	besought	besought
Bid, for-	bid or bade	bidden or bid
Bind, un-	bound	bound
Bite	bit	bitten or bit
Bleed	bled	bled
Blow	blew	blown
Break	broke	broken
Breed	bred	bred
Bring	brought	brought
Build, re-	built	built
Burst	burst	burst
Buy	bought	bought
Cast	cast	cast
Catch	caught	caught R
Chide	chid	chidden or chid
Choose	chose	chosen

\* Assertives having regular forms are marked R.

Passing transit.    Detached past time.    Perfect participle.

Cleave, to adhere	R	R
Cleave, to split	clove or cleft	cloven or cleft
Cling	clung	clung
Clothe	clothed	clad, R
Come, be-	came	come
Cost	cost	cost
Crow	crew, R	crowed
Creep	crept	crept
Cut	cut	cut
Dare, to venture	durst	dared
Dare, to challenge	R	
Deal	dealt, R	dealt, R
Dig	dug, R	dug, R
Do, mis- un-	did	done
Draw, with-	drew	drawn
Drink	drank	drunk
Drive	drove	driven
Dwell	dwelt, R	dwelt, R
Eat	eat or ate	eaten
Fall, be-	fell	fallen
Feed	ed	fed
Feel	felt	felt
Fight	fought	fought
Find	found	found
Flee, from a foe	fled	fled
Fling	flung	flung
Fly	flew	flown
Forbear	forbore	foreborne
Forget	forgot	forgotten, forgot
Forsake	forsook	forsaken
Freeze	froze	frozen
Get, be- for-	got	gotten or got
Gild	gilt, R	gilt, R
Gird	girt, R	girt, R
Give, for- mis-	gave	given
Go	went	gone
Grave, en- R	graved	graven

Passing transit.	Detached Past Time.	Perfect Participle.
Grind	ground	ground
Grow	grew	grown
Hang	hung	hung
Hang, to deprive of life	hanged	hanged
Have	had	had
Hear	heard	heard
Hew	hewed	hewn, <i>a</i>
Hide	hid	hidden or hid
Hit	hit	hit
Hold, be- with-	held	held
Hurt	hurt	hurt
Keep	kept	kept
Knit	knit, <i>a</i>	knit or knitted
Know	knew	known
Lade	laded	laden
Lay, in-	laid	laid
Lead, mis-	led	led
Leave	left	left
Lend	lent	lent
Let	let	let
Lie, to lie down	lay	lain
Load	loaded	laden, <i>a</i>
Lose	lost	lost
Make	made	made
Mean	meant	meant
Meet	met	met
Mow	mowed	mown, <i>a</i>
Pay, re- pre-	paid	paid
Put	put	put
Quit	quit or quitted	quit
Read	read	read
Rend	rent	rent
Rid	rid	rid
Ride	rode	ridden or rode
Ring	rung or rang	rung
Rise	rose	risen



Passing transit.	Detached past time.	Perfect participle.
Rive	rived	riven
Run	ran	run
Saw	sawed	sawn, R
Say	said	said
See	saw	seen
Seek	sought	sought
Seethe	seethed or sod	sodden, R
Sell	sold	sold
Send	sent	sent
Set, be-	set	set
Shake	shook	shaken
Shape, mis-	shaped	shapen, R
Shave	shaved	shaven, R
Shear	sheared	shorn
Shed	shed	shed
Shine	shone, R	shone, R
Shoe	shod	shod
Shoot	shot	shot
Show	showed	shown
Shrink	shrunk or shrank	shrunk
Shred	shred	shred
Shut	shut	shut
Sing	sung or sang	sunk
Sink	sunk or sank	sunk
Sit	sat	sat
Slay	slew	slain
Sleep	slept	slept
Slide	slid	slidden
Sling	slung	slung
Slink	slunk	slunk
Slit	slit or slitted	slit, R
Smite	smote	smitten
Sow	sowed	sown, R
Speak, be-	spoke	spoken
Speed	sped	sped
Spend, mis-	spent	spent
Spin	spun	spun

Passing transit.	Detached past time.	Perfect participle.
Spit	spit or spat	spit or spitten
Split	split	split
Spread	spread	spread
Spring	sprung or sprang	sprung
Stand, with-	stood	stood
Steal	stole	stolen
Stick	stuck	stuck
Sting	stung	stung
Stink	stunk or stank	stunk
Stride	strode or strid	stridden
Strike	struck	struck or stricken
Strung	strung	strung
Strive	strove	striven
Strew	strewed	strewed
Strow	strowed	strown or strowed
Swear	swore	sworn
Sweat	sweat, R	sweat, R
Swell	swelled	swollen, R
Swim	swum or swam	swum
Swing	swung	swung
Take	took	taken
Teach	taught	taught
Tear	tore	torn
Tell	told	told
Think	thought	thought
Thrive	throve, R	thriven
Throw	threw	thrown
Thrust	thrust	thrust
Tread	trod	trodden
Wax	waxed	waxen or R
Wear	wore	worn
Weave	wove	woven
Weep	wept	wept
Win	won	won
Wind	wound	wound
Wring	wrung	wrung
Write	wrote	written

Passing transit.

Detached past time. Perfect participle.

Rive

rived

riven

Run

ran

run

Saw

sawed

sawn, R

Say

said

said

See

saw

seen

Seek

sought

sought

Seethe

seethed or sod

sodden, R

Sell

sold

sold

Send

sent

sent

Set, be-

set

set

Shake

shook

shaken

Shape, mis-

shaped

shaped.

Shave

shaved

shave

Shear

sheared

shorn

Shed

shed

shed

Shine

shone, R

shone

Shoe

shod

shod

Shoot

shot

shot

Show

showed

shown

Shrink

shrank or shrank

shrank

Shred

shred

shred

Shut

shut

shut

Sing

sung or sang

sung

Sink

sunk or sank

sunk

Sit

sat

sat

Slay

slew

slew

Sleep

slept

slept

Slide

slid

slid

Sling

slung

slung

Slink

slunk

slunk

Slit

slit

slit

Smite

smote

smote

Sow

sowed

sown

Speak, be-

spoke

spoken

Speed

sped

sped

Spend, R

spent

spent

Spin

spun

spun

to be examined or corrected, that I have in the third book dwelt upon, and endeavoured to make it so plain, that the plainness of the mischief, nor the plainness shall be any excuse for those who will not seek the meaning of their own words and will not allow the plainness of their expressions to be inquired into.

The grammatical works which stand high in reputation, not only differing in their definitions of the English moods, but contradicting each other, naturally creates our suspicion, and awakes our suspicion that all is not correct. To reconcile these differences, but instead of doing so, every effort discovers still greater inconsistency. It contributes to confirm Mr. Locke's observations. Nothing so boring and frivolous is all that has been written on the English moods, that one can hardly help thinking that the author must have had on his mind, when he wrote these words, *all that has been written on the English moods since his time, as well as all that was written before his time, on the same subject.* If the writers from whose works we have taken the following extracts, were to write a description of the Phoenix, that they would agree better and have fewer contradictions than they have, in what they wrote on the moods, more than probable. What inference must we draw? Must we believe in the non-existence of the English moods, as we do in that of the Phoenix; or must we infer these writers had an imperfect knowledge of the moods? We must believe either the one or the other, when we test what they have written, by what I consider a good definition, namely :—

A good definition of any thing is a *direct, full, and perspicuous* reply to the question, what is *that* thing?

We cannot believe that any respectable author can write badly, carelessly, or unintelligibly, on a subject which he understands; particularly when he is fully aware

REMARKS ON WHAT ENGLISH GRAMMARIANS  
CALL MODES OR MOODS.

We will introduce our remarks by citing Mr. Locke's observations on the use of scientific expressions. In his epistle to the reader, he observes :

“ The commonwealth of learning is not, at this time, without master-builders, whose mighty designs, in advancing the sciences, will leave lasting monuments to the admiration of posterity : but every one must not hope to be a Boyle or a Sydenham ; and in an age that produces such masters as the great Huygenius and the incomparable Mr. Newton, with some others of that strain, it is ambition enough to be employed as an under labourer in clearing the ground a little, and removing some of the rubbish that lies in the way of knowledge ; which certainly had been very much more advanced in the world, if the endeavours of ingenious and industrious men had not been much incumbered with the learned but frivolous use of uncouth, affected, or unintelligible terms, introduced into the sciences, and then made an art of to that degree, that philosophy, which is nothing but the true knowledge of things, was thought unfit, or incapable to be brought into well-bred company and polite conversation. Vague and insignificant forms of speech and abuse of language, have so long passed for mysteries of science, and hard and misapplied words, with little or no meaning, have by prescription, such a right to be mistaken for deep learning and height of speculation, that it will not be easy to persuade, either those who speak, or those who hear them, that they are but the *covers* of ignorance, and *hindrance* of true knowledge. To break in upon the sanctuary of vanity and ignorance, will be, I suppose, some service to human understanding ; though so few are apt to think they deceive or are deceived in the use of *words* ; or that the language of the sect they are of, has any

faults in it, which ought to be examined or corrected, that I hope I shall be pardoned, if I have in the third book dwelt long on this subject, and endeavoured to make it so plain, that neither the inveterateness of the mischief, nor the prevalence of the fashion, shall be any excuse for those who will not take care about the meaning of their own words and will not suffer the significancy of their expressions to be inquired into."

To find English grammatical works which stand high in public estimation, not only differing in their definitions of the same thing, but contradicting each other, naturally creates our astonishment, and awakes our suspicion that all is not correct. We in vain try to reconcile these differences, but instead of being able to do so, every effort discovers still greater inconsistencies, and contributes to confirm Mr. Locke's observations. Indeed, so jarring and frivolous is all that has been written on the English moods, that one can hardly help thinking Mr. Locke must have had on his mind, when he wrote these observations *all that has been written on the English moods since his time*, as well as *all that was written before it, on the same subject*. If the writers from whose works we have taken the following extracts, were to write a description of the Phoenix, that they would agree better and have fewer incongruities than they have, in what they wrote on the moods, is more than probable. What inference must we draw? Must we believe in the non-existence of the English moods, as we do in that of the Phoenix; or must we infer these writers had an imperfect knowledge of the moods? We must believe either the one or the other, when we test what they have written, by what I consider a good definition, namely:—

A good definition of any thing is a *direct, full, and perspicuous* reply to the question, what is *that* thing?

We cannot believe that any respectable author can write badly, carelessly, or unintelligibly, on a subject which he perfectly understands; particularly when he is fully aware at the

time of writing, that the correctness of his ideas, and the accuracy with which he delineates them, can alone establish an enviable reputation, insure public gratitude, and enable him to leave to posterity a *name* and *memory to be revered*.

However great may be our respect for an author or his memory, that respect is overruled by our public duty, which imperatively demands that the truth of everything written for instructing youth in the principles of their language should first be strictly investigated, and that these investigated truths should be imparted in the manner best calculated to relieve masters and teachers, and facilitate the acquisition of knowledge.

We have two motives in giving the following *long* extracts; first, to save our readers the trouble of seeking or purchasing the works from which we quote; second, to enable them by reading before and after the disputed passage to determine the author's *spirit* and *exact meaning*, without which they cannot decide with any degree of certainty whether we have wrested the signification, or acted honourably towards these authors or not.

### HARRIS'S HERMES, Chapter VIII., page 140.

“ We have observed already that the soul's leading powers are those of *perception*, and those of *volition*, which words we have taken in their most comprehensive acceptation. We have observed also, that all speech or *discourse* is a publishing or exhibiting some part of our soul, either a certain *perception*, or a certain *volition*. Hence, then, according as we exhibit it, either in a *different part* or in a *different manner*, hence, I say, the variety of modes, or moods.

“ If we simply *declare*, or *indicate* something to be, or not to be (whether a perception or volition, it is equally the same), this constitutes that mode called the declarative or indicative.

“ If we do not strictly assert, as of something absolute and certain, but of something *possible* only, and in the number of *contingents*, this makes that mode, which grammarians call

the *potential*; and which becomes on such occasions the leading mode of the sentence.

“ Yet sometimes it is not the leading mode, but only *subjoined* to the indicative. In such case, it is mostly used to denote the *end*, or final *cause*; which end, as, in human life, it is always a contingent, and may never perhaps happen in despite of all our foresight, is therefore expressed most naturally by the mode here mentioned. For example; *Thieves rise by night, that they may cut men's throats.*

“ Here that they *rise*, is positively asserted in the *declarative* or indicative mode; but as to their *cutting men's throats*, this is only delivered *potentially*, because how truly soever it may be the *end* of their rising, it is still but a *contingent*, that may never perhaps happen. This mode, as often as it is in this manner subjoined, is called by grammarians, not the potential, but the subjunctive.

“ But it so happens, in the constitution of human affairs, that it is not always sufficient merely to *declare* ourselves to others.

“ We find it often expedient, from a consciousness of our inability, to address them after a manner more interesting to ourselves, whether to have some *perception informed*, or some *volition gratified*. Hence, then, new modes of speaking; if we *interrogate*, it is the *interrogative mode*; if we *require*, it is the *requisitive*. Even the *requisitive* itself hath its subordinate species; with respect to inferiors, it is the imperative mode; with respect to equals and superiors, it is a *precativ*e or *optative*.

“ And thus have we established a variety of modes; the indicative or declarative, to assert what we think certain, the potential, for the purposes of whatever we may think contingent; the interrogative, when we are doubtful, to procure us information, and the requisitive, to assist us in the gratifications of our volitions. The requisitive too appears under two distinct species, either as it is imperative to inferiors, or precativ to superiors.

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being, doing, or suffering. As far as grammar is concerned, there are no more moods in any language, than there are forms of the verb, appropriated to the denoting of such different manners of representation. For instance; the Greeks have a peculiar form of the verb, by which they express the subject, or matter of a wish; which properly constitutes an optative mode. But the Latins have no such form; the subject of a wish in their language is subjoined to the wish itself, either expressed or implied, as subsequent to it, and depending on it, they have therefore no optative mode; but what is expressed by that mode in Greek, falls properly under the subjunctive mode in Latin. For the same reason, in English the several expressions of condition, will, possibility, liberty, obligation, etc. belong to the indicative mode: it is their conditionality, their being subsequent and depending upon something preceding, that determines them to the subjunctive mode. And in this grammatical model form, however they may differ in other respects, logically or metaphysically, they all agree. That will, possibility, liberty, obligation, etc., though expressed by the same verbs that are occasionally used as subjunctive auxiliaries, may belong to the indicative mode, will be apparent from a few examples:

“ Here we *may* reign secure.”—  
 “ Or of the eternal co-eternal beam  
 “ *May* I express thee unblam’d?”  
 ‘ Firm they *might* have stood,  
 “ Yet fell”—

MILTON.

“ What we *would* do,  
 “ We *should* do, when we *would*.

SHAKESPEARE.—*Hamlet*.

“ Is this the nature  
 “ Which passion *could* not shake? Whose solid virtue  
 “ The shot of accident, or dart of chance,  
 “ *Could* neither raze, nor pierce!”—*IBID.*—*Othello*.

“ These sentences are all either declarative, or simply inter-

Passing transit.	Detached past time.	Perfect participle.
Cleave, to adhere	■	■
Cleave, to split	clove or cleft	cloven or cleft
Cling	clung	clung
Clothe	clothed	clad, ■
Come, be-	came	come
Cost	cost	cost
Crow	crew, ■	crowed
Creep	crept	crept
Cut	cut	cut
Dare, to venture	durst	dared
Dare, to challenge ■		
Deal	dealt, ■	dealt, ■
Dig	dug, ■	dug, ■
Do, mis- un-	did	done
Draw, with-	drew	drawn
Drink	drank	drunk
Drive	drove	driven
Dwell	dwelt, ■	dwelt, ■
Eat	eat or ate	eaten
Fall, be-	fell	fallen
Feed	ed	fed
Feel	felt	felt
Fight	fought	fought
Find	found	found
Flee, from a foe	fled	fled
Fling	flung	flung
Fly	flew	flown
Forbear	forbore	foreborne
Forget	forgot	forgotten, forgot
Forsake	forsook	forsaken
Freeze	froze	frozen
Get, be- for-	got	gotten or got
Gild	gilt, ■	gilt, ■
Gird	girt, ■	girt, ■
Give, for- mis-	gave	given
Go	went	gone
Grave, en- ■	graved	graven

Passing transit.	Detached Past Time.	Perfect Participle.
Grind	ground	ground
Grow	grew	grown
Hang	hung	hung
Hang, to deprive of life	hanged	hanged
Have	had	had
Hear	heard	heard
Hew	hewed	hewn, a
Hide	hid	hidden or hid
Hit	hit	hit
Hold, be- with-	held	held
Hurt	hurt	hurt
Keep	kept	kept
Knit	knit, a	knit or knitted
Know	knew	known
Lade	laded	laden
Lay, in-	laid	laid
Lead, mis-	led	led
Leave	left	left
Lend	lent	lent
Let	let	let
Lie, to lie down	lay	lain
Load	loaded	laden, a
Lose	lost	lost
Make	made	made
Mean	meant	meant
Meet	met	met
Mow	mowed	mown, a
Pay, re- pre-	paid	paid
Put	put	put
Quit	quit or quitted	quit
Read	read	read
Rend	rent	rent
Rid	rid	rid
Ride	rode	ridden or rode
Ring	rung or rang	rung
Rise	rose	risen

Passing transit.	Detached past time.	Perfect participle.
Rive	rived	riven
Run	ran	run
Saw	sawed	sawn, R
Say	said	said
See	saw	seen
Seek	sought	sought
Seethe	seethed or sod	sodden, R
Sell	sold	sold
Send	sent	sent
Set, be-	set	set
Shake	shook	shaken
Shape, mis-	shaped	shapen, R
Shave	shaved	shaven, R
Shear	sheared	shorn
Shed	shed	shed
Shine	shone, R	shone, R
Shoe	shod	shod
Shoot	shot	shot
Show	showed	shown
Shrink	shrunk or shrank	shrunk
Shred	shred	shred
Shut	shut	shut
Sing	sung or sang	sunk
Sink	sunk or sank	sunk
Sit	sat	sat
Slay	slew	slain
Sleep	slept	slept
Slide	slid	slidden
Sling	slung	slung
Slink	slunk	slunk
Slit	slit or slitted	slit, R
Smite	smote	smitten
Sow	sowed	sown, R
Speak, be-	spoke	spoken
Speed	sped	sped
Spend, mis-	spent	spent
<i>Spin</i>	<i>spun</i>	<i>spun</i>

Passing transit.	Detached past time.	Perfect participle.
Spit	spit or spat	spit or spitten
Split	split	split
Spread	spread	spread
Spring	sprung or sprang	sprung
Stand, with-	stood	stood
Steal	stole	stolen
Stick	stuck	stuck
Sting	stung	stung
Stink	stunk or stank	stunk
Stride	strode or strid	stridden
Strike	struck	struck or stricken
Strung	strung	strung
Strive	strove	striven
Strew	strewed	strewed
Strow	strowed	strown or strowed
Swear	swore	sworn
Sweat	sweat, a	sweat, a
Swell	swelled	swollen, a
Swim	swum or swam	swum
Swing	swung	swung
Take	took	taken
Teach	taught	taught
Tear	tore	torn
Tell	told	told
Think	thought	thought
Thrive	throve, a	thriven
Throw	threw	thrown
Thrust	thrust	thrust
Tread	trod	trodden
Wax	waxed	waxed or a
Wear	wore	worn
Weave	wove	woven
Weep	wept	wept
Win	won	won
Wind	wound	wound
Wring	wrung	wrung
Write	wrote	written

## REMARKS ON WHAT ENGLISH GRAMMARIANS CALL MODES OR MOODS.

We will introduce our remarks by citing Mr. Locke's observations on the use of scientific expressions. In his epistle to the reader, he observes :

“ The commonwealth of learning is not, at this time, without master-builders, whose mighty designs, in advancing the sciences, will leave lasting monuments to the admiration of posterity : but every one must not hope to be a Boyle or a Sydenham ; and in an age that produces such masters as the great Huygenius and the incomparable Mr. Newton, with some others of that strain, it is ambition enough to be employed as an under labourer in clearing the ground a little, and removing some of the rubbish that lies in the way of knowledge ; which certainly had been very much more advanced in the world, if the endeavours of ingenious and industrious men had not been much incumbered with the learned but frivolous use of uncouth, affected, or unintelligible terms, introduced into the sciences, and then made an art of to that degree, that philosophy, which is nothing but the true knowledge of things, was thought unfit, or incapable to be brought into well-bred company and polite conversation. Vague and insignificant forms of speech and abuse of language, have so long passed for mysteries of science, and hard and misapplied words, with little or no meaning, have by prescription, such a right to be mistaken for deep learning and height of speculation, that it will not be easy to persuade, either those who speak, or those who hear them, that they are but the *covers* of ignorance, and *hindrance* of true knowledge. To break in upon the sanctuary of vanity and ignorance, will be, I suppose, some service to human understanding ; though so few *are apt* to think they deceive or are deceived in the use of *words* ; or that the language of the sect they are of, has any

faults in it, which ought to be examined or corrected, that I hope I shall be pardoned, if I have in the third book dwelt long on this subject, and endeavoured to make it so plain, that neither the inveterateness of the mischief, nor the prevalence of the fashion, shall be any excuse for those who will not take care about the meaning of their own words and will not suffer the significancy of their expressions to be inquired into."

To find English grammatical works which stand high in public estimation, not only differing in their definitions of the same thing, but contradicting each other, naturally creates our astonishment, and awakes our suspicion that all is not correct. We in vain try to reconcile these differences, but instead of being able to do so, every effort discovers still greater inconsistencies, and contributes to confirm Mr. Locke's observations. Indeed, so jarring and frivolous is all that has been written on the English moods, that one can hardly help thinking Mr. Locke must have had on his mind, when he wrote these observations *all that has been written on the English moods since his time*, as well as *all that was written before it, on the same subject*. If the writers from whose works we have taken the following extracts, were to write a description of the Phoenix, that they would agree better and have fewer incongruities than they have, in what they wrote on the moods, is more than probable. What inference must we draw? Must we believe in the non-existence of the English moods, as we do in that of the Phoenix; or must we infer these writers had an imperfect knowledge of the moods? We must believe either the one or the other, when we test what they have written, by what I consider a good definition, namely :—

A good definition of any thing is a *direct, full, and perspicuous* reply to the question, what is *that* thing?

We cannot believe that any respectable author can write badly, carelessly, or unintelligibly, on a subject which he perfectly understands; particularly when he is fully aware at the



time of writing, that the correctness of his ideas, and the accuracy with which he delineates them, can alone establish an enviable reputation, insure public gratitude, and enable him to leave to posterity a *name* and *memory to be revered*.

However great may be our respect for an author or his memory, that respect is overruled by our public duty, which imperatively demands that the truth of everything written for instructing youth in the principles of their language should first be strictly investigated, and that these investigated truths should be imparted in the manner best calculated to relieve masters and teachers, and facilitate the acquisition of knowledge.

We have two motives in giving the following *long* extracts; first, to save our readers the trouble of seeking or purchasing the works from which we quote; second, to enable them by reading before and after the disputed passage to determine the author's *spirit* and *exact meaning*, without which they cannot decide with any degree of certainty whether we have wrested the signification, or acted honourably towards these authors or not.

### HARRIS'S HERMES, Chapter VIII., page 140.

“ We have observed already that the soul's leading powers are those of *perception*, and those of *volition*, which words we have taken in their most comprehensive acceptation. We have observed also, that all speech or *discourse* is a publishing or exhibiting some part of our soul, either a certain *perception*, or a certain *volition*. Hence, then, according as we exhibit it, either in a *different part* or in a *different manner*, hence, I say, the variety of modes, or moods.

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“ What we *would* do,  
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“ Is this the nature  
 “ Which passion *could* not shake? Whose solid virtue  
 “ The shot of accident, or dart of chance,  
 “ *Could* neither raze, nor pierce!”—*IBID.*—*Othello*.

“ These sentences are all either declarative, or simply inter-

rogative; and however expressive of will, liberty, possibility, or obligation, yet the verbs are all of the indicative mode. It seems therefore, that whatever other metaphysical modes there may be in the theory of universal grammar, there are in English no other grammatical modes than those above described.

“ That the participle is a mere mode of the verb is manifest, if our definition of a verb be admitted; for it signifies being, doing, or suffering, with the designation of time superadded. But if the essence of the verb be made to consist in affirmation, not only the participle will be excluded from its place in the verb, but the infinitive itself also, which certain ancient grammarians of great authority held alone to be the genuine verb, denying that title to all the other modes.”  
—See HERMES, p. 164.

We find the following definitions and observations in Mr. Lindley Murray's Grammar :

“ Mood is a particular form or state of the verb, showing the manner in which the being, action, or passion is represented.

“ The nature of a mood may be more intelligibly explained to the scholar, by observing, that it consists in the change or inflection which the verb undergoes, to signify various intentions of the mind, and various modifications and circumstances of action: which explanation, if compared with the following account, and uses of the different moods, will be found to agree with and illustrate them.

“ There are five moods of verbs, the indicative, the imperative, the potential, the subjunctive, and the infinitive.

“ The indicative mood simply indicates or declares a thing: as, ‘he loves, he is loved;’ or it asks a question: as, ‘does he love? is he loved?’

“ The imperative mood is used for commanding, exhorting, entreating, or permitting; as, ‘depart thou; mind ye; let us stay; go in peace.’

“ *The potential mood implies possibility or liberty, power,*

will, or obligation: as, 'It may rain; he may go or stay; I can ride; he would walk; they should learn.'

"The subjunctive mood represents a thing as contingent or uncertain, as under a condition, motive, wish, supposition, etc., and is preceded by a conjunction expressed or understood, and attended by another verb: as, 'I will respect him, though he chide me; were he good, he would be happy;' that is, 'if he were good.'"—See also Fifth Edition of the Octavo Grammar, p. 113.

"The infinitive mood expresses a thing in a general and unlimited manner, without any distinction of number or person; as, 'to act; to speak; to be feared.'

"The participle is a certain form of the verb, and derives its name from its participating not only of the properties of a verb, but also those of an adjective: as, 'I am desirous of knowing him. Admired and applauded he became vain. Having finished his work, he submitted it.'

"There are three participles, the present or active, the perfect or passive, and the compound perfect: as, 'loving, loved, having loved.'

In page 102, we find this note:

"As the participle in this mode of conjugation performs the office of a verb, through all the moods and tenses; and as it implies the idea of time, and governs the objective case of nouns and pronouns, in the same manner as verbs do; is it not manifest, that it is a species or form of the verb, and that it cannot be properly considered as a distinct part of speech?"

Page 103.—"Some grammarians apply, what is called the conjunctive termination, to the persons of the principal verb, and to its auxiliaries, through all the tenses of the subjunctive mood. But this is certainly contrary to the practice of good writers. Johnson applies this termination to the present and perfect tenses only. Lowth restricts it entirely to the present tense; and Priestley confines it to the present and imperfect tenses. This difference of opinion amongst grammarians of such eminence, may have contributed to that diversity of practice, so observable in the use of the subjunctive mood. Uniformity in this point is highly desirable. It would materially

assist both teachers and learners; and would constitute a considerable improvement in our language. On this subject, we adopt the opinion of Dr. Lowth; and conceive we are fully warranted by his authority, and that of the most correct and elegant writers, in limiting the conjunctive termination of the principal verb, to the second and third persons singular of the *present tense*.

“Grammarians have not only differed in opinion, respecting the extent and variations of the subjunctive mood; but a few of them have even doubted the existence of such a mode in the English language. These writers assert, that the verb has no variation from the indicative; and that a conjunction added to the verb, gives it no title to become a distinct mood; or, at most, no better than it would have, if any other particle were joined to it. To these observations it may be replied:—

“1st. It is evident, on inspection, that, in the subjunctive mood, the present tense of the principal verbs, the present and imperfect tenses of the verb *to be*, and the second and third persons in both numbers of the second future tense of verbs in general; often require a variation from the forms which those tenses have in the indicative mood. So much difference in the form of the verb, would warrant a correspondent distinction of mood, though the remaining parts of the subjunctive were, in all respects, similar to those of the indicative.”

In Page 109 he candidly tells us, “The English tongue is, in many respects, materially different from the learned languages. It is, therefore, very possible to be mistaken ourselves, and to mislead and perplex others, by an undistinguishing attachment to the principles and arrangements of the Greek and Latin grammarians. Much of the confusion and perplexity which we meet with in the writing of some English grammarians, on the subject of verbs, moods, and conjugations, has arisen from the misapplication of names. We are apt to think, that the old names must always be attached to the identical forms and things to which they were anciently attached. But if we rectify this mistake, and properly adjust the names to the peculiar forms and nature of the things in our

own language, we shall be clear and consistent in our ideas; and consequently, better able to represent them intelligibly to those whom we wish to inform."

Page 197, he tells us, "Almost all the irregularities in the construction of any language, have arisen from the ellipsis of some words, which were originally inserted in the sentence, and made it regular; and it is probable, that this has generally been the case with respect to the conjunctive form of words, now in use; which will appear from the following examples: 'We shall overtake him though he *run*;' that is, 'though he *should run*;' 'unless he *act* prudently, he will not complete his purpose,' that is, 'unless he *shall* act prudently.' 'If he succeed and obtain his end, he will not be the happier for it:' that is, 'if he should succeed, and should obtain his end.' These remarks and examples may be useful to the student, by enabling him, on many occasions, to trace the words in question to their proper origin and ancient connexions. We shall, however, add a few observations on this subject.

"That part of the verb which grammarians in general call the present tense of the subjunctive mood, has a future signification. In cases of this nature, the terminations of the second and third persons singular, are varied from those of the indicative; as will be evident from the following examples: 'If thou *prosper*, it will be a source of gratitude;' 'unless he *study* more closely, he never will be learned.' Some writers, however, would express these sentiments, without those variations; if thou prosperest, etc.' 'unless he studies, etc.'; and as there is great diversity of practice in this point, it is proper to offer the learners a few remarks, to assist them in distinguishing the right application of these different forms of expression. It may be considered as a rule, that the changes of termination are necessary, when those two circumstances concur.

"1st. When the subject is of a dubious and contingent nature; and 2nd. When the verb has a reference to future time. In the following sentences, both these circumstances will be found to unite: 'If thou *injure* another, thou wilt hurt thyself;' 'he has a hard heart; and if he *continue* impenitent, he



must suffer;’ ‘he will maintain his principles, though he lose his estate: whether he *succeed* or not, his intention is laudable;’ if he be not prosperous he will not repine;’ ‘if a man *smite* his servant and he *die*,’ etc., Exodus xxi. 20. In all these examples, the things signified by the verbs are uncertain, and refer to future time; but in the instances which follow, future time is not referred to; and therefore a difference takes place; ‘if thou livest virtuously, thou art happy;’ ‘unless he *means* what he says, he is doubly faithless;’ ‘if he *allows* the excellence of virtue, he does not regard her precepts;’ page 202. It is proper here to observe, that the potential mood, as well as the indicative, is converted into the subjunctive, by the expression of contingency being applied to it: as, ‘if thou canst do anything;’ ‘have compassion,’ etc.

“That tense which is denominated the present of the subjunctive, may be considered as having two forms of the *principal* verb: first, that which simply denotes contingency: as, ‘if he desires it, I will perform the operation;’ that is, ‘if he now desires it:’ Secondly, that which denotes both contingency and futurity: as, ‘if he desire it, I will perform the operation; that is, if he should hereafter desire it.’

“The imperfect tense of the verb *to be*, in the subjunctive, has likewise, according to the practice of good writers, two variations, namely, ‘if he were present, he was highly culpable; if he was present, he was highly culpable.’

“The varied forms of the verb *to be*, which refer to present time, and also the variations in the imperfect, are often used indiscriminately. When it is proper to do so, and when improper, general usage and correct taste must determine.”

Mr. Harris, in his “Hermes,” gave us a chapter of 33 pages, octavo, on mode or mood, but the most intelligent and acute English reader cannot, from anything therein stated, glean *what is mode or mood*.

What is the origin of this paradox? Have not Englishmen sufficient intellect to comprehend a well written English sentence, paragraph, or chapter?

Certainly they have. The origin of this paradox is not any *natural* or general defect in the comprehension of Englishmen,

because there is no nation of the earth more advanced in useful and profitable knowledge. It is the natural consequence of writing on a subject, of which the writer had confused or imperfect ideas. We may be considered presumptuous in asserting that Mr. Harris, who had so general a knowledge of other languages, had an imperfect knowledge, or confused ideas of his own. A great critic on language has judiciously observed, that a person may study all the languages of Europe in a few years, but to study one *perfectly*, is more than the business of a man's life?

That Mr. Harris, according to the fashion of the respectable in his time, instead of occupying himself in studying English, employed himself in studying Greek and Latin, and that he devoted much of his time to the study of the modern or living languages, is very probable. In what time, then, did he study that which is more than the business of a man's life?

He says (see our first extract, p. 69),

"Hence, then, according as we exhibit it, either in a *different part*, or after a *different manner*, hence I say the variety of modes or moods."

Peruse the preceding sentence with an earnest desire to uphold its correctness, and then tell us what is the antecedent of the word *it*. Is not *it* substituted for the soul or a part of the soul, and must not the *different part*, be also a different part of the soul? Let us replace 'the soul,' or 'a part of the soul,' instead of the word *it*, and supply the *different*, which must evidently be a different part of the soul, and then see what sense the sentence will make, which must run in either of the two following forms. "Hence, then, according as we exhibit the soul either in a *different part of the soul*, or after a *different manner*; hence I say, the variety of modes or moods." Or thus: "Hence, then, according as we exhibit a part of the soul, in a different part of the soul, or after a different manner, hence, I say, the variety of modes or moods."

The sentence admits only of these two constructions which we have given it, and certainly neither of them is calculated to corroborate the opinion which Doctor Lowth expressed of "Hermes," in the preface to his Grammar, namely: "Those

who would enter more deeply into this subject, will find it fully and accurately handled, with the greatest acuteness of investigation, perspicuity of explication, and elegance of method, in a treatise, entitled ‘Hermes,’ by James Harris, Esq., the most beautiful and perfect example of analysis that has been exhibited, since the days of Aristotle.”

The foregoing is an incontrovertible proof of the manner in which *truth* and public duty are sometimes sacrificed to kindness, interest, or ambition. The Doctor, knowing how much importance Mr. Harris’s approbation must add to his “Short Introduction to English Grammar,” appears to have bestowed this unlimited praise to obtain it. The calculation proved to be correct, as may be seen in the 6th extract from “Hermes;” in which *he* in return says of Lowth’s Introduction: “But for those, and all other speculations, relative to the genius of the English language, we refer the reader who wishes for the most authentic information to that excellent treatise of the learned Doctor Lowth, entitled A Short Introduction to English Grammar.” Both, evidently, thought more of returning mutual obligations, than of investigating each other’s work. Horne Tooke was much more faithful in the discharge of his duty as a public writer, than either Mr. Harris or Doctor Lowth; and his opinion of Harris’s “Hermes,” is strongly opposed to the Reverend Bishop’s, as may be seen in many parts of the “Diversions of Purley.”

#### EXAMPLE 1.

Diversions of Purley, Part 7. — “The recommendation, no doubt, is full, and the authority great; but I cannot say that I have found the performance to correspond; nor can I boast of any acquisition from its perusal, except indeed of hard words, and frivolous and unintelligible distinctions.”

#### EXAMPLE 2.

In page 275, Horne Tooke says,

“Mr. Harris’s logical ignorance most happily deprived him of a sense of his misfortunes. And so little, good man, did *he dream of the danger* of his situation, that whilst all others

were acknowledging their successful, though indefatigable labours, and lamenting their insuperable difficulties, he prefaces his doctrine of connectives with this singularly confident introduction: — ‘What remains of our work is a matter of less difficulty; it being the same here as in some historical pictures; when the principal figures are once formed, it is easy labour to design the rest.’”

The sentence to which we have already alluded namely, “*Hence, then, according as we exhibit it, either in a different part, or after a different manner,*” wants both perspicuity and common sense. Mr. Harris could declare nothing more incomprehensible to man’s understanding, than the exhibition of the *whole* in its *part*, or the exhibition of one *part* of any thing in a *different part* of the same. If any person was to announce, that he could exhibit a perfect human being in his shin, or that he could exhibit the knee in the eye, or the eye in the knee, he should justly be considered as a fit subject for a mad-house. What is it but exhibiting the whole in a part, or one part in another?

Hence we say, that the nature and origin of modes or moods, cannot be ascertained from what Mr. Harris wrote on the subject.

Doctor Lowth gives us the three following different definitions of mode in the same page. (*See first and second extract, p. 71.*)

1st. “The mode is the manner of representing the being, action or passion.”

2nd. “A mode is a particular form of the verb, denoting the manner, in which a thing is, does, or suffers.”

3rd. “A mode is a particular form of the verb, expressing an intention of the mind concerning such being, doing, or suffering.”

We have here *three different* definitions of the same thing, of which two at least must be wrong; because, if any one of them is right, the other two which are different must be wrong. Let us examine them, and try to discover which of them is right. In the first of them, he says, that “A mode is the manner of representing the being, action or passion.” What

is the manner of representing the being, action, or passion? The only manner of representing the being, action, or passion, having any connexion with *grammar*, is by the application of words. Hence *mode is the application of words*. Can anything be more vague or unmeaning than this? No wonder, indeed, he attempted to define it better; with what success we shall see.

2. "A mode is a particular form of the verb, denoting the manner in which a thing is, does, or suffers."

Let us test this definition.

I can correctly say, *I am of that family*, but I cannot say, *I am that family*; because the family must consist of two or more persons; therefore, I cannot say, I am that family, neither can you say with any propriety, that *a mood is a particular form of the verb*, which we shall prove by the Doctor's own words. In the 37th and 38th page of his Grammar,

				1		2	
he	gave	us	the	ten	following	forms	of
I	am,	thou	art,				
3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
he	is,	we	are,	thou	beest,	I	was,
				thou	wast,	we	were,
				10			
				thou	shalt	be.	

Now, if each of these ten different forms is of the *indicative mood*, can you say that the indicative mood is any one of them? You can say it, but then you say as perfect nonsense as, *I am the family*, or, *the family is I*. *Am* is of the indicative mood, but it is not the mood, nor is the mood *am*, because the indicative mood consists of ten *different* forms, according to Lowth, and any one of them cannot be the ten; the same as, *I am of the family*, but *I am not the family*: therefore, mode is not a particular form of the verb, but a plurality of *different forms*, which appears from the Doctor's own classification of the forms of the verb, according to the different moods to which he makes them belong. His definition of mood, and his conjugation are dangerously opposed to each other. If his definition of mood be admitted, we must admit eighty moods; or else there must be some *forms* of the verb, that are of no mood, which we believe no grammarian

has yet ventured to assert. That there are eighty moods according to the definition, may be thus proved.

Every verb in the language, except the defective, has at least eighty forms, which may be seen in page 31; that is, there are thirty-eight forms corresponding to the subject *I*, and thirty-eight different forms corresponding to the subject *thou*, which make seventy-six; add to this the four forms, he writes, he is writing, he has written, he has been writing; and we have eighty different forms of the verb. We ask which of these eighty different forms of the verb does he mean in the definition, when he says, that a mode is a *particular form* of the verb. Which of the eighty is the *particular form*? He tells us, after the last definition (*see* 2nd extract p. 63), that "as far as grammar is concerned, there are no more modes in any language than there are forms of the verb appropriated to the denoting of such different manner of representation." We have shown that the English language has eighty forms to denote these different manners of representation, and consequently, according to the learned Bishop's definition and observation, we must have *eighty modes*! Therefore, this definition which leads to so gross an absurdity cannot be correct. We shall examine his third definition, which is this:

3rd. "A mode is a particular form of the verb, expressing an intention of the mind, concerning such being, doing, or suffering."

To the inconsistency of the second definition the Doctor adds, in the third definition, the ridiculous absurdity of *an intention of the mind concerning such being, doing, or suffering*.

How Doctor Lowth who made so many useful remarks on the writings of others, could himself write anything so unmeaning and ridiculous as this definition, is difficult to conceive.

Let us test it by a few examples:

"The grass *grows*, the wind *blows*, the trees *bud*, the dogs *bark*, Mary *is sick*, who *spilt* the milk?" etc.

In the sentence, "the grass grows," *grows* is the verb, and by the definition, it expresses an intention of the mind. We

ask of whose mind does the word *grows* express an intention? Certainly not of the mind of the *grass*, which has no mind, and the speaker's mind has nothing to do with the growth of the grass. The definition applied to the verb *blows* and *bud*, makes similar nonsense. To speak of the intention of the *dog's mind*, is not more rational, than to speak of the *intention* of the *grass* to grow, or of the intention of the trees to *bud*! In the sentence, "Mary is sick," *is* is the verb, and by the definition, it expresses an intention of Mary's mind! Mary must indeed be insane to have any *intention to be sick*. In the sentence, "who spilled the milk?" *spilled* is the verb. As we do not know who spilled the milk, how can we say there was any intention of the mind to spill it? Might it not be spilled by accident, and without an intention of the mind?

As the signification of Mr. Lindley Murray's definition of mood is the same as Doctor Lowth's second definition, from which it is evidently copied, our objections to both are the same. Mr. Murray's definition *is*, "Mood or Mode, *is* a particular form of the verb, showing the manner in which the being, action, or passion is represented."

We shall henceforth take occasional notice of Doctor Crombie's Etymology and Syntax, and Mr. John Grant's Grammar, which are more modern works than those we have already cited. These authors by wandering from English to ancient and modern languages, have shown their own superior learning, which is the *dearest object* of some men's ambition; but they ought not to have forgotten, that pupils merely studying English, for whom English grammars are exclusively written, can derive no benefit from their Greek, Latin, Hebrew, Saxon, Celtic, French, and Italian quotations.

We ask any thinking English teacher, who has the least experience in conducting the education of youth, what is the use to tell a pupil who has no knowledge of those languages, that *be* in the English language means *bi* in the Celtic; that *than* is derived from the Saxon *thonne*; that *trem si vellem*, expresses present liberty and inclination?

We find almost every page of both works, so speckled with inferences from other languages that a person can hardly

believe that they were written as guides to conduct students to a critical knowledge of English composition.

If the accuracy of an English grammatical definition, or the truth of an English grammatical rule, does not appear from the genius and structure of the English language, are we to admit its accuracy, or its truth, because Doctor Crombie, or Mr. John Grant, tells us that the definition is perfectly accurate when applied to the Celtic; and the rule is philosophically true when applied to the Hebrew or Saxon? By no means; we have no faith in the grammatical infallibility of either, nor in the infallibility of any other person who has written on the subject: consequently we cannot rationally be required to receive as truth, that which is not within the limits of our understanding.

Doctor Crombie himself declares, in his preface, that "no language whatever can be critically learned, but by careful study of its general structure and peculiar principles." If this is true, why did the learned Doctor unnecessarily write so much of his English grammar on other languages? Where is the Doctor's consistency?

We find the following in Mr. Grant's preface: "Has the English language a passive voice, a subjunctive and potential mood, a future tense, and similar other tenses, without definite number? The very terms, indeed, would never have been introduced into English grammar, but from a servile and unwarrantable imitation of the grammars of languages widely differing from the English in their genius and structure." He adds, in a note at the bottom of the 8th page of his preface, that Mr. Lindley Murray forgets that the premises must be proved, to render the conclusion legitimate.

To the truth and justness of the foregoing observation we gladly subscribe. We ask both Doctor Crombie and Mr. Grant, why have they themselves continued that *imitation*, which they so justly condemned in others? We ask them, how do cases, mood, and voice appear from the genius and structure of the English language? What necessity are we under to admit this imaginary trinity into our English grammars? What inconvenience can or must arise from their rejection, or



what advantage from their admission? We ask why has not he, in the beginning of the 3rd section, defined what is the English grammatical meaning of the word *case*? The learned Doctor substituted the subsequent nonsense for the definition. — See page 34 of his Grammar.

## OF CASES.

“The third accident of a noun, is case, (*casus* or fall) so called, because ancient grammarians (it is said) represented the cases as declining or falling from the nominative, which was represented by a perpendicular, and thence called *casus rectus*, or upright case, while the others were named *casus obliqui*, or oblique cases. The cases, in the language of Greece and Rome were formed by varying the termination; and were intended to express a few of the most obvious and common relations. In English there are only three cases, the nominative, genitive, and objective, or accusative case. In substantives, the nominative case and the objective have, like neuter nouns in Greek and Latin, the same form, being distinguishable from each other by nothing but their place, thus:—

Nom.                      Obj.

“‘Achilles slew Hector,

“‘Hector slew Achilles;’

where the meaning is reversed, by the interchange of the nouns, the nominative, or agent, being known by its being placed before the verb; and the subject of the action by its following it. Pronouns have three cases, that is, two inflexions from the nominative, as *I, mine, me; thou, thine, thee.*”

We find the following in a note in page 71, which we transcribe, as it relates to the present subject:—


“It may be asked, what is the difference between a *man’s* head and a *human* head? If ‘*man’s*’ be deemed a noun, why should not *human* be deemed a noun also? It may be answered that *man’s* does, in fact, perform the office of an adjective, expressing not only the individual, but conjunction also; and that Mr. Wallis assigns to the English genitive,

the name of adjective. Besides, does not Mr. Tooke himself maintain 'that case, gender, and number, are no parts of the noun?' and does it not hence follow, that the real nouns are not *man's* and *human* but *man*? for such certainly is their form, when divested of those circumstances which, according to Mr. Tooke, make no part of them. If the doctrine, therefore, of the learned author be correct, and if the real noun exclude gender, case, and number, as any part of it, neither *man's* nor *human* can, with consistency, be called nouns." He adds, in page 73, "it is true, if we are to confine the term noun to the simple name of the subject, we shall exclude the genitive singular from all right to this appellation; for it denotes, not the subject simply, but the subject *in conjunction*—the inflexion being equivalent to 'belonging to.' This indeed is an inconsistency which can in no way be removed, unless by adopting the opinion of Wallis, who assigns no cases to English nouns, and considers *man's*, *king's*, etc., to be adjectives. And were we to adopt Mr. Tooke's definition of our adjective, and say, 'It is the *name of a thing* which is directed to be joined to another *name of a thing*,' it will follow, that *king's*, *man's*, are adjectives. In short, if the question be confined to the English language, we must, in order to remove all inconsistency, either deny the appellation of *noun* to the adjective, and with Wallis, call the genitive case an adjective; or we must first call *man's*, *king's*, etc. adjectives; secondly, we must term *happy*, *extravagant*, *mercenary*, etc., nouns, though they are not names; and thirdly we must assign the appellation of noun to the verb itself.

"From this view of the subject, the reader will perceive that the whole of the controversy depends on the meaning which we annex to the term *noun*. If by this term we denote simply the thing itself, without any accessory circumstance, then nothing can be called a noun, but the name in its simple form. If to the term noun, we assign a more extensive signification, as implying not only the thing itself, simply and absolutely, but also any accessory idea, as conjunction, action, passion, and so forth, then it follows, that all words may be termed *names*."

Why not confine the *question* to the *English language*? Why not *remove* all *inconsistency*? Why not deny the name of *noun* to *adjectives*? and why not with Doctor Wallis, who was so great a favourite of Doctor Crombie's, call *man's* and *king's* adjectives? Why call anything a *noun* or *name* but what is a *noun* or *name*? He tells us, in the last page, that "this indeed is an inconsistency which can in *no way* be removed, unless by adopting the opinion of Wallis, who assigned no cases to English nouns, and considered *man's*, *king's*, etc. to be adjectives;" yet in page 35 of his (Crombie's) Grammar we find, "In English, there are only three cases, nominative, genitive, and objective, or accusative case." What consistency!!! On what a dangerous foundation did the Doctor erect the structure of his cases! In imitation of whom did the Doctor write a section on case and not commence it by defining what is the English grammatical meaning of the word case? In imitation of whom did he tell us, *instead of defining* the subject of the section, that "The third accident of a noun is case (*casus*, or fall), so called, because ancient grammarians (it is said) represented the cases as declining or falling from the nominative, which was represented by a perpendicular, and thence called *casus rectus*, or upright case, while the others were named *casus obliqui*, or oblique cases."

The foregoing stale jargon has been written in imitation of Mr. Harris's chapter on the moods, and has been nearly copied from the 277th and 278th page of the same work, which for the reader's satisfaction we shall here transcribe. "The *Pertinetics* held it to be no *case*, and likened the noun, in this its *primary* and *original* form, to a perpendicular line, such for example as the line, A B.



"The variations from the nominative, they considered as if A B were to fall from its perpendicular, as for example, to A C or A D. Hence, then, they only called these variations *casus*, cases, or fallings. The Stoics, on the contrary, and the grammarians with them, made the *nominative* a case also. Words they considered (as it were) *to fall from the mind*, or *discursive faculty*. Now, when a noun fell thence in its *primary form*, they then called it *casus rectus*, an erect or upright case, or falling, such as A B, and by this name they distinguished the *nominative*, *when it fell from the mind under any of its variations*; as, for example in the form of a *genitive*, a *dative*, or the like, such variations they called *casus obliqui*, oblique cases, or sidelong fallings (such as A C or A D) in opposition to the other (that is A B) which was erect and perpendicular.\* Hence, too, grammarians called the method of enumerating the various cases of a noun *declinatio*, a declension, it being a sort of *progressive descent from the noun's upright form through its various declining forms*, that is, a descent from A B to A C, A D, etc."

Here we are informed that case and fall are synonymous terms, that the ancients represented the *upright fall* by a perpendicular, and represented the other falls, as *falling* from the *upright fall*. Has anything ever fallen away so very far from common sense as this? Who has ever heard of an *upright fall*? What master-mind can comprehend it? Yet the ancients and Dr. Crombie made this incomprehensible *upright fall*, the *source* and parent of the other falls, which they call *oblique falls*. If the ancients had only two falls, the *upright* and the *oblique fall*, why have not we the same number of falls? How did the Doctor convert them into three falls, namely, the *nominative*, the *genitive*, and the *objective fall*?

Why did not the Doctor add the illustration of the *upright fall* to his valuable illustrations?

We have copied the following account of the Cases from Mr. Grant's Grammar, p. 16 :

\* See Ammon. in *Libro de Interpr.*, p. 35.

## “ OF CASE.

“ Case serves to express certain relations of one thing to another.

“ A case is a variation in the termination of a noun or pronoun. The variation of cases is termed *inflection*, or *declension*.

“ In English there are three cases; the nominative, the genitive, or possessive, and the accusative, or objective.

“ The nominative and accusative of nouns are always alike, being distinguishable from each other only by their place in a sentence.

“ The nominative is the noun in its simple form, and is the name of the agent, or the subject of a verb; as, *man* speaks, *John* is loved.”

1st. If case is only the *variation* in the *termination* of a *noun*, or *pronoun*, when there is no change in the *termination* of the noun, or pronoun, there can be no *case*, because case is not (by the definition) a change of words, but a change of termination only.

Hence in the sentence, “ John found a diamond;” John and diamond are in no case, because there is no variation in the termination of either. This is not a solitary exception, but one that extends to *all the nouns* in the language; consequently no noun can be in the nominative or accusative case, according to Mr. Grant’s definition.

2ndly. How can we vary the *termination* of the pronoun *I*, which consists of one letter? We cannot change the termination without changing the entire word, and by the definition, a change of words does not constitute a case; consequently we cannot say according to the definition, that *I*, or *me*, is in any case; because *I* is the pronoun in its simple form, and has no variation in its termination; and *me* is not formed by changing the termination of *I*, but is a distinct word. He must be clever indeed, who can show that *me* is formed by chan-

ging the termination of *I*, that *us* is formed by changing the termination of *we*, and that *her* is formed by changing the termination of *she*. If every noun in the English language had three forms, its simple form, and two others, formed by two variations of the termination of the simple form, still, according to Mr. Grant's definition, there can only be two cases as the simple form has no variation in its termination, it cannot be in any case by the definition. We are sure that if Mr. Grant and Dr. Crombie closely studied the English language, and critically examined its structure and genius, instead of amusing themselves, and their readers, with what *is only reported of the Peripatetics, the Stoics, and the ancient grammarians,\** they would not have given case as an accident of an English noun, or pronoun, or have written the foregoing contradictory inconsistencies. What the Peripatetics, Stoics, and ancient grammarians said concerning cases, is as applicable to the nouns and pronouns of the English language, as the laws of China to Her Majesty's dominions.

The ancients, and Dr. Crombie, no doubt, attracted public attention to their perpendicular absurdities, but Mr. Grant has surpassed them when he says, "in which the *perpendicular coincides with the horizontal line*, or with lines formed by

\* Mr. Grant also, like Doctor Crombie, borrowed the same *perpendicular nonsense* concerning the cases, from "Harris's Hermes." See note, Grant's Grammar, page 61.—"It may not be improper to add a few words respecting the origin of the term *case*. The *Peripatetics* did not consider the nominative as a case; but likened the noun in this state to a perpendicular line. The variations of the word from the nominative they compared to other lines drawn from the same point, in which the *perpendicular coincides* with the horizontal line, or to lines formed by considering the perpendicular to fall with different degrees of obliquity; and these they termed the noun's *cases* or *fallings*. But the Stoics and ancient grammarians considered the nominative also as a case. When the noun *fell* from the mind in its simple primary state, they termed it the upright case. When it fell under any of its variations, such as genitive, dative, etc.; they termed it an oblique case."

considering the perpendicular to fall with *different degrees of obliquity*." Mr. Grant, by the above, has put science to the blush, and snatched the laurels from Mr. Harris, the ancients, and the Doctor. We do not presume to impeach the profoundness of Mr. Grant's geometrical knowledge, but we are certainly at a loss to conceive how a perpendicular can *fall*, to *coincide with a horizontal line*! Or how a perpendicular can fall with different degrees of obliquity!

Mr. Grant has presented the scientific world with an *extraordinary* and hitherto *unknown perpendicular*, which *coincides with a horizontal line*, or with a line formed by considering the *perpendicular to fall with different degrees of obliquity*! If Mr. Grant was asked by any of his young mathematical friends, When is a straight pole perpendicular to a horizontal plane? He no doubt would reply, when the pole stands on, or in the plane, so as to make equal angles, or right angles, with the plane, in every direction. If his young friend next asked him, What is a horizontal line? Mr. Grant, we presume, would tell him, that any straight line drawn on a horizontal plane, or parallel to that plane, is a horizontal straight line. His young friend takes the *pole*, and lays it on the plane, and asks Mr. Grant, Is not the pole now perpendicular to the plane? Mr. Grant replies, that it is not; that there are no lying, or reclining perpendiculars; that every perpendicular to a plane must be standing, and make equal angles with the plane in all directions. The youth observes, Sir, according to the ideas you have just given me, I do not understand, how a perpendicular can *coincide with a horizontal line*; how a perpendicular can *fall with different degrees of obliquity*, or *any obliquity whatever*; or how a *perpendicular can coincide with any line forming oblique angles*! To the truth of the youth's inferences Mr. Grant could not object. We hope he will reconsider the propriety of allowing *case* to be an accident of an English noun or pronoun. In his preface he asks, "Has the English language a passive voice, a subjunctive and potential mood, a future tense, and similar other tenses, without definite number?" He replies, in the next sentence, that "The very terms, indeed, *would* never have

been introduced into English grammar, but *from* a servile and unwarrantable imitation of the grammars of languages widely differing from the English in their genius and structure." We tell him, that case could never have been introduced into English grammar, but by a "servile and unwarrantable imitation of the grammars of other languages, widely differing from the English in their genius and structure."

We now return to the subject of the moods, after the foregoing retrospective digression, into which we have been driven by the manner in which Messrs. Crombie and Grant blended mood and case together.

Ere we proceed to examine the *concord* of English grammarians, respecting the number and names of the moods, we must first give a few extracts from the last named authors.

We find the following in Mr. Crombie's Grammar, page 94.

"The English verb has but one voice, namely, the active. Dr. Lowth, and most other grammarians, have assigned it two voices, active and passive. Lowth has, in this instance, not only violated the simplicity of our language, but has also advanced an opinion inconsistent with his own principles. For, if he has justly excluded from the number of cases in nouns, and moods in verbs, those which are not formed by inflexion, but by the addition of prepositions and auxiliary verbs, there is equal reason for rejecting a passive voice, if it be not formed by variety of termination. Were I to ask him why he denies *from a king* to be an ablative case, or, *I may love*, to be the potential mood, he would answer, and very truly, that those only can justly be regarded as cases or moods which, by a different form of the verb, express a different relation, or a different mode of existence. If this answer be satisfactory, there can be no good reason for assigning to our language a passive voice, when that voice is formed not by inflection, but by an auxiliary verb.

"*Doceor* is truly a passive voice; but *I am taught*, cannot, without impropriety, be considered as such. Besides, as it is justly observed by Dr. Ash, our author, when he parses the clause, 'I am well pleased,' tells us, that *am* is the indicative mood, present tense, of the verb *to be*; and *pleased*, the pas-



live participle of the verb *to please*. Now in parsing, every word should be considered as a distinct part of speech : whether, therefore, we admit *pleased* to be a passive participle or not (for this point I shall afterwards examine), it is obvious on the principles now laid down, and acknowledged by Dr. Lowth, *am pleased*, is not a present passive, nor has the author himself parsed it in this manner. Into such inconsistencies do our grammarians run, from a propensity to force the grammar of our language into a conformity with the structure of Greek and Latin.

“The same reason will also account for my assigning to English verbs no more than two tenses and one mood. For, if we consider the matter, not metaphysically, but grammatically, and regard those only as moods which are diversified by inflexion (and, as Lowth himself observes, as far as grammar is concerned, there can be no others), we find that our language has only one mood and two tenses.

Page 96 — “This doctrine, in respect to the cases, is generally admitted. For, though the Greeks and Romans expressed their different relations by variety of inflexion, which they termed cases, it does not follow that we are to acknowledge the same number of cases as they had, when these relations are expressed in English, not by inflexions, but by prepositions, or words significant of these relations. The Latins would not have acknowledged *absque fructu*, without fruit, as forming a seventh case, though they acknowledged *fructu*, by fruit, as making an ablative, or sixth case. And why? because the latter only was formed by inflexion. For this reason, I consider giving the name of dative case to the combination of words *to a king*, or of ablative case, to the expression *from a king*, to be a palpable impropriety. Our language knows no such cases; nor would an Englishman, unacquainted with Greek or Latin, ever dream of these cases, though perfectly master of his own language.

Page 97.—“In truth, we may as reasonably contend that our language has all the tenses that are to be found in the Greek and Latin, because, by the aid of auxiliaries and definitives, we contrive to express what they denote by one word,

as to contend that we have a potential, an optative, or imperative mood, or a passive voice: because by auxiliaries, or variety of arrangement, we can express the circumstances of power, liberty, duty, passion, etc. No grammarian has, as yet, gone so far as to affirm that we have in English a *paulo post* future, because our language by definitives, or auxiliaries, is capable of expressing that time. Or, what should we think of that person's discernment, who should contend that the Latins had an optative mood, because *utinam legeres* signifies 'I wish you would read.' It is equally absurd to say, that we have an imperfect, preterpluperfect, or future tense; or, that we have all the Greek varieties of mood, and two voices, because, by the aid of auxiliary words and definitive terms, we can contrive to express these accidents, times, or states of being. I consider, therefore, that we have no more cases, moods, tenses, or voices in our language, as far as its grammar, not its capacity of expression, is concerned, than we have a variety of terminations, to denote these different accessory ideas. "

If, as Doctor Crombie informs us, in the first extract, Doctor Lowth violated the simplicity of our language, by assigning two voices to it, namely, active and passive, that is a sufficient reason for not receiving his grammatical opinions, without first strictly examining their truth, and next their applicability to the English language. We cannot disguise our opinion, that Doctor Crombie and Lindley Murray made similar use of Lowth's grammar, that is, when either found himself embarrassed by a diversity of opinions on any grammatical point, instead of investigating the origin of that diversity, and industriously endeavouring to write something less objectionable, or incontrovertible on that subject; lo! he yields to a most unaccountable and affectionate veneration for Lowth, which suddenly takes possession of his soul, and makes the mere name of Lowth a sufficient authority! By this means, they escaped the danger, and avoided the disagreeable necessity, of writing on a subject of which they themselves had neither clear nor consistent ideas. Of the truth and justice of this impeachment, we can cite innumerable proofs, but

our limits will not permit us to notice more than the two following.

See our 2nd extract from Lindley Murray's grammar, in which you shall find a great diversity of opinion concerning what Mr. L. Murray calls the extent of the subjunctive termination. He, without the shadow of either reason or argument, conceives he is fully warranted in adopting the opinion of Lowth, and concludes his sentence, by excluding Johnson, Priestley, and *all* who differ with Lowth from the class of correct and elegant writers! How glorious to be always supported on right and left by the most correct and elegant writers! Poor Lowth, whose authority is a sufficient warrant, in page 103, to exclude all who dissented from his grammatical views, from the class of correct and elegant writers, is himself excluded, in page 18, of the same work, from the best grammarians, because he differs with Lindley Murray, in not making initial *w*, a vowel. Doctor Crombie seemed to vie with L. Murray in inconsistency, and was wonderfully successful in his endeavours. See our first extract from Doctor Crombie's Grammar, in which he says, that "the English verb has only one voice, namely, the active. Doctor Lowth, and most other grammarians, have assigned it two voices, active and passive. Lowth has in this instance, not only violated the simplicity of our language, but has also advanced an opinion, inconsistent with his own principles. For if he has justly excluded from the number of cases in nouns, and moods in verbs, those which are not formed by inflexion, but by the addition of prepositions and auxiliary verbs, there is equal reason for rejecting a passive voice, if it be not formed by variety of termination. Were I to ask him why he denies *from a king* to be an ablative, or *I may love*, to be the potential mood, he would answer, and very truly, that those only can be justly regarded as cases, or moods, which by a different form of the noun or verb, express a different relation, or a different mode of existence."

Truth, uniformity, and a retentive memory, are the best friends of consistency. Does Doctor Crombie's Grammar show, that he was assisted by a retentive memory? does it declare

that he adhered to *truth*, and observed *uniformity*? We apprehend the following observations will sufficiently prove the contrary. If, as Doctor Crombie informs us, Doctor Lowth violated the simplicity of our language, by assigning two voices to it, what proof have we, that he did not also violate it, by excluding cases, and moods formed by the addition of auxiliary verbs? Any thing said by Lowth that seemed to prop up Crombie's views, was *justly* and *truly said*, and every difference in opinion violated the simplicity of our language. What reason did Lowth or Crombie give us, that cases and moods *can only be formed by inflexion*? Lowth gave us three cases and four moods, and of the cases, one only is formed by inflexion, and of the four moods, *not one of them is formed by inflexion*! What inconsistency! For Crombie's consistency with respect to the cases, *see* our observations on the cases, in page 77, 78, and 79; and compare the following, with the foregoing doctrine. In page 35, he says, "that in substantives, the nominative case and the objective, have, like neuter nouns in Greek and Latin, the same *form*, being distinguishable from each other by *nothing* but their place; thus,

Nom.            Obj.

'Achilles slew Hector.'

'Hector slew Achilles.'

Where the meaning is reversed, by the interchange of the nouns, the nominative, or agent, being known by its being placed before the verb, and the subject of the action, by its following it." Here is a proof of the great inconsistency of Doctor Crombie's views, and that he was not assisted by a retentive memory.

He at one time declares, that the *cases of nouns* and *moods of verbs*, can only be formed by inflexion; and at another, as if with a *design* to be *inconsistent*, he tells us, that the nominative or objective case of *nouns* is not formed by inflexion, that nouns have no *inflexions* to distinguish these two cases, and that they have the same form for both cases; that the one can only be known from the other by its place in the sentence. In page 210, note 2, we find that substantives have no objective case! These are his words:—"As substantives have

*no objective case*, the subject, or object of the energy, or affection, is distinguished by its place, which is after the verb." Is not the nominative case of substantives known by its place, as well as the objective? Why allow the nominative case, and deny the objective?

According to Crombie's Grammar, there is but one voice, the active, consequently, each of the verbs in the following examples, must be in the active voice; I *respect* you, I *am* old, I *sleep*, I *am respected*, etc. As *respect* is an active verb, you may say, without either shocking the understanding, or complimenting Mr. Crombie's grammatical knowledge, that it is of the active voice; but why say, it is a verb of the *active voice*, after you declare it to be an *active verb*. If he calls *am* and *sleep*, neuter verbs, and *am respected*, a verb passive, and in the same breath, declares them to be verbs of the *active voice*; we cannot restrain our astonishment. If I *write*, is the indicative mood, what inflexion of the word *writes* declares the *indicative*. If you cannot show it, you cannot say that *writes* is the indicative mood, because he positively asserts in page 132, "that no language, grammatically examined, has more *cases, tenses, or moods*, than are formed by inflexion." According to this declaration, we have in the English language, no mood, and but one tense, because no verb in the language has any inflexion to denote mood; nor has it more than one inflexion to denote time. *Walk* is the verb in its simple form, without inflexion, consequently, according to his doctrine, it cannot be called a tense, or be said to denote one; but *walked* is an inflexion of *walk*, and, according to Crombie, represents the only tense of an English regular verb. If Doctor Crombie's doctrine is true, we have many verbs that cannot be used to denote or mark any tense; as *put, go, burst, see*, etc.; because *put* has no inflexion to mark past time. *Go* is the verb in its simple form, and *went* is no inflexion of *go*, but a different word, there is not one letter common to the word *go* and *went*. How can *went* be called an inflexion of *go*? According to Crombie's Grammar, it cannot be in any mood or tense, because it has no inflexion to express either.

Why did he not define the grammatical meaning of the word

*voice*, and then let the reader decide whose opinion is correct? Why did he obscure the subject of the voices, by introducing *case* and *mood* into it? Perhaps his love of *simplicity* led him to this confusion. Did he show that case depended on mood, or mood on case? What necessity was there to mix them together? We shall only say of Grant's Grammar, with respect to the voices, moods, and tenses, that it gives the same account of them, as Crombie's, consequently, we have the same objections to both.

We shall conclude our remarks on the moods, by a brief sketch of the discord of grammarians, respecting the names and number of the moods.

In Harris's *Hermes*, page 144, we find four moods, namely:—

1. "The indicative, to assert what we think certain.
2. "The potential for the purposes of whatever we think contingent.
3. "The interrogative, when we are doubtful, to procure us information.
4. "And, the requisitive, to assist us in the gratification of our volitions."

In Lowth's *Grammar*, page 33, we find four moods, namely:—

1. "The Indicative, when we simply declare or question.
2. "The Imperative, when we bid.
3. "The Subjunctive, to express conditions or suppositions.
4. "The Infinitive, to express a thing, without limitation of number or person.

In Lindley Murray's *Grammar*, page 72, we find five moods.

1. "The Indicative, to indicate or declare a thing.
2. "The Imperative, to command, exhort, entreat, or permit.
3. "The Potential, to imply possibility, liberty, power, will, or obligation.
4. "The Subjunctive, to express a contingency, motive, wish, supposition, etc.

5. "And the Infinitive, to express a thing without distinction of number or person.

In Crombie's *Etymology and Syntax*, page 96, we find only one mood, the indicative; yet in his conjugation, we find two

moods, the indicative, and infinitive. In Grant's Grammar, page 60, we find that he only admits one mood, the indicative; but to our surprise, in page 72, we find he admits three moods, namely, the indicative, the imperative, and the infinitive. The note in page 60 informs us, that the infinitive mood is evidently a verbal noun! If it is a noun, why call it a verb? How can a noun be in the infinitive mood? This is the first time that we have heard of *nouns in the infinitive mood*! If the infinitive mood is evidently a verbal noun, Mr. Grant *evidently misled* his readers!

Let us imagine Harris, Lowth, Lindley Murray, Crombie, and Grant, met for the purpose of reconciling their jarring opinions, respecting the names and number of the moods. Let us suppose the sentence *If you go, may I accompany you?* under consideration. Each writer, according to the name and number of his moods, calls the verbs thus:

Harris calls *go* a verb of the potential mood, and *may accompany* a verb of the interrogative.

Lowth calls *go* a verb of the *subjunctive* mood, and *may accompany* a verb of the indicative.

Lindley Murray calls *go* a verb of the *subjunctive* mood, and *may accompany* a verb of the *potential*.

Crombie calls *go* and *may* verbs of the indicative mood, and *accompany* a verb of the infinitive; notwithstanding he informs us, in page 94, "In English there is only one mood, namely, the indicative;" and in page 101 he says, "For the same reasons I concur decidedly with the grammarians who are so far from considering the infinitive as a distinct mood, that they entirely exclude it from the appellation of a verb." Yet, in page 99, he very strangely calls *to be* a verb of the infinitive mood! How are we to know his opinion, when he contradicts himself in this manner?

Grant calls *go* and *may* verbs of the indicative mood, and *accompany* a verb of the infinitive: see first extract from Grant's Grammar, in which he says, "There is, *strictly speaking*, but one mood—the indicative;" consequently, according to this view, *go*, *may*, and *accompany*, must be of the *indicative mood*; but a note in page 116 shows that he has chan-

ged his first opinion, and must make *go* and *may* verbs of the indicative mood, and *accompany* a verbal noun. The following is the note :

“To term, in the usual way, *I have walked, I may walk, I may be walking, I shall walk*, etc. tenses, is not, in reality, *parsing*, but *phrasing*. Such words as *have, may, shall*, ought to be considered as verbs, and leading or principal verbs, too, rather than auxiliaries, in present time; *be* and *walk*, as infinitives depending on the verbs; *walked*, as a perfect participle, or a participial, supplying the place of a noun in the objective case, and denoting a finished action; and *walking*, an imperfect participle, referring to the nominative *I*. In *I do murder, I do write, I did murder, I did write*, I can consider *murder* and *write* as nothing else but verbal nouns, merely the specific names of action, governed by *do* and *did*, and capable themselves of governing an accusative.”

According to this note, in the sentence, “If you *go, may I accompany* you?” *accompany* must be a verbal noun.

Stronger proofs of irreconcilable discord and contradictory absurdities cannot be produced than are to be found in the opinions of these writers, concerning the verbs of one simple sentence!

Harris divides the verbs of all assertive sentences into three classes, namely, the indicative, the potential, and the requisitive; but, strangely enough, he indiscriminately calls any one of these three classes, when used interrogatively, a verb of the interrogative mood. Doctor Crombie and Mr. Grant ask Mr. Harris, why does not he call all verbs used to assert or affirm, verbs of the assertive, or indicative, mood, as well as he calls all verbs used to interrogate, verbs of the interrogative?

Harris replies, “Gentlemen, I shall answer your question after you inform me, why have you not called all verbs used in asking questions interrogative verbs, as well as you call all verbs used in asserting anything, verbs of the *indicative* mood? You, Doctor Crombie, tell us, in page 83 of your Grammar, ‘that the verb *essentially* expresses *affirmation*.’ I ask you to point out to me any *affirmation* in the sentence, ‘If you



*go, may I accompany you?*' The clause, '*If you go,*' is not an affirmation, but a supposition; and '*may I accompany you?*' is an interrogation, and not an affirmation; hence, *go, may, or accompany,* cannot be called a verb, according to the 83rd page of the learned Doctor's grammar, which declares that the verb essentially expresses affirmation, without which there could be no communication of sentiment."

Crombie and Grant have (by the foregoing question) given a death-blow to Harris's doctrine of the moods, and Harris, in his turn, has most effectually overthrown their pretensions, either to philosophical accuracy or to grammatical consistency.

Crombie and Grant feeling themselves humbled by the fatal interrogations of Harris, decide on attacking Lowth and Lindley Murray, in hopes of better success.

Accordingly they ask them, first, "What authority or reason have *you* for uniting *may* and *accompany*, and calling them one verb, after you both defined a verb to be a *word* that signifies *to be, to do, or to suffer?*" secondly, "Why does not your definition of a verb, show that two, three, or four words can be sometimes taken as one verb?" Lastly, turning to Mr. Lindley Murray, they ask, "Is not *may I accompany you* the indicative mood, according to your definition of it, as well as *I accompany you?* Do you not declare the possibility of accompanying in the one as well as you declare the fact of accompanying in the other? That is, you declare a *thing* in each of the two sentences; consequently each of the verbs is a verb of the indicative mood, which proves your definition of both moods to be wrong, inasmuch as your indicative mood comprehends all verbs of what you call the potential mood, and makes the potential a useless incumbrance."

Lindley Murray replies, "Gentlemen, I shall follow your own fashionable example; that is, instead of answering your questions, I shall propose you some others. If there is but one mood, as you say, what necessity is there of designating it by the word *indicative?* Is not every adjective used to prevent the possibility of mistaking one name or thing for another: but how can there be any possibility of mistaking one *mood* for another when there is but one?"

Notwithstanding the intended limits of this work, and the already exhausted patience of our readers, do not permit us to pursue the critical investigation of *all* the absurdities which arise in consequence of admitting the existence of *cases* and *moods* in the English language, yet we have sanguine hopes that what we have already written on the subject, *if rigidly examined*, forms a sure train to these absurdities, that must for ever *explode* them from the English language.

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### REMARKS ON WHAT GRAMMARIANS CALL TENSES, OR TIMES.

We presume that no person of common sense will deny, that the sovereign, and the pocket that contains it, are different things, that is, the pocket is not the sovereign, nor is the sovereign the pocket; therefore, nobody calls a sovereign a pocket, nor a pocket a sovereign. Neither is time action, nor action time, nor does any writer confound one with the other, except those grammarians whose confused ideas and contradictory opinions render them incapable of writing common sense.

May we not call a *melon* a *horse* with as much propriety as call time by any name that does not imply it? Some of those writers may perhaps object, that there is an inseparable connexion between action and time, that does not exist between the sovereign and pocket, or between the melon and horse, and that the cases are therefore dissimilar. We reply, that connexion of any kind, whether separable or inseparable, cannot convert *time* into *action*, nor *action* into *time*. The connexion between action and the actor is as inseparable as

that between time and action, and so is that between matter and space equally inseparable, yet no one will venture to assert, that the action is the actor, or that matter is space; consequently such objections are futile.

We find the following definitions in Lindley Murray's Grammar, page 80.

"Section 8, of the TENSES.

"Tense being the distinction of time, might seem to admit only of the present, past, and future, but to mark it more accurately, it is made to consist of six variations, viz., the present, the imperfect, the perfect, the pluperfect, and the first and second future tenses.

"The present tense represents an action or event, as passing at the time in which it is mentioned; as, 'I rule, I am ruled, I think, I fear,' etc.

"The imperfect tense represents the action or event either as past and finished, or as remaining unfinished at a certain time past; as, 'I loved her for her modesty and virtue; they were travelling post when he met them.'

"The perfect tense not only refers to what is past, but also conveys an allusion to the present time; as, 'I have finished my letter; I have seen the person that was recommended to me.'

"The pluperfect tense represents a thing, not only as past, but also as prior to some other point of time specified in the sentence; as, 'I had finished my letter before he arrived.'

"The first future tense represents the action as yet to come, either with or without respect to the precise time when; as, 'the sun will rise to-morrow; I shall see them again.'

"The second future intimates that the action will be fully accomplished at or before the time of another future action or event; as, 'the two houses will have finished their business when the king comes to prorogue them; I shall have dined at one o'clock.'

That the definition of tense given by Mr. Lindley Murray is not *direct*, *full*, or *perspicuous*, and that it cannot, strictly speaking, be called a definition, may be thus proved.

"Tense being the distinction of time, might seem to admit

only of the present, past, and future; but to mark it more accurately, it is made to consist of six variations, viz., the present, the imperfect, the perfect, the pluperfect, and the first and second future tenses."

The only part of the above *attempt* to define *tense*, that has any resemblance to a definition, is *tense being the distinction of time*, or tense is a distinction of time, consequently, to-day, to-morrow, yesterday, *are tenses*, because each of them is a distinction of time. The name of each day in the week, and month in the year, is a tense, because each of them is a distinction of time; so is every year since the Creation a tense, also, because each of them distinguishes time.

The answer to the question, "What o'clock is it?" at any hour, minute, or second since the creation up to the passing instant, is a distinction of time, and consequently a tense; but as we have had some millions of hours, minutes, and seconds since then, hence we have had some millions of tenses. Are not *lately*, *formerly*, *hereafter*, etc. distinctions of time; consequently they are tenses by the definition. Let the reader judge the correctness of this definition.

"Tense might seem to admit, etc., and it is made to consist of six variations, etc.," are answers to the questions, what might tense seem to admit of? and what is it made to consist of? and not to the question, *what is tense?* hence they cannot be the definition of tense.

If the definition of every other English grammatical term is as vague, confused, and obscure, as that here given of tense, the English language is the most difficult as well as the most imperfect living language. The contrary is universally admitted. All foreigners who have studied the English and other languages, acknowledge, that the construction of our language is pre-eminently simple and consistent; and, that it is at least as perfect as any other, is unquestionable, from the fact, that the poetical and prose works of our English authors, namely, Shakespeare, Milton, Pope, Dryden, Addison, Hume, Sir Walter Scott, Lord Byron, Thomas Moore, etc., have as powerfully attracted the admiration of the literary world, as those of any other country.

"The present *tense* represents an action or an event, as passing at the time in which it is mentioned; as, 'I rule, I am ruled, I think, I fear.'" With as much common sense might he have told us, that black represents white, or that the distinction of *apples represents an elephant*, as to tell us, that the distinction of *time* represents an *action*.

"The *imperfect tense* represents the action or event, either as past and finished, or as remaining unfinished, at a certain time past; as, 'I loved her for her modesty and virtue.'

If *tense* is a distinction of *time*, the imperfect *tense* must be a distinction of time imperfectly, or badly made; but any distinction of time, whether perfectly or imperfectly made, cannot represent an *action* or *event*.

"The perfect *tense* not only refers to what is past, but also conveys an allusion to the present time; as, 'I have finished my letter,' etc."

In this definition, the perfect *tense* is the subject of the assertive *refers*; and *refers*, according to Lindley Murray's Grammar, and all others, is called an active verb; but, that *time*, or any of its *distinctions* can either *refer* us, or perform an action, is almost too gross an absurdity to deserve refutation.

As a reference or an allusion, is the offspring of *language* and *reason*, and as these joint endowments are only bestowed on the members of the human race, none but persons can *refer*; therefore, we cannot say, that time or any of its distinctions *refers*. You can with as much propriety say, that space, coat, or horse *refers*, as say that time *refers*.

Why does not the perfect *tense* represent an action, as well as the present or imperfect *tense*?

"The pluperfect *tense* represents a thing, not only as past, but also as prior to some other point of time specified in the sentence; as, 'I had finished my letter before he arrived.'"

The definitions of the other tenses which we have examined, strongly declare, that Lindley Murray wrote, without critically investigating the truth or accuracy of his own writings or those which *he copied*; but the definition of the pluperfect *tense* shows an unpardonable indifference to perspicuity, consistency, and

common sense. We first refer the reader to our remarks on the present and imperfect tenses. We are of opinion, that his imperfect and pluperfect relate to the same time, that is, to a time that is entirely passed. And, that the example, "*I had finished my letter before he arrived,*" is bad English, according to his own definition and observations, which may be thus proved: He tells us, that "The imperfect tense represents the action or event, either as past and finished, or as remaining unfinished *at a certain time past.*" He also tells us, in page 81, "that the perfect tense and imperfect tense, both denote a thing that is past; but that the former denotes it in such a manner, that there is still actually remaining some part of the time to slide away; whereas, the imperfect denotes the thing or action past, in such a manner, that *nothing remains of that time in which it was done.* If we speak of the present century, we say, philosophers have made great discoveries in the present century; but if we speak of the last century, we say, philosophers made great discoveries in the last century."

When I say, *I had finished my letter before he arrived*, is not the time in which I finished my letter a past time, that has no part of it remaining unfinished or unexpired? Is not it the imperfect tense according to Mr. Lindley Murray's definition of that tense and the observations we have just quoted? Therefore, to say, '*I had finished my letter before he arrived,*' is bad English. We ought to say, I finished my letter before he arrived, because the time in which I finished my letter, is a past time that totally expired at his arrival, the same as the last century is a past time that totally expired at the commencement of this century; therefore, if the one is the imperfect tense, so is the other.

I can say with propriety, "I had finished writing my letter at twelve, at twenty minutes before twelve, at half past eleven," or at any past instant, because, what I assert, is not the writing of the letter, but the completion or finishing of the letter, which is as instantaneous as the completion of any past time. When we only want to assert something that is past, and that does not require *duration*, we can use what Mr. Lindley Murray calls the pluperfect tense or time, which in

reality is *no time*. It is only a transit from one past time into another.

The following interrogations and observations may throw some light on this subject.

1st. Are the two following sentences good English?

"I wrote to him before twelve o'clock this morning."

"I had written to him before twelve o'clock this morning."

Both cannot be good English, because to believe, that our ancestors uselessly incumbered us with two forms of every assertive to mark the same time is absurd; therefore, one of the two sentences is bad English.

*I wrote to him before twelve o'clock this morning*, is good English, and *I had written to him before twelve*, is bad. Is not before twelve o'clock the same as in the forenoon, which after twelve is as perfectly a past time, as yesterday or 1840. Who has any knowledge of English says, "I had written to him yesterday, I had written to him in 1840, or I had written to him in the forenoon," that is, *before twelve o'clock*. Every correct writer says, I wrote to him in the forenoon, I wrote to him in 1840. If you say, I wrote to him in the forenoon, or this forenoon, how can you say, I had written to him before twelve, that is, *in the forenoon*!

Are the two following sentences good English?

"I had written my letter at twelve o'clock."

"I wrote my letter at twelve o'clock."

The propriety or impropriety of *had written*, and *wrote*, in the above sentences, can only be determined by the meaning we attach to the clause, *at twelve o'clock*. If *at twelve o'clock*, means the boundary between the fore and afternoon, "I had written my letter at twelve o'clock," is good English, and "I wrote my letter at twelve o'clock," is an absurdity, because a letter cannot be written instantaneously, that is, in the boundary between the fore and afternoon. But if we attach to the clause, *at twelve o'clock*, the same meaning that we do, when we say, "We breakfasted *at twelve o'clock* yesterday," that is, we commenced breakfast at twelve o'clock, without any respect to the duration of the time which we took to breakfast: according to this meaning of the clause, *at*

*twelve o'clock*, "I had written," is bad English, because I cannot say, I had written in a past time having duration, whatever may be its beginning, end, or the time that comes after it; we must say, *I wrote in every past time*, which is detached from the future.

Ere we conclude these observations on the past transit, which might advantageously be continued, if the fear of being prolix did not deter us, we cannot refrain from observing, that whenever the auxiliary *had* is employed, the speaker's object is to mark the point of time at which the thing was either commenced or finished, and not to assert of the subject the signification of the assertive used, which may be thus proved: 'I had written my letter at twelve o'clock;' that is, I had finished my letter at twelve o'clock; 'I had done one half my work at four o'clock,' that is, I had finished one half my work at four o'clock. As I could not with any propriety tell a person, that I had finished my *letter* at twelve, who knew nothing previously about it, consequently, to assert or communicate the circumstance of writing, which must have been previously known to the person addressed, is not so much the speaker's object, as to assert or communicate the point of time at which it was finished.

The foregoing observation shows why the two following forms must be different, notwithstanding each event is instantaneous and relates to the same point of time.

"He had finished his letter at twelve o'clock."

"He dropt down dead at twelve o'clock."

Here I cannot say, he had dropt down dead at twelve o'clock, because I do not suppose the person addressed knows any thing of the *death*, consequently, my object is to communicate that event, and not to mark the instant of its commencement or completion. As the whole event was so sudden, to mark either its commencement or completion, is unnecessary, therefore we cannot say, "He had fallen dead at twelve o'clock;" we must say, "*He fell dead* at twelve o'clock."

All the other grammatical works that we have seen, which have been published since Lindley Murray's first edition except Crombie's and Grant's, in what relates to the tenses), are



mere copies of his theory, consequently, our objections to them are the same as to his.

According to Crombie's theory of the tenses or times, *see* page 96 of his Grammar, there are only two tenses, namely, the *present* and the *preterite*; but to our great astonishment, we find the following inconsistent and contradictory catalogue of tenses in his conjugation, page 113, 118, and 119.

"1. *Present*, I write.

"2. *Preterperfect*, I wrote.

"These are the only two tenses in our language formed by varying the termination; the only two tenses, therefore, which properly belong to it."

If these are the only tenses that properly belong to the English language, to what language do the following additional tenses which he introduced into his conjugation belong? Why admit into his English Grammar, what does not belong to the English language?!!

"3. *Preter Imperfect*, I have been writing.

"4. *Preter Pluperfect*, I had written.

"This tense denotes, that an action was perfected before another action was done.

"5. *Plusquam, Preterite, Imperfect*, I had been writing.

"This tense, in respect to time, is more than past, and in respect to action, is imperfect. It denotes that an action was going on, or in a state of progression, before another action took place, or before it was perfected, as, 'I had been writing before you arrived.'"

What refined nonsense to say a time is *more than past*! How can it be more than *past*?

"6. *Future Indefinite*, I shall write.

"7. *Future Imp. Progressive*, I shall be writing.

"8. *Future Perfect*, I shall have written.

In page 120, he says, that "Duration, like space, is continuous and uninterrupted. It is divisible in idea only. It is past or future, merely in respect to some intermediate

point, which the mind fixes as the limit between the one and the other. Present time, in truth, does not exist any more than a mathematical line can have breadth, or a mathematical point be composed of parts. This position has, indeed, been controverted by Dr. Beattie; but in my judgment, without the shadow of philosophical argument.\*

\* "Dr. Beattie observes, 'that the fundamental error of those philosophers who deny the existence of present time is, that they suppose the present instant to have, like a geometrical point, neither parts nor magnitude. But as nothing is, in respect of our senses, a geometrical point, (for whatever we see or touch, must of necessity have magnitude,) so neither is the present, or any other instant, wholly unextended.' His argument amounts to this, that as a mathematical point is not an object of sense, nor has any real existence, so neither has a metaphysical instant. It is granted. They are each ideal. But does this prove the author's position, that philosophers have erred in asserting their similarity? or does it evince that no analogy subsists between them? Quite the reverse. The truth is, a geometrical point is purely ideal; it is necessary to the truth of mathematical demonstration, that it be conceived to have no parts. Finding it convenient to represent it to the sense, we therefore give it magnitude. A metaphysical instant, or present time, is in like manner ideal; but we find it convenient to assume as present, an extended space. The Doctor observes, that sense perceives nothing but what is present. It is true; but it should be remembered that no time, but objects which exist in time, are perceived by the senses. It may enable a person to form a correct idea of this matter if he will ask himself, what he means by the present time. If it be the present hour, is it not obvious, that part of it is past, and part of it future? If it be the present minute, it is equally clear, that the whole of it cannot be present at once. Nay, if it be the present vibration of the pendulum, is it not obvious, that a part of it is performed, and a part of it remains to be performed? Nor is it possible to stop in this investigation, till present time, strictly speaking, be proved to have no existence. Did it exist, it must be extended, and if extended, it cannot be present, for past and future must necessarily be included in it. If it

“Harris, Reid, and several others, have incontrovertibly proved it. But though present time, philosophically speaking, has no existence, we find it convenient to assume a certain portion of the past and the future as intermediate spaces between these extremes, and to consider these spaces as present; for example, the present day, the present week, the present year, the present century, though part of these several periods be past, and part to come. We speak of them, however, as present; as, this month, this year, this day. Time being thus in its nature continuous, and past and future being merely relative terms, some portion or point of time being conceived where the one begins and the other ends, it is obvious, that all tenses indicative of any of these two general divisions must denote relative time, that is, time past or future, in relation to some conceived or assumed space; thus it may be past or future, in respect to the present hour, the present day, the present week.”

If there is no present time, as Harris, Reid, and many others, and as Dr. Crombie himself proves in this extract, what necessity is there to assume an absurdity, that is, to assume a certain portion of the past and future, as an *intermediate space between these extremes*. Between what extremes? Between the past time and future time, which are *continuous and inseparable*. This false hypothesis, like every other, if examined, must necessarily lead to an absurdity or impossibility. Let us test it. If the three following sentences, *I write well to-day, I have written well to-day, I shall write well to-day*, are good English, which none will deny, and if *to-day* is *present time*, as the Doctor assumes, consequently,

should be answered, that this proves time, like matter, infinitely divisible, and that the most tedious process will still leave something capable of division, I reply, that as whatever may be left in the one case, must be figure, and not a point, so the remainder, in the other, must be a portion of extended time, how minute soever, and not an instant. The process, therefore, must be continued, till we arrive, in idea, at a point, and an instant, incapable of division, being not made up of parts.”

*write, have written, and shall write*, are forms of the assertive which correspond to *to-day*; that is, to the *present time*. According to this theory, each of them is the present tense; but in page 113 of his Grammar, he calls *I write* the *present tense*, in page 118, he calls, *I have written* the *preterfect tense*, and tells us, "This tense expresses time as past, and the action as perfect. It is compounded of the present tense of the verb denoting possession, and the perfect participle. It signifies a perfect action, either newly finished, or in a time of which there is some part to elapse, or an action whose consequences extend to the present. In short, it clearly refers to present time. This, indeed, the composition of the tense manifestly evinces. Thus, *I have written a letter*, means, *I possess at present the finished action of writing a letter*. This phraseology, *I acknowledge*, seems uncouth and inelegant; but how awkward soever it may appear, the tense is unquestionably thus resolvable."

The Doctor had no occasion to draw the reader's attention to the apparent awkwardness of his *attempt* to illustrate the simple sentence, *I have written a letter*. If *I have written a letter* means, *I possess at present the finished action of writing a letter*, common sense means nonsense; because *I have written a letter*, is common sense, and *I possess at present the finished action of writing a letter*, is nonsense. We can confidently assert, that there is not one native of Great Britain or Ireland, who can read English, that does not know the meaning of the sentence, *I have written a letter*, and we can as safely assert there is not one of them who understands the Doctor's illustration, namely, *I possess at present the finished action of writing a letter*. We have always been of opinion, that every action is as transitory as the time in which it is performed, and we must confess, that the Doctor's illustration is by no means calculated to change that opinion. Is not the sentence, *I have written a letter*, easier to understand, than what is a *finished or perfect action*? Is not one action as perfectly an action as another? By what extraordinary means did he *get possession* of a *past action*, and by what supernatural power did he manage to *keep* that *possession*?

He, in speaking of *have written*, says, "This tense *expresses* time as past:" consequently, the action performed in that past time, is a past action, and he says, *I possess at present the finished action of writing a letter*, that is, *I possess at present the past action* of writing a letter. What unmeaning jargon! He must have borrowed this illustration of the simple sentence, *I have written a letter*, without taking the trouble to examine it. Cobbett's Grammar contains the same nonsense about possessing a *past action*.

In page 119, he tells us, that *shall write*, "denotes futurity of action;" that is, it denotes the time of an action to be future, consequently, it is a future tense: but the Doctor says page 121, "It may enable a person to form a correct idea of this matter, if he will ask himself, what he means by present time. If it be the present hour, is it not obvious, that a part of it is past, and a part of it future? If it be the present minute, it is equally clear, that the whole of it cannot be present at once. Nay, if it be the present vibration of the pendulum, is it not obvious, that part of it is performed, and part of it remains to be performed? Nor is it possible to stop in this investigation, till present time, strictly speaking, be proved to have no existence."

As present time, strictly speaking, has *no existence*, therefore *to-day*, which is one of the Doctor's present times, *has no existence*. As, *write*, *have written*, and *shall write*, in the sentences *I write well to-day*, *I have written well to-day*, *I shall write well to-day*, correspond to the same time *to-day*, but *to-day* is the present time, and the present time, according to the Doctor's own logic, has no existence; consequently *write*, *have written*, and *shall write*, in the preceding sentences, are no tenses, because they coincide with *no time*. *Write*, *have written*, and *shall write*, according to his theory, must be the same tense in the preceding sentences; but according to his illustrations they are different!

We copy the following definitions and observations from Mr. Grant's Grammar, p. 61, to show that he is as justly chargeable with inconsistency respecting the *tenses* as Dr. Crombie:—

“Action and state are spoken of as existing in time; hence the accident of tense. There are two *tenses* or *times*.”

“The present tense is the name of the verb. It is said to imply time considered as relatively present; and it denotes action indefinitely, as, ‘I write,’ ‘I love.’

“The precise time must, we apprehend, be inferred from circumstances. We say, ‘I write *every day*,’ ‘I *now* write,’ ‘I write *to-morrow*.’

“The preterite is generally formed by adding *d* or *ed* to the present, as, ‘I *loved*,’ ‘I *rested*.’ From its implying *past time*, it is termed *preterite*; from its denoting a *finished action*, it is termed *perfect*, and hence the appropriate compound term *preter-perfect*.” In page 83 (see the note), he says, “In ‘I have a letter *written*,’ the possession is present, but the writing is described as finished *merely*, in past time, and the phrase does not designate the agent. The agent may be the subject of the verb, or any one else. But, in ‘I have *written*,’ the writing is denoted as done by the subject of the verb, the phrase being equivalent to ‘I *possess my own* I wrote.’ As ‘I *have written*’ denotes the present possession of the subject’s own finished action, so ‘I *had written*,’ denotes his past possession of the same description of action. “I *have been writing*’ denotes the present possession of an imperfect or progressive action, that existed in time continuous to the present moment.” In page 83, he says, “Fourthly, that, ‘I *have written*’ does include the present *now*, or time of assertion. The action denoted by *written* may have been done in any part of past time, but the phrase denotes the *present possession* of the action, or the result of the action, and does not admit the introduction of any words of time, not considered as continuous to the very *now* of possession, in which the as-

\* “Some consider *times* and *tenses* as, in origin and acceptation, synonymous terms. Others derive the latter from the Latin, *tensus*, applying it to that extension or inflexion of the word by which difference of time is implied, or difference in action denoted; in the same way as *case* is applied to the variation of a noun or pronoun, by which a change in relation is denoted.”

section is made—the time denoted by *written* being considered as connected with the time denoted by *have*.” In the same note, he says, “But, speaking during the morning, we say either ‘he *arrived* this morning,’ or, ‘he *has arrived* this morning.’ When the action, then, is spoken of as having occurred in time considered as prior to, and disjoined from, the *present time*, whether this be the present hour, morning, day, or century, ‘*I wrote*’ must be employed; otherwise, ‘*I have written*.’”

As Dr. Crombie's theory of the tenses or times accords so perfectly with Mr. Grant's, which appears from the extracts here given, our observations on the former are applicable to the latter; yet, lest Mr. Grant may think us unjust, to censure his theory without showing the truth and justice of that censure, we, for his particular satisfaction, select the following examples from the foregoing extracts, taken from his grammar. He tells us, the phrase, *I have written*, is equivalent to, *I possess my own I wrote*. We deny the equivalence, and that *I have written* implies possession; consequently, *I have written*, cannot be equivalent to the phrase *I possess my own I wrote*, because *I have written* is common sense, and *I possess my own I wrote*, is nonsense. If *I have written* is equivalent to *I possess my own I wrote*, “I have seen all the Queen's palaces,” is equivalent to *I possess all my own Queen's palaces I saw*. Although we do not envy him these *rich possessions*, we cannot help doubting *his loyalty*, who has usurped the *royal palaces*. He can by his theory make himself the most extensive possessor in the world. He can, in like manner, very easily make himself the possessor of the *sun, moon, and stars*. If *I have written*, is equivalent to *I possess my own I wrote*, “I have seen Europe, Asia, Africa, and America,” is equivalent to *I possess my own Europe, Asia, Africa, and America I saw*, etc., etc. “I have seen the sun, I have seen the moon and stars,” etc., is equivalent to *I possess my own sun I saw, I possess my own moon and stars I saw*, etc.

The only difference in meaning between *I wrote a letter* and *I have written a letter*, is the difference in time; that is, *I*

*wrote a letter*, signifies, that the letter was written in a past time detached from the future; as, *I wrote a letter yesterday, I wrote a letter in 1840*; but *I have written a letter* signifies that the letter was written in a past time attached to the future; as, I have written a letter in the past part of *this morning, day, week, year*, etc., which is briefly expressed by saying, I have written this morning, to-day, this week, this year, etc., consequently, if *I have written a letter*, implies possession, *so must, I wrote a letter*. Let Mr. Grant show, that *I wrote a letter yesterday*, implies possession, and let him show or declare the thing possessed if he can. We fear much it will be like *his royal possessions*. He tells us, "*the present tense is the name of the verb.*" And he also tells us, "there are two tenses or times, the present and past," and in the same page 61, he informs us, "that some consider *times* and *tenses*, as, in origin and acceptation, synonymous terms." Mr. Grant's own words, "*tenses or times*," show that he is of the same opinion as the persons alluded to in this note, consequently, if the *present tense is the name of the verb*, the *present time is also the name of the verb*, because tense and time are in *origin and acceptation synonymous*.

To assert that the *present time* is the name of a *cloth* or *metal*, is not more nonsensical than to assert, that the *present time is the name of the verb*.

There is a great deal of grammatical nonsense to be found in the observations of Doctor Arthur Browne, on the *definite* and *indefinite* times of assertives, and not less in the commentaries of Doctor Crombie and Mr. Grant on these observations.

No assertive in the English language either limits or defines the duration of that *time* to which its form corresponds. The English assertive has three forms corresponding to times having duration; but they have not the least respect to the length or shortness of that duration; which may be seen from the following examples; "I wrote in June," "I wrote yesterday," "I wrote in 1840."

In the foregoing example, does not the form, *wrote*, correspond to the *month, day*, and *year*; and in any one of them



does it limit the exact duration of the time of writing? It merely denotes that each of them is a past time, detached from the future. It corresponds to short times as well as long, provided they are past and detached times. For each of the other forms, *see* our times and transits, or the exposition of the different forms of the assertive.

We beg our readers to peruse the following extracts with attention, as they prove in the clearest manner, how little writers on this subject *respected common sense, and the necessity of investigating the truth* of their grammatical principles. They generally follow each other, as sheep do in snow. Precedent, whether *good or bad, true or false*, is all that is necessary.

We find in Lindley Murray's Grammar, page 82:—"In general, the perfect tense may be applied wherever the action is connected with the present time, by the actual existence, either of the author or of the work, though it may have been performed many centuries ago; but if neither the author nor the work now remains, it cannot be used. We may say *Cicero has written orations*; but we cannot say, *Cicero has written poems*, because the orations are in being, but the poems are lost. Speaking of priests in general, we may say, they have, in all ages, claimed great powers, because the general order of the priesthood still exists; but if we speak of the Druids, or any particular order of priests which does not now exist, we cannot use this tense. We cannot say, 'the Druid priests *have claimed* great powers,' but must say, the Druid priests *claimed* great powers; because that order is now totally extinct.—*See* Pickbourn, on the English Verb; and the fifth edition of the Octavo Grammar, page 113."

If the perfect tense may be applied wherever the action is connected with the present time, *by the actual existence either of the author or of the work*, "though it may have been performed many centuries ago," we can correctly say, "*Cicero has written orations* some centuries ago;" because the orations now actually exist. We can also say, "In the beginning, God *has created* the heaven and the earth," because the author, *God*, now actually exists. "I have written to my friend

last week," is good English, because the author, *I*, now actually exists. "William the Conqueror, *has built* the Tower of London," is good English, because the tower (that is the work) now actually exists. We insist that each of the foregoing examples is bad English, that the principle laid down by Pickbourn, Lindley Murray, Grant, Lennie, and at least by a dozen other *faithful copyists*, is false, and that *their solitary and immutable example, Cicero has written orations*, is bad English; and ought to be, *Cicero wrote orations*.

All Cicero's actions were performed in his lifetime, of which the instant of his death was the *final* instant; but that time is detached from the future by the intermediate time that has since elapsed: the same as yesterday is detached from the future by the time since elapsed, which is the past part of to-day; consequently, Cicero's *life-time* and *yesterday* are detached past times. As *wrote* is the form of the assertive that corresponds to *every detached past time*, consequently I must say, "I *wrote* yesterday," "Cicero *wrote* orations." "In the beginning God *created* the heaven and the earth," "William the Conqueror *built* the tower of London," etc.

According to this extract from Lindley Murray's Grammar, you cannot say, "the Druid priests *have claimed* great powers." Why cannot you say so? He informs us you cannot say so, simply because the Druid order of priests *does not now exist*. *Does Cicero now exist?* Yes; Mr. Grant has performed a master-miracle by *raising Cicero from death to life, and putting him in possession of his orations*.—See Grant's Grammar, p. 84. "When we say, Cicero *has written orations*, we speak of Cicero, *though dead*, as *alive*, and in the *present possession of the effects of his action*, because they now exist; but we do not say, Cicero *has written* poems, because these do not now exist, but Cicero *wrote* poems." We maintain that the existence or non-existence of the work is *perfectly indifferent*, and that the same form of the assertive must be used, whether the work exists or not, if the time or transit is the same. I can with propriety say *I have written several letters this year*, whether the letters *now* exist or not, I can as correctly say, "I *have written* several letters this year, which do

not now exist," as I can say, "I have written several letters this year which do now exist." Hence, the existence or non-existence of the work cannot direct us in the form of the assertive to be used. The only guide is the time or transit expressed or understood, for which see our exposition of these forms. We cannot say, after a man's death, that he *has written* or *has done* anything; we must say, he *wrote*, or *did*, because death detached his lifetime from the future; therefore, we must use that form of the assertive that corresponds to *every detached past time*, namely, *wrote*, *did*, etc. Deplorable, indeed, must be the grammatical views which can only be maintained by *miracles*, or by sacrificing *truth* or *common sense*.

We have taken the following extracts from Lennie's Grammar, page 22:—

"The past tense is used when the action or state is *limited* by the *circumstance* of time or place; as, 'we *saw* him *yesterday*.' 'We were in bed when he arrived.' Here the words *yesterday* and *when* limit the action and state to a particular time. After *death* all agents are spoken of in the *past tense*, because time is limited or defined by the *life* of the person; as, 'Mary, Queen of Scots was remarkable for her beauty.' This tense is peculiarly appropriated to the *narrative style*, because all narration implies some *circumstance*; as 'Socrates refused to adore false gods.' Here the period of Socrates's life, being a limited part of past time, circumscribes the narration. It is improper then to say of one already dead, 'He *has been* much admired; he *has done* much good;' but 'he *was* much admired; he *did* much good.'"

After comparing the following extract with the foregoing, you may judge Mr. Lennie's consistency.

Page 23.—"We say, *Cicero has written* orations, because the orations are still in *existence*; but we cannot say, *Cicero has written* poems, because the poems do not exist—they are lost; therefore, we must say, *Cicero wrote* poems."

As this extract concerning Cicero is so faithfully copied from Pickbourn, Lindley Murray, or some of the authors who have copied from them, the observations we have already made will

here suffice. We shall only ask, if the period of Socrates's lifetime *is a limited part of past time*, is not Cicero's lifetime *a similar part of past time*? Why then not say, "Socrates refused to adore false gods, Cicero wrote orations?"

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## REMARKS ON THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE ASSERTIVES, OR *Verbs*.

Lowth, page 30. Third Edition, 1754:—

"There are three kinds of Verbs—Active, Passive, and Neuter Verbs.

"A Verb Active expresses an action, and necessarily implies an agent and an object acted upon; as, to love; I love Thomas.

"A Verb Passive expresses a passion, or suffering, or the receiving of an action; and necessarily implies an object acted upon, and an agent by which it is acted upon: as, to be loved, 'Thomas is loved by me.' So, when the agent takes the lead in the sentence, the verb is active, and is followed by the object; when the object takes the lead, the verb is passive, and is followed by the agent.

"A Verb Neuter expresses being, or a state or condition of being, when the agent and the object acted upon coincide, and the event is properly neither action or passion, but rather something between both: as, 'I am, I sleep, I walk.'

"A Verb Active is called also transitive, because the action passeth over to the object, or hath an effect on some other thing; and the verb neuter is called intransitive, because the effect is confined within the agent, and doth not pass over to an object.

"In English many verbs are used both in an active and neuter signification, the construction only determining of which kind they are.

"The distinction between verbs absolutely neuter, as, *to sleep*, and verbs active intransitive, as, *to walk*, though founded in nature and truth, is of little use in grammar. Indeed it would rather perplex than assist the learner; for the difference between verbs active and neuter, as transitive and intransitive, is easy and obvious; but the difference between verbs absolutely neuter and intransitively active is not always clear."

The classification of the assertives in every grammatical work published since Lowth's time, which has fallen under our notice, is either a literal copy of the foregoing or in meaning the same. Grant seems to dissent, but he soon retracts, as may be seen in page 56 of his Grammar.

Seeming Dissent, page 56: "Passion or Suffering. There is no passive verb, or voice, in English. But such phrases as, *John is flogged, is whipped,*' denote the suffering of John; and hence, *is flogged, is whipped,* and the like, have been (erroneously) termed *passive* verbs."

Recantation, same page.—"Verbs may be divided into *substantive* and *adjective* verbs. Adjective verbs may be divided into *active, passive, and neuter*; and active verbs may be subdivided into *transitive and intransitive*."

We are fully prepared, from the Doctor's definitions, to subvert his classification of the assertives into *active, passive, and neuter*; consequently, the same arguments, if founded in truth, must subvert the classification of his copyists. If there are only three kinds of verbs, namely, *active, passive, and neuter*, we may justly infer that every verb in the language must belong to some one of the three classes, which we shall call the First Inference from the definitions.

If every verb active expresses an action, and necessarily implies an *agent*, and an *object acted upon*, consequently, the verb that does not express an action is not an active verb, which we shall call the Second Inference.

As every verb active, by the definition, expresses an action,

and as the action is always affirmed of the subject of an active verb, consequently, the verb cannot be active, if its subject be incapable of performing an action, which we call the Third Inference.

If every verb active necessarily implies an *agent*, and an *object acted upon*, consequently, the verb is not an active one that does not imply them, which we call the Fourth Inference.

If every verb passive expresses a passion, suffering, or the receiving of an action, and necessarily implies an object acted upon, and an agent by which it is acted upon, *consequently*, the verb that does not express a passion, or a suffering, or the receiving of an action, and that does not necessarily imply an *object acted upon*, and an agent by which it is acted upon, cannot be a passive verb, which we shall call the Fifth Inference.

If every verb neuter only expresses being, or a state or condition of being, when the agent and the object acted upon coincide, and when the event is "properly, neither action nor passion, but rather *something* between both," consequently, the verb that does not express being, or a state of being, and that has not an agent and an object which coincide, cannot be a verb neuter; this we shall call the Sixth Inference.

That we add strength, beauty, and dignity to the language by the use of rhetorical figures, is indisputable; and that the use of these figures is not admissible on all occasions, is equally incontrovertible.

As a *figurative reply* is not *direct*, and as a definition is a direct, full, and perspicuous reply to the question, what is *that*? consequently, we cannot with propriety use figurative language in writing a definition.

Let us test the definition.

"A verb active *expresses* an action, and necessarily *implies* an agent, and an object acted upon."

To prove the lameness and incorrectness of this definition, we need only test the two assertives used in the definition itself. If you ask any of Lowth's followers what kind of verb is the word *expresses* in this definition, they will tell you it is

a verb active, because, they say, it expresses an action, and has an *agent* and an object; that the agent is the word *verb*, and the object the word *action*. We freely grant there is action in expressing or speaking, but is a *word* or *verb* capable of *performing this action*? Can we, with any degree of consistency, or with the sanction of common sense, speak of the *acting* or *performance* of a word or *verb*. Can a word or verb *perform*? Certainly not. How then can it be an *agent*, that is, a doer or performer? By the 3rd inference, the word *expresses* in this definition, is not an active verb, because its subject is incapable of performing an action. Neither is it passive or neuter; hence it belongs to none of his three classes; but by the first inference it belongs to some one of them, which is absurd. *Words do not express ideas*, but we do express ideas by means of words. Therefore, Lowth should have said, a verb active is a word by which *we* express an action. He, to express his erroneous idea, ought to have said, *and necessarily requires*, instead of *necessarily implies*. What opinion must we have of the accuracy of a gentleman's grammatical views, who maintained that we can with propriety say, *he, she, it, or they, were in the act of implying*; which is as disagreeable to the ear, as it is revolting to common sense? To speak of the *act of existing*, is not more nonsensical than to speak of the *act of implying*.

That every action necessarily requires an agent to perform it, none will deny; but that every action requires an *object acted upon*, no reflecting person can admit. Who can deny there is action in walking? If a verb active necessarily requires an object acted upon, why does not the verb *to walk*, by which we express an action, require an *object acted upon*? The word *action* is the object of the verb *expresses*, that is, it is *the object acted upon*. The verb active or agent in this sentence, is an extraordinary actor; it performs an action, *that acts upon another action*. *Acting upon an action* is incomprehensible.

That the verb, *to imply*, when used assertively or interrogatively, requires a subject, and that this *subject* and *verb* must be followed by *something to complete the sense*, must be ad-

mitted; but that *any action* can be expressed by the verb *to imply*, or that the object of the verb *is acted upon*, we positively deny. By the 2nd inference, *implies* is not an active verb, because we express no action by it; and as it is not passive or neuter, it belongs to none of the three classes of verbs, which is absurd by the first inference.

The verbs in the following sentences, and hundreds of others, that are called active verbs, no one can prove to be active by the definition, as no one can point out any agency performed by any of the subjects; and as no subject can be called an *agent*, that does not perform something, the subjects cannot be called agents, and a verb without an *agent*, and an *object acted upon*, is not active by the definition.

My hat *cost* a guinea.

Lord Ashburton *has* an estate in America.

I *have* a head-ache.

Sixteen ounces *make* one pound.

I *feel* your kindness.

The hat, which is the subject of the verb *cost*, is not an agent, it can in no manner be said to act.

Indeed, we cannot conceive how any, except those who absolutely wish to *speak nonsense*, can speak of the *act of a hat*, the *agency of a hat*, or the *acting of a hat*; and yet, without absurdly attributing action to it in this sentence, you cannot call *cost* an active verb.

*Lord Ashburton has an estate in America.*

In this sentence, *Lord Ashburton* is the subject of the transitive verb *has*, and the estate in America is the *object acted upon* by Lord Ashburton. Captain Warner must now lament his folly in demanding £100,000 of the British government, for constructing a machine, of which the action is confined to four or five miles; when Lord Ashburton, without any machinery, can, according to Lowth's doctrine, perform an *action that passes from himself in England, to his estate in America!* There is not one verb neuter in the language that has less action in it than the verb *to have*, therefore action cannot make, what they call, a verb active. In the sentence *I have a head-ache*, *I* is a passive subject and performs no action whatever, ~~con-~~



quently, it is not an *agent*; but a verb cannot be active without an *agent* and an *object acted upon*; therefore, *have*, in this example, is not an active verb, because it has not an *agent*. We have never heard of the act of *having*, nor do we believe has any one else.

In the sentence, *sixteen ounces make one pound*, the sixteen ounces perform no action; consequently, the verb *make* has no agent, and cannot be active by the 4th inference. We find the following note in Lowth's Grammar, page 37.

"This participle represents the action as complete and finished; and being subjoined to the auxiliary *to have*, constitutes the perfect times. I call it therefore, the perfect participle.

"The same subjoined to the auxiliary *to be*, constitutes the passive verb; and in that state, or when used without the auxiliary in a passive sense, is called the passive participle."

According to this note and the 2nd extract from his Grammar, the foregoing examples may be written thus.

A guinea *is cost* by my hat.

An estate in America *is had* by Lord Ashburton.

A head-ache *is had* by me, etc.

We leave the reader to judge the propriety of the above sentences.

"A verb passive expresses a passion or suffering, or the receiving of an action, and necessarily implies an object acted upon, and an agent by which it is acted upon."

By this definition, any verb is passive, by which we express a passion, suffering, or the receiving of an action.

In the sentence, *afflictions overpower me*, *overpower* is a verb passive according to the definition; because none will deny, that I *suffer* when afflictions overpower me; consequently, *overpower* is a verb passive, because it is used to express a suffering, and has an object acted upon, which is *me*, and an agent by which the object is *acted upon*, which is *afflictions*.

In the sentence, *I love Maria*, *love* is a verb passive, because it is used to express a *passion*, and has an object *acted upon*, which is *Maria*, and an agent by which the object is *acted upon*, which is *I*.

In the sentence, *I suffered the keenest distress*, *suffer* is a verb passive, because it is used to express a *suffering* and has an object *acted upon*, which is the subject *I*, and an agent by which the object is *acted upon*, which is the keenest distress.

In the sentence, *I have carried the table*, does not the verb *have carried*, express the receiving of an action, that is, that the table has received the action which is asserted of the subject *I*?

Consequently, according to their own definition, it is a verb passive, because it expresses the receiving of an action, and has an object *acted upon*, which is *the table*, and an agent by which the object is acted upon, which is *I*?

According to this unmeaning definition of a passive verb, and the observations we have made in testing the verbs *overpower*, *love*, *suffer*, and *have carried*, every active verb in the language is *passive*.

We prove every passive verb is active thus:—

As a verb passive necessarily implies an *agent*, and an *object acted upon*, that the object cannot be acted upon without an action is evident; that is, the verb passive is used to express an action, the same as the verb active; as, *the table has been carried by me*. In this sentence, I not only express the same action, but also the same meaning as in the sentence, *I have carried the table*, and the agent and object in the one, are the agent and object in the other. Why, then, call *have carried* an active verb, and *has been carried* passive?

If you ask them to point out the *agent*, and the *object acted upon*, in the sentence, *the table has been carried by me*. They will tell you, that *me* is the *agent*, and that the table is the object *acted upon*. We assert that no verb passive either implies or requires an agent, that it only requires a subject; and that the word *me* is not used here as an agent, but as the object of the preposition *by*. When the pronoun *I* is used as an agent it is written *I*; but when used as an object, it is written *me*, except it is used as the subject of a verb, of which *let* is an auxiliary.

As a tree is known by its fruit, so is the truth or falsehood of a definition, by the consistency or inconsistency to which it

leads: therefore, the definition of an active verb and that of a passive are false, because they lead to the absurd conclusion, that every verb active is passive, and every verb passive, active.

No verb, strictly speaking, expresses *being*, *action*, or *passion*; nor can we express *being*, *action*, or *passion* by any verb: therefore, to say that a verb active expresses an *action*, when the speaker, and not the verb active expresses it, is nonsensical; nor does the speaker express the action by either the verb active or its subject, but by both conjointly; consequently, we cannot truly say, that a verb *expresses an action*.

“A verb neuter expresses being, or a state or condition of being; when the agent and the object acted upon coincide, and the event is properly neither action nor passion, but rather something between both.”

For the reasons stated in testing the truth of the definition of an active or passive verb, no verb *expresses being*, nor a state or condition of *being*; as the speaker only can express being, and he can *only* do it by the joint use of a *subject* and *verb*. The Doctor was actually in one of his thoughtless moments when he wrote the second part of this definition, namely, “when the agent and object acted upon coincide, and the event is properly neither *action* nor *passion*, but rather *something* between both.” That his *verb neuter* requires an *agent* and an *object acted upon*, appears from this part of the definition, because the object cannot *be acted upon* without an action, and every action *must be performed by an agent*; hence we express action by a *neuter verb* and its *agent*, the same as we do by a *verb active* and its agent, and each verb has an object *acted upon*; but by the definition, a verb neuter expresses neither action nor passion; and by the same definition, it expresses action, as we have shown, which is absurd. This is not the only absurdity in this definition.

“The event is properly neither action nor passion, but rather something between both.” What is the *event* mentioned in this definition, of which the Doctor strangely marks *our* pre-acquaintance, by prefixing the word *the*: and of which in the same sentence, he honestly declares *his own ignorance*, by *virtually acknowledging* he does not know what this event is?

All he knows about it is that it is *something* between action and passion.

Is this definition a *direct*, *full*, and *perspicuous* reply to the question, what is a verb neuter?

*Something* is a singular explanation of the event.

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### NECESSARY ORDERS AND QUESTIONS FOR EXAMINATION.

33. What is an assertive or interrogative?

34. How many different meanings can we express by an assertive, if we only use the subject *I*, *thou*, *he*, *she*, *we*, *you*, *they*, and the word *if* and *not*?

35. Into how many classes are the different meanings of an assertive divided?

36. Into how many classes are the assertives themselves divided?

37. Name each class of meanings, and define it.

38. Name each class of assertives, and define it.

39. What is the *primitive* signification of an assertive?

40. What is the *auxiliary* signification of an assertive?

41. What is the *link* signification of an assertive?

42. What is an auxiliary assertive?

43. What is its use?

44. Name the auxiliaries.

45. What auxiliaries change the primitive meaning of an assertive?

46. What auxiliaries do not change the primitive signification?

47. What auxiliaries have no forms corresponding to the passing transit?

48. By what auxiliaries do we mark the time or transit of an assertive, without changing its primitive meaning?

49. What is time?

50. How many grammatical times?

51. How many grammatical transits?

52. Name the times, and define each.

53. Name the transits, and define each.

54. What is the detached past time?

55. What is the attached past time?

56. What is future time?

57. What is the passing transit?

58. What is the past transit?

59. What is the future transit?

60. What is the difference between *shall* and *will*?

61. What is the best guide in the choice of auxiliaries?

62. Name the auxiliary used to mark the attached past time of the primitive signification.

63. By what auxiliary do we mark the past transit of the primitive meaning?

64. Name the times and transits of the primitive meaning.

65. What are the peculiarities of the assertive *to be*?

66. By what means can we express the link meaning of an assertive, and use the same form of the assertive, and the same auxiliaries, as we do to express either the primitive or auxiliary meaning?

67. How many assertives in the English language have two forms for the detached past time of the link meaning, and only one for the detached of the primitive?

68. Can one of these two forms be dispensed with on all occasions, without any detriment or inconvenience?

69. Name the times and transits of the auxiliary meaning.

70. What is a regular assertive?

71. What is an irregular assertive?

72. What is a defective assertive?

73. How are assertives classed with regard to termination?

74. What is the exposition of an assertive?

## ANSWERS TO THE FOREGOING QUESTIONS.

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33. See the definition of an assertive, or interrogative.

34. One thousand six hundred.

35. Into three classes.

36. Into two classes.

37. The *primitive*, the *auxiliary*, and the *link* meanings.

The primitive meaning of an assertive is that which we express by its primitive form, or by any other form that only changes the time of the primitive meaning; as, *I write*, he *wrote*, they *have written*, etc. The following observation may here be beneficially re-inserted, namely, *all the forms of the assertive that are used to assert, command, interrogate, or deny the same thing, even at different times, may justly be classed together, whether the subject is the same or not.* See the observations on the subject in the third page on the assertive.

The auxiliary meaning is that new meaning which an auxiliary gives to an assertive of the primitive signification; as, *I may write*, they *must write*, we *might have written*, etc. The link meaning is that which the link imparts to the assertives which it connects; as, *if he go I shall stop at home*, etc.

38. There are two classes, or kinds, of assertives; namely, the *subject* assertives and the *requisite* assertives. To define each, see its definition.

39. 40. 41. The answer to each of these three questions may be found in the answer to the 37th.

42. See the definition of an auxiliary assertive.

43. Its use is either to mark a time, or transit, or to give a new meaning to any assertive by which we express the primitive signification.

44. Do, did, have, had, shall, should, will, would, may

might, can, could, let, and must, and the auxiliary *to be* in all its variations.

45. Shall, should, will, would, may, might, can, could, must, and let, change the primitive signification. See the explanation of each of them.

46. The auxiliary *have, be, and do, and their variations.*

The auxiliary *shall, will, may and can, have no forms coinciding with the passing transit. When they are prefixed to requisite assertives, and are the only auxiliaries, they always coincide with future time.*

48. By the auxiliary *do, did, have, and had.*

49. See the definition of time.

50. Three grammatical times.

51. Three grammatical transits.

52. The *attached past time, the detached past time, and future time. To define each of these, see its definition.*

53. The transits are the passing transit, the past transit, and the future transit. To define each, *see its definition.*

54. The detached past time is any past time that is detached from the future; as, yesterday.

55. The definition of the attached past time is the answer to this.

56, 57, 58, 59. An answer similar to the last can be given to each of these four questions.

60. *Shall* is used to represent the subject of the compound assertive, under the influence of some cause, of which the signification of the assertion is the predicted consequence, or it is used to ascertain whether the subject shall, at a future time, be under that influence. *Will* is used to assert, or ascertain the *future free-agency* of personal subjects, or our *conjectural predictions* of all other subjects.

61. The meaning to be expressed is the best guide in the choice of auxiliaries, that is, the auxiliary by which we can best express the meaning, must be chosen.

62. The auxiliary *have.*

63. By the auxiliary *had.*

64. The passing transit, the detached past time, the attached past time, and the past transit.

65. First, it is the only assertive in the language, of which the primitive form, and the form corresponding to *I*, in the passing transit of the primitive signification, are not the same. *Be* is the primitive form, but we cannot say *I be*, we must use the form corresponding to the passing transit, which is *am*, and say, *I am*.

Secondly, it is the only one of which any form corresponding to the subject *I*, is not the same as the form corresponding to a plural subject, in the same time, or at the same transit, and of the same signification. Thus we say, *I am*, but we cannot say, *we am*, we must say, *we are*. Thirdly, it is the only assertive in the language that has two forms for the detached past time of any of the link significations, as, "*if I was*," "*if I were*."

66. By simply prefixing the link to the subject.

67. Only one, the assertive, *to be*. We may say, "*if I was*," or "*if I were*," and can only say, "*I was*."

68. We have no occasion to say, "*if I were*, *if thou wert*, *if he were*," we can, without either injuring the sense or offending the ear, in all similar cases say, "*if I was*, *if thou wast*, *if he was*." The latter forms are supported by analogy, but the former are opposed to it, consequently what they call the subjunctive form of the verb, *to be*, can be dispensed with, without any inconvenience.

69. The future time, the future transit, the detached past time, and the past transit.

70. A regular assertive is that of which the detached time, and perfect participle are formed by adding *d*, or *ed*, to the primitive form of the assertive, as from *to love* is formed *loved*, and from *to walk* is formed *walked*, etc.

71. An irregular assertive is that of which the detached time, and perfect participle, are not formed by the addition of *d*, or *ed*, to the primitive form of the assertive; as, *write*, *wrote*, *written*; *go*, *went*, *gone*, etc.

72. See the definition of a defective assertive.

73. They are classed into regular and irregular.

74. The exposition of an assertive is an orderly display of all its varied forms and meanings.



## ON THE SENTENCE-DESCRIPTIVE, OR ADVERB.

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A *sentence-descriptive* is a word used to describe the signification of a simple sentence; as, “He writes English *well*. *How* does he write? He does *not* write English.”

The reader by carefully perusing the sentence, *he writes English well*, will easily discover that the word *well* is descriptive, or explanatory, of the sentence or assertion, *he writes English*, and not of any word or part of the sentence taken separately. If I ask the question, *what does he do well?* You cannot answer, *he well*, because *he well* is neither an answer nor common sense; therefore *well* is not descriptive of the word, *he*. Neither can you answer, *he writes well*, because *he writes well*, means that his hand-writing, or composition, is good, but he may write a beautiful hand, and express himself well, without knowing a word of English; therefore *well* is not descriptive of *he writes*, taken separately; it is a descriptive of the sentence, *he writes English*.

On examination, every *sentence-descriptive* in the language, will be found to perform a similar duty to the word *well*, and to relate to the *assertion*, or *interrogation*, and not to any particular *word* in the sentence taken separately; hence the appropriate name, *sentence-descriptive*.

We have found the following definitions of the *sentence-descriptive*, or *adverb*, in the grammars here quoted.

In Lowth's, “Adverbs are *added to verbs and adjectives*, to denote some modification, or circumstance, of an action, or quality, as the manner, order, time, place, distance, motion, relation, quantity, quality, comparison, doubt, affirmation, negation, demonstration, interrogation.

“An adverb is sometimes joined to another adverb to mo-

diffy, or qualify its meaning; as, very much, much too little, not very prudently."

In Lindley Murray's, "An adverb is a part of speech joined to a verb, an adjective, and sometimes to another adverb, to express some quality, or circumstance respecting it; as, 'he reads *well*, a *truly* good man, he writes *very correctly*.'"

In Crombie's, "An adverb is that part of speech which is joined to a verb, adjective, or other adverb, to express some circumstance, quality, degree, or manner of its signification; and hence adverbs have been termed attributives of the second order."

In Grant's, "Adverbs are joined to verbs, participles, adjectives, or other adverbs, to denote some quality, or circumstance, respecting them; as, 'he writes *well*, *truly* loving, *extremely* improper, *tolerably well*.'"

In Lennie's, "An *adverb* is a word joined to a *verb*, an *adjective*, or another *adverb*, to express some quality, or circumstance of *time*, *place*, or *manner*, respecting it; as, 'Ann speaks *distinctly*, she is *remarkably* diligent, and reads *very correctly*.'"

Lowth's definition of the adverb is in substance this, "My dear reader, although I have undertaken to write an English grammar, yet after much thinking, and as much embarrassment, I feel the painful necessity of acknowledging, that I do not know what an adverb is! And consequently that I cannot clearly define it. I now throw myself entirely on your kind indulgence, and hope you will be content, if I tell you to what words the adverb *is added*, instead of telling you *what it is*." Accordingly, we find in his grammar, that the adverb is added to a verb, or adjective, to denote some modification, or circumstance, of an *action*, or *quality*, and that it is sometimes added to another adverb, to modify, or qualify, its meaning. If in Lowth's opinion the adverb could be added, or joined to any other words besides *verbs*, *adjectives*, and *adverbs*, he would have named them at the same time. From the extract we have given from Lowth's grammar, two inferences may be drawn.—*First inference*: That no word is an adverb which is not added to a verb, or adjective, to express

some modification, or circumstance of an *action*, or *quality*, except that which is joined to another adverb to modify, or qualify, its meaning.

*Second inference*, that an adverb cannot be added to a neuter verb, because the end for which it is added is to express some modification or circumstance of an action, or quality, but as a verb neuter "expresses neither *action* nor *passion*," consequently we can add no word to it to modify an action which it does not imply. Let us test the truth of this definition by a few examples; "he writes English *well*, they live *comfortably*."

As *well* is joined to the substantive *English*, and not to a verb, adjective, or adverb, by the first inference, it is not an adverb; but it is an adverb by his parsing,\* and not by his definition, which is absurd.

As *comfortably* is joined, or added to a verb neuter, and therefore expresses no modification, or circumstance of an action, or quality, consequently by the second inference it is not an adverb.

One half the adverbs in the language are not adverbs according to Lowth's definition. Is what he has said of the adverb an answer to the question—what is an adverb? If not, it is no definition.

Let us now test Mr. Lindley Murray's *direct, full, and perspicuous* reply to the question, *what is an adverb*?

He tells us that "An adverb is a part of speech joined to a verb, an adjective, and sometimes to another adverb, to express some quality, or circumstance respecting it; as, 'he reads *well*, a *truly* good man, he writes *very correctly*.'" He begins his direct, full, and perspicuous reply by telling us, that "an adverb is a *part of speech*." Certainly it is, and so is every other word in the language a *part of speech* as well as the adverb, consequently this vague and indirect assertion cannot be called any part of the definition. The second assertion, namely, that the *adverb is joined to a verb, an adjective, and sometimes to another adverb*, is equally vague

\* See Lowth's Grammar, page 168.

and indirect. What word in the language cannot we occasionally join to a *verb*, an *adjective*, or an *adverb*. We can correctly say, *he sits on the sofa*. In this sentence the pronoun *he* and the preposition *on* are joined to the verb *sits*. In the sentence, *O spare the child*, the interjection *O*, and the article *the*, are joined to the verb *spare*. In the sentence, *Jane reads and writes*, the substantive *Jane*, and the conjunction *and*, are joined to the verb *reads*. In the sentence, *I intend to write two letters to-day*, the verb *intends*, and the adjective *two*, are joined to the verb *to write*.

The above examples show that articles, nouns, adjectives, pronouns, verbs, adverbs, prepositions, conjunctions, and interjections, are occasionally joined to verbs as well as adverbs, consequently the assertion, *an adverb is joined to a verb*, is as vague and unmeaning as *an adverb is a part of speech*. The assertion, *an adverb is joined to an adjective*, is equally vague and unmeaning, which may be seen from the following examples.

In the sentence, *use the small table*, the article *the*, and the substantive *table*, are joined to the adjective, *small*. In the sentence *how anxious he must be!* the adverb *how*, and the pronoun *he*, are joined to the adjective *anxious*. In the sentence, *she is grateful to you*, the verb *is*, and the preposition *to*, are joined to the adjective *grateful*. In the sentence, "*O dearest and most affectionate friend*, how thy torments grieve me," the interjection *O*, and the conjunction *and*, are joined to the adjective *dearest*. The examples here given, show that all kinds of words are joined to adjectives as well as adverbs; consequently the assertion, *an adverb is joined to an adjective*, is as inconclusive as the two assertions we have already tested. Stating, or defining, the **END** for which we join one word to another, *is not defining the word joined*, hence what Mr. Lindley Murray wrote on the adverb, is no definition of it.

As the definition given by Crombie, Grant, and Lennie, is the same as that given by Lowth, or Lindley Murray; consequently, our observations on the latter, are equally applicable to the former.

We cannot imitate our numerous predecessors who have uselessly divided upwards of three thousand *sentence-descriptives*, which the language contains, into classes, varying in number from twelve to twenty-five. To distinguish each of which by its appropriate name, is a task that discourages and fatigues the learner, and shamefully encroaches on the master's time, without the least advantage to either.

All that is necessary for the master or pupil to know, is, the word's acception, its correct application and that it is a sentence-descriptive. When he knows these, he knows all that is really useful. Beyond utility, mere precedent shall never tempt us.

That the meaning of almost every sentence-descriptive in the language can be expressed by a link and its explanatory requisite; which sometimes has adjuncts, and sometimes not, is remarkable.

Sentence-descriptives	Links	Adjuncts	Explanatory objects
Abed	in		bed
Abjectly	in	a mean	manner
Aboard	in or on	a	ship
Abominably	in	a hateful	manner
Abortively	in	an unseasonable	time
About	{ on in	all every	sides, or direction
Abreast	by	each other's	side
Abroach	in	a running out	posture
Abroad	in	another	country
Abruptly	in	a sudden	manner
Absolutely	without		restriction
Abstemiously	without		indulgence
Actually	in		reality
Acutely	in	a keen	manner
Additionally	by		addition
Adequately	in	an adequate	manner
Adjectively	in	an adjective	manner
Adieu	to		God
Admirably	in	an admirable	manner

Sentence-descriptives	Links	Adjuncts	Explanatory objects.
Admiringly	with		admiration
Adrift	in	{ a floating or random }	manner
Advantageously	in	an advantageous	manner
Adverbially	in	the manner of an	adverb
Adversely	in	an unfortunate	manner
Advisedly	in	{ a prudent or de-signed }	manner
Adulterously	in	an adulterous	manner
Affably	in	an affable	manner
Affectedly	in	an affected	manner

Those who have time and inclination, may readily continue the above list of *sentence-descriptives* alphabetically, from any good dictionary. Our limits will only permit us to give a few more of those which are in common use.

Almost	with	few	exceptions
Apart	by		itself
Asunder	in	separate	places
Already	in	a past	time
Well	in	a good	{ state or manner }
Ill	in	an inferior	{ state or manner }
Verily	without		{ uncertainty or doubt }
Perhaps	by		chance
Nay	by	no	means
Not	{ a word used to reverse the signification of a sentence }		
Namely	for		example
Nowise	in	no	manner
Together	in	a collective	state
Rather	with	more	inclination
Here	in	this	place
There	to or in	that	place

Sentence-descriptives	Links	Adjuncts	Explanatory objects
Where	to or in	what	place
Hither	to	this	place
Thither	to	that	place
Whither	to	what	place
Hence	from	this	place or cause
Thence	from	that	place or cause
Whence	from	which	place or cause
Now	at	the passing	instant
Before	in	a previous	time
Heretofore	in	a remote past	period
Hitherto	up to	this	time
Lately	in	a time which has	{ recently expired
Hereafter	in	a future	time
Presently	in	{ a time soon after the passing	{ transit
Immediately	in	{ that future which shall soonest be- come past	{ time
Afterwards	after	that	time
Frequently	in	{ many, or conse- cutive	{ times
Often	in	many	instances
Seldom	in	few or rare	instances
Once	at	one	time
Twice	at	two	times
Thrice	at	three	times
First	before	any other	{ inference or thing
Secondly	after	the first	inference
Thirdly	after	the second	inference, etc.
Much	in	a great	degree
Little	in	an insufficient	degree

## ON THE REQUISITE-LINK, OR PREPOSITION

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The *requisite link* is a connective word, by which we join an explanatory requisite to an assertion or interrogation; as, “he sits *on* the sofa, “they came *from* Bath *on* Saturday,” etc.

Is not *he sits* an assertion, and have not we linked the explanatory requisite, *sofa*, to it by the word *on*? By the definition, *on* is a requisite link. Hence comes the appellation which we have given it.

*They came* is an assertion, and to it we link the explanatory requisite *Bath*, by the word *from*, and again to the assertion *they came from Bath*, we join the explanatory requisite *Saturday*, by the word *on*; hence *from* and *on* are requisite links by the definition.

The meaning of a simple sentence is frequently so indefinite, as to excite desires which can only be gratified by words with which the sentence itself refuses to associate. For instance, the sentence, *he went*, must excite a desire to know the place from which he went, and also the place he went to. The first of these places is naturally required immediately after the thing asserted, and the second after the first; yet the sentence refuses to associate with them; that is, the sentence with the names of the places, without *requisite links*, makes nonsense; as, *he went Bath Bristol*, etc. Hence, we are obliged to use the requisite links, and say, “*he went from Bath to Bristol*.”

From the definition here given, and the observations we have made, both the necessity of the English link and its use are evident.

The explanatory requisites, which a simple sentence requires, depend on what is previously known to the person addressed, which may be thus shown. If my neighbour, Captain Smith of London, told Mrs. Taylor and me, on Saturday last, that he



intended to visit Brighton the next day, she could correctly ask me on the following Monday, *did the Captain go*, and I could as correctly answer, *he went*; because the explanatory requisite, *London, Brighton, and Sunday*, are in each case known to the person here addressed; consequently, to name them or link them to either of the sentences, *did the Captain go?* or *he went*, is unnecessary.

If the Captain declared the place of his intended visit, but not the day, Mrs. Taylor could afterwards correctly ask me, *when did the Captain go?* I could reply, *he went on Monday*. If he fixed the time, and not the place, she could properly ask me, *where did he go?* I could reply, *he went to Liverpool*. If the time was fixed, but the residence and destination of the Captain unknown to her, she could ask me, *where did the Captain go last week?* I could reply, *he went from Liverpool to Bath*.

The preceding examples fully prove that the explanatory requisites which a simple sentence requires, depend on what we believe the person addressed, *already knows*.

We have found the following definitions of the requisite link, unmeaningly called a *preposition*, in the grammars here quoted.

In Lowth's, "Prepositions, so called, because they are commonly *put before* the words to which they are applied, serve to connect words with one another, and to show the relation between them."

In Lindley Murray's, "Prepositions serve to connect words with one another, and to show the relation between them. They are, for the most part, put before nouns and pronouns; as, 'he went *from* London to York;' 'she is *above* disguise;' 'they are instructed by him.'"

In Doctor Crombie's — "A preposition has been defined to be 'that part of speech which shows the relation that one thing bears to another.' According to Mr. Harris, it is a part of speech devoid itself of signification, but so formed as to unite words that are significant, and that refuse to unite or associate of themselves. He has, therefore, compared them to *pegs or pins*, which serve to unite those parts of the building

which would not, by their own nature, incorporate or coalesce. When one considers the formidable objections which present themselves to this theory, and that the ingenious author, now quoted, has, in defence of it, involved himself in palpable contradictions; it becomes matter of surprise, that it should have so long received from grammarians an almost universal and implicit assent. This furnishes one of many examples, how easily error may be imposed and propagated by the authority of a great name. But, though error may be repeatedly transmitted from age to age, unsuspected and unquestioned, it cannot be perpetuated. Mr. Horne Tooke has assailed this theory by irresistible arguments, and demonstrated, that in our language, at least, prepositions are significant of ideas, and that as far as import is concerned, they do not form a distinct species of words."

The Doctor has saved us the trouble of giving Harris's definition of the preposition.

In Grant's — "Prepositions are words generally *put before* their regimen, to express the relations of things; as, 'He went to London;' 'it was done *by* him;' 'he is a man of wisdom.'"

In Lennie's — "A preposition is a word put before nouns and pronouns, to show the relation between them; as, 'He sailed *from* Leith *to* London *in* two days.'"

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Ere we commence the examination of the foregoing definitions of the preposition, we beg the reader to bear in *mind*, that a correct definition — is a *direct, full, and perspicuous* reply to the question, *What is a preposition?* See the definition extracted from Lowth's grammar.

If they are called *prepositions* simply because they are commonly put before the words to which they are applied, and no other reason is assigned, are not *articles, adjectives*, and the *subjects* of verbs, commonly put before the words to which they are applied? Are not they prepositions by the Doctor's

theory? which is absurd, if what is asserted in the preceding part of this definition, is only true of prepositions; yet it is not a *direct, full, and perspicuous reply* to the question, *what is a preposition?* and, consequently, it is not a definition of it.

The next part of the learned Doctor's diverting subterfuge for a definition is, "prepositions serve to connect words with one another, and to show the relation between them," that is, prepositions serve to connect words with one another and prepositions serve to show the relation between the words which the prepositions connect. That prepositions serve to connect words with one another, we deny, but that a preposition serves to connect a detached word to a sentence we freely *admit*. That other words serve to connect words with one another we *insist*. Do not requisite assertives serve to connect words with one another; as, "James *wrote* a letter." Does not the word *wrote* connect the word *James* and the word *a*, which refuse to coalesce, as we cannot say *James a letter*. In the sentence, "James *has* money," does not the word *has* connect the word *James* and the word *money*. Do not adjectives serve to connect words with one another; as, *He is a tolerably good musician*. In the preceding sentence the word *good*, connects the word *tolerably* and the word *musician*, which refuse to coalesce, as we cannot say, "He is a *tolerably musician*," hence the assertion, that "prepositions serve to connect words with one another," is false, although true of other words, but whether true of other words or not, it is not a *direct, full, and perspicuous reply* to the question, *what is a preposition?* Consequently it is not the definition of a preposition. We shall now test his last assertion, namely, that prepositions serve to show the relation between the words which they connect.

That prepositions *show, or serve to show*, any relation between the words which they connect, we must positively deny. Let any grammarian who maintains the Doctor's views, point out *one sentence* in the English language in which the preposition shows any *relation whatever* between the words which it connects. If it shows a relation between the two words *which it connects*, let any of his numerous copyists name this

relation. We fear much, that they must reply, as many others have, that although they cannot express this relation by any appropriate name, *yet that the preposition shows a relation*. There is, certainly, some relation between these, who thus reply, and Goldsmith's schoolmaster.

The following interrogations and observations may help to expose the absurdity of that *fairly relation*, which writers on grammar inform us is shown by the preposition—a relation that has not yet appeared to the human understanding, and that never will.

Have every *two words* in the language a relation existing between them or not?

That *every two words* in the language have not a relation existing between them may be thus proved. If possible, let every two words in the language have a relation existing between them. As the number of words in the English language is about thirty-five thousand, the number of pairs in thirty-five thousand, that is the number of relations, far exceeds the number of grains of sand in the sea. We have considerably less than a hundred prepositions in the language to show the entire of these relations, consequently the same preposition must show some millions of different relations, which is absurd, therefore there are words in the English language that have no relation existing between them, which was to be proved.

That the relation shown by the preposition exists between the *two words* which it connects, appears from Lowth's definition.

Let us test the truth of this assertion by its application to the following examples:—

1. "They are *exactly of the same nature*."—Lindley Murray.
2. "The English language is, *perhaps, of all* the present European languages by much the most simple in its form and construction."—Lowth's Preface.
3. "*Instead of saying*, the Lord hath given, and the Lord hath taken away," etc.—Lindley Murray.
4. "I am *going to London*."—J. Grant.
5. "We *went to Spain*."—W. Lennie.

6. "A verb agrees with its nominative in number *and person*."—Dr. Crombie.

In the first of the preceding examples, the preposition *of*, connects the adverb *exactly*, and the article *the*; in the second example it connects the adverb *perhaps*, and the adjective *all*; and in the third example it connects the conjunction *instead*, and the participle *saying*. In the fourth example the preposition *to*, connects the participle *going*, and the substantive *London*; in the fifth, *to* connects the neuter verb *went*, and the substantive *Spain*; and in the sixth example, the preposition *in*, connects the conjunction *and*, and the substantive *person*.

As he who receives a bill in payment, and passes it in commerce, by the act of passing it with his signature, binds himself to the *holder* of that bill for its amount when payable; so does the author that writes for the instruction of youth, and publishes the opinions of his predecessors, by the act of publishing with his signature, bind himself to the public for the truth of these opinions. The author is as justly responsible for the truth of his work as the other for the amount of the bill. We arraign Lowth's numerous followers and copyists, for the following false and absurd assertion, namely, a *preposition shows the relation between the words which it connects*. Until they prove that this relation exists between every two words that can be connected in construction by a *preposition*, and that the preposition *shows* this *relation*, the public have a just right to look on them as propagators of error and untruth. We ask them to point out, and name, in the preceding examples, the relation that exists between the adverb *exactly* and the article *the*, between the adverb *perhaps* and the adjective *all*, between the conjunction *instead* and the participle *saying*, between the participle *going* and the substantive *London*, between the verb *went* and the substantive *Spain*, and between the conjunction *and* and the substantive *person*. Let them explain how the preposition *of*, shows three different relations in the first three examples, how the preposition *to*, shows a relation in the fourth and fifth, and how the preposition *in*, shows the relation between the conjunction *and* and the sub-

stantive *person*, in the sixth example. If the use of a preposition is *to connect words*, and show the relation between them, how very strange, every writer on grammar can show the connexion, and none can show or name the relation. As Mr. Lindley Murray's definition of the preposition is Lowth's, of course we shall pass it without observation.

Let us test Doctor Crombie's definition of a preposition, which see, by its application to a few examples: "James went to London;" "give the book to Ellen," etc.

If "a preposition shows the relation which one thing bears to another" in the preceding examples, the preposition *to*, shows the relation between some two things mentioned in the sentence. As there are *only* two mentioned in it, namely, James and London (unless he calls *went* a *thing*), the relation alluded to in the definition must exist between London and *James*, or between London and *went*. Let the reader, if he can, name the relation that exists either between *London* and *James*, or between *London* and *went*, and then explain how does the word *to*, *show that relation*. He tells us in page 188 of his Grammar, "the name of preposition has been assigned to them because they generally precede their regimen, or the word which they govern. What number of these words ancient and modern languages contain has been much disputed; some grammarians determining a greater, and some a less number. This, indeed, of itself, affords a conclusive proof that the character of these words has not been clearly understood, for, in other parts of speech, noun, adjective, and verb, the discriminating circumstances are so evident, that no doubt can arise concerning their classification."

Why has not the character of the preposition been as clearly understood as the character of the noun or adjective? Because the preposition is not so well defined in the Greek or Latin grammars as the noun or adjective. Our first writers on English grammar did not write from their knowledge of the English language, but from their knowledge of Greek and Latin, consequently the imperfections in the Greek and Latin grammars were thus transfused into our language in its infancy. Nineteen in every twenty of those who have written on the sub-

ject since that time, have been of the same character as the primitive writers. That many of these grammatical inconsistencies and imperfections still exist, cannot surprise us. Doctor Crombie, in alluding to Mr. Harris's definition of the preposition has justly observed:—"This furnishes one of many examples how easily error may be imposed and propagated by the authority of a great name. But, though error may be repeatedly transmitted from age to age, unsuspected and unquestioned, it cannot be perpetuated." The definition of the preposition which the Doctor *selected*, and to which *he* gave the authority of his *great name*, is *another of the many examples*.

Lennie's definition of the preposition is, "A preposition is a word put before nouns and pronouns, to show the relation between *them*; as, 'He sailed *from* Leith *to* London *in* two days.'"

Between *what* does the preposition show a relation? Between *nouns* and *pronouns*—between what nouns and pronouns? Of course between the nouns and pronouns which are the antecedents of the pronoun *them*, that is, the nouns and pronouns before which the preposition is put. According to this definition the nouns and pronouns between which the preposition shows a relation, must follow the preposition, which, I believe, is not the meaning Mr. Lennie wanted to impart. Consequently the definition is *badly worded*. In the sentence *he sailed from Leith*, the only noun after the preposition *from*, is the word *Leith*, but we cannot say the preposition *from*, shows a *relation between Leith*. It must be between *Leith* and some other noun or pronoun after *from*, which is absurd, when *Leith* is the only word after it.

We strongly recommend the learner to ask, what relation does every preposition show? Between what words the relation exists, and how does the preposition show it. For instance, in the example given by Mr. Lennie, "He sailed *from* Leith *to* London *in* two days." What relation does the word *from* show? Between what two words does this relation exist? How does the word *from* show this relation? Perhaps Mr. Lennie may reply, that the word *from* shows the relation of *departure, or sailing*, between the word *he* and the word

*Leith*. Neither Mr. Lennie, nor any other, can show that *Leith* has anything to do with the departure, or sailing. *Leith did not depart, or sail!!!* Between what two words does the preposition *to* show a relation, and what *is* that relation? How does the word *to* show this relation? There is no relation existing between *Leith* and *London* that can be expressed by the word *to*. What relation does the word *in* show? Between what two words does this relation exist? How does the word *in* show it? According to Lennie the word *days* is one of the words between which the word *in* shows a relation, but according to his definition what the other word is, no one can say. It may be, *he*, *Leith*, or *London*. To assert that a relation exists between the word *days* and the word *he*, *Leith*, or *London*, and that the word *in* shows this relation, is as evident an inconsistency as to assert that *virtue is vice*.

We present the reader the following rich specimens of Mr. Lennie's puffing.

See title page: "The principles of English grammar, comprising *the substance of all the most approved English Grammars extant*, briefly defined and neatly arranged."

Page 179. "The preceding Grammar, owing to the uncommon *precision* and brevity of the *definitions*, *rules*, and *notes*, is not only better adapted to the capacity of children than the generality of these, styled introductory Grammars; but it is so extensively provided with exercises of every sort, that it will entirely supersede the use of "Mr. (Lindley) Murray's larger Grammar and exercises; for this is not a mere *outline*, like his Abridgment, which contains only about *seven* pages of exercises on bad grammar. This contains more than *sixty*. This contains a *complete course* of grammar, and *supersedes the use of any other book of the kind*." What a national jewel!!

"In short, by abridging every subject of minor importance, by omitting discussion on the numberless points about which grammarians differ, by rendering the rules and definitions more perspicuous, and at the same time abridging them more than *one-half*, by selecting short sentences on bad grammar, by leaving few broken lines, and printing them close together—as many exercises under each rule of syntax are compressed



into this epitome as there are in Mr. Murray's volume of Exercises; so that the use of his Abridgement, price 1s. 3d.—his larger Grammar, price 4s.—and that of his Exercises, price 2s. 6d. are completely superseded by this little volume at 1s. 6d.; while, at the same time, the learner will acquire as much knowledge of grammar with this in *six* months, as with all these volumes in *twelve*."

The last clause shows Mr. Lennie's *refined* taste and *pure* diction. It only contains *four glaring errors*: namely, the use *are* completely superseded, instead of, *is* superseded; *and that*, instead of *and*; *with this*, for *by this*; *with all these*, for *by all these*.

Let us examine this *puffing* a little.

How can Mr. Lennie's Grammar comprise the substance of all the most approved English grammars extant, and *omit the numberless discussions* on subjects of the greatest grammatical importance on which grammarians have differed; as, *moods, tenses, cases*, etc.? In one part of his Grammar, he tells us, that his is better adapted to the capacities of children than other grammars; in page 84, he unblushingly acknowledges his *incapability* of writing a definition of a preposition, which will lead a child to distinguish it from the other kinds of words. Let the public judge his capability of writing a definition of it for adults. To finish his *bubble*, he modestly informs the public, that "every page" in his rough-bound, 18-penny Grammar "*wears an air of neatness and ease invitingly sweet*." What Mr. Lennie means *by wearing an air*, we cannot imagine. *Invitingly sweet*, is a flagrant prostitution of words.

See Lennie's grammar, page 142.

"*With* and *and*."

"When a *singular* noun has a clause joined to it by *with*, it is often difficult to determine whether the *verb* should be *singular* or *plural*, especially as our most reputable authors use sometimes the one, and sometimes the other; for example, some would say, 'My uncle with his son, *was* in town yesterday.' Others would say, 'My uncle with his son, *were* in town yesterday.'

“If we take the *sense* for our guide—and nothing else can guide us in a case of this kind—it is evident that the verb should be *plural*; for both *uncle* and *son* are the joint subject of our affirmation, and declared to be both in the *same* state.

“When we perceive from the *sense*, that the noun *before* *with* is *exclusively* the real subject, then the verb should be *singular*; thus, ‘*Christ* with his three chosen disciples was transfigured on the mount.’ Here the verb is *singular*, because we know that none but Christ was transfigured; the disciples were not joint associates with him, they were mere spectators. There seems to be an ellipsis in such sentences as this, which, if supplied in the present, would run thus: ‘*Christ* (who was attended) with his three chosen disciples, was transfigured on the mount.’” *With* in the last sentence is bad English, and ought to be *by*.

“Mr. Lindley Murray, however, thinks that the verb should be *singular* in the following and similar sentences. ‘Prosperity with humility *renders* its possessor truly amiable;’ ‘the side A, with the sides B and C composes the triangle.’ In my opinion, on the contrary, the verb should be *plural*. For in the first sentence it is not asserted that prosperity *alone* renders its possessor truly amiable, but prosperity and humility *united*, and co-operating to produce an effect in their joint state, which they were incapable of achieving in their individual capacity.

“If true, as Mr. Lindley Murray says, that the *side* A, in the second sentence, is the *true* nominative to the verb, then it follows of course, that the two sides, B and C, have no agency, or no share, in forming the triangle. It is obvious, however, that *one* side cannot form a triangle, or three-sided figure, and that the sides B and C are as much concerned in forming the triangle, as the side A, and, therefore, the verb should be *plural*.

“Upon the whole, we may venture to give the two following general rules:—

“1. That wherever the noun or pronoun after *with* exists, acts, or suffers, *jointly* with the singular nominative *before* it, the verb should be *plural*; as, ‘She with her sisters are well;’ ‘his purse with its contents were abstracted from his pocket;’

'the General with his men *were* taken prisoners.' In these sentences the verb is plural, because the words *after with* are as much the *subject* of discourse as the words before it. Her *sisters were well* as well as she; the *contents* as well as the purse were abstracted; and the *men* as well as the General were taken prisoners. If in the first example we say—*is well*, then the meaning will be, she is well when in *company* with her sisters; and the idea that her *sisters are well*, will be entirely *excluded*.

"2. When the noun *after with* is a mere involuntary or inanimate *instrument*, the verb should be *singular*; as, 'the Captain with his men *catches* poor Africans and *sells* them for slaves;' 'the 'Squire with his hounds *kills* a fox.' Here the verb is *singular*, because the men and hounds are not *joint* agents with the Captain and 'Squire; they are as much the mere instruments in their hands as the *gun* and *pen* in the hands of *he* and *she* in the following sentences. 'He with his gun *shoots* a hare;' 'she with her pen *writes* a letter.'"

Mr. Lennie says, "If we take the sense for our guide, and nothing else can guide us in a case of this kind, it is evident that the verb should be *plural*, for both uncle and son are the joint subject of our affirmation." He informs his readers, in page 83 of his Grammar, that the word *with* is sometimes used for *and*, and refers to the following examples under his first general rule (which rule *see*, in the extract we have already given): "'She with her sisters *are* well;' 'his purse with its contents *were* abstracted from his pocket;" "the General with his men *were* taken prisoners." In these sentences the verb is *plural*, because the words *after with* are as much the subject of discourse (we suppose he means as much the subject of the *verbs*) as the words before them."

We insist that the word *with* cannot be correctly used for *and*; that Mr. Lennie's first general rule is erroneous, and that each of the sentences, "My uncle with his son *were* in town yesterday;" "she with her sisters *are* well;" "his purse with its contents *were* abstracted from his pocket;" "the General with his men *were* taken prisoners;" is bad English. They ought to be, "*She and her sisters are well*;" "his purse *and* its con-

tempts were abstracted from his pocket;" "the General *and* his men were taken prisoners." If, in the examples given by Mr. Lennie, namely, "She with her sisters are well," etc., *with* is used instead of *and*, consequently *with* in these examples is a conjunction. Mr. Lennie tells us that the words after *with* are as much the subject of the verbs as the words before it, consequently the conjunction *with*, in these examples, combines the agency of the noun before it, with that of the noun after it; but he tells us in page 83, that "*And* is the *only conjunction* that combines the agency of two or more into *one*;" which appears to us a manifest contradiction.

Let us test the propriety of using *with* for *and*, by an example or two. "*If my uncle with his son were in town yesterday*," is good English; "*My father with his son were in town yesterday*;" that is, *My father with I were in town yesterday*, is equally correct. I hope Mr. Lennie will not deny that *I am my father's son*, and that *My father with I were in town yesterday*, is bad English; consequently, *with* cannot be used for *and*, which proves his first general rule is erroneous.

Lindley Murray says, "the side A *with* the sides B and C composes the triangle."

Lennie says, that it ought to be, "the side A *with* the sides B and C compose the triangle."

We say, that Lindley Murray and Lennie are both wrong, and that the sentence ought to be, the side A, B, *and* C *form* the triangle.

As each of the three sides has a share in the formation of the triangle, consequently, they are the joint subject of the verb *form*; but the subjects of the same verb cannot be coupled or combined by a preposition. Therefore, Lindley Murray was wrong in using *with* to combine the side A with the side B and C, which are subjects of the same verb; and he was also wrong in using *composes*, which is the form of the verb coinciding with an individual subject.

Lennie has only corrected one of Lindley Murray's faults, that is, he has properly used the plural form of the verb, but he has improperly used *with* instead of *and*.

When the singular noun before *with* is exclusively the subject of the verb, as in the sentence, "My uncle with his son was in town yesterday," *with*, and the explanatory requisite *his son*, ought to come after the simple sentence; as, "my uncle was in town yesterday *with his son*." If the noun before, and the noun after *with* are the subject of the verb, *and* must be used to combine them, and not *with*; as, the side A, B, and C form the triangle, and not, the side A with the sides B and C form the triangle.

If the word *with* is sometimes used for *and*, that is, as a conjunction, why has not Mr. Lennie included it in the list of his conjunctions? or why has not he pointed out to the reader how to determine when the conjunction *with* is preferable to the conjunction *and*?

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### ON THE LINK, OR CONJUNCTION.

A *Link* is a connective word, by which we combine two sentences; as, "I shall go, *if* you please;" "she improves, *because* she studies," etc.

Is not, *I shall go*, a sentence? Is not, *you please*, another? Are not these sentences combined by the word, *if*? By the definition, *if* is a link. Is not, *she improves*, a sentence? Is not, *she studies*, another? Are not they combined by the word *because*? By the definition, *because* is a link.

English grammarians are not unanimous respecting the use of the conjunction. Lowth, Ruddiman, and some others, declare it is only used to link sentences. Lindley Murray, Crombie, Grant, and many others, assert, that in some examples the conjunction does not connect sentences—that it merely connects words. In support of these views, Lindley Murray makes the following observations, page 127.—"Though

the conjunction is commonly used to connect sentences together, yet, on some occasions, it merely connects words, not sentences; as, 'the king *and* queen are an amiable pair;' where the affirmation cannot refer to each; it being absurd to say, 'that the *king*, or the *queen*, only, is an amiable pair.' So in the instances, 'two and two are four;' 'the fifth and sixth volumes will complete the set of books.'"

Crombie's grammar, page 237, *note* 2: — Mr. Harris says "That the chief difference between prepositions and conjunctions is, that the former couple words, and the latter, sentences." This opinion is erroneous; for conjunctions frequently couple words, as in the following example:—"A man of wisdom and virtue is a perfect character." "Here it is not implied, that a man of wisdom is a perfect character, but a man of wisdom, combined with virtue, or a man of wisdom and virtue. That conjunctions, indeed, do not couple at all, in that sense; at least, in which grammarians have understood the term, Mr. Tooke seems to have incontestably proved. That they sometimes couple sentences, or that instances may be produced, in which Harris's definition will appear correct, the following example will serve as an evidence:"—"You and I and John rode to town:" *i. e.* 'You rode,' and 'I rode,' and 'John rode.' But to assert, that this is their distinctive property, is to affirm what may be disproved by numberless examples. If we say, 'two and two are four.' Are two four, and two four? A B, B C, and C A, form a triangle. Is A B a triangle? or B C? or C A? 'John and Mary are a handsome couple.' 'Is John a couple? and Mary a couple? The common theory, therefore, is false; nor is it to be doubted, that conjunctions are, in respect to signification, and were originally in regard to their regimen, verbs, or words compounded of nouns and attributives."

Grant's grammar, page 210:—"Conjunctions connect verbs or sentences, and sometimes like cases: as, 'He *receives* plentifully, *and bestows* liberally,' 'I *love* him, and (I *love*) her;' '*he and she* are considered as a happy couple;' 'I consider him and her as a happy couple;' 'the quarrel was between *John and William*.'"

*Explanation.* — “ Conjunctions, we apprehend, generally connect verbs or affirmations; the copulative, however, connecting sometimes these, and sometimes like cases of nouns and pronouns. In the two first examples, it is evident that the two verbs or sentences are connected. In the three last, it is equally evident that two sentences are not connected, but two cases *couple* and *quarrel*, being predicable, not of each individual, but of the two taken conjointly as parts of one and the same affirmation. When, therefore, Mr. Lindley Murray (Syntax—rule 18) marks, ‘The master taught *her and me* to write,’ as an example, in which the copulative connects merely cases, he is incorrect; for, in truth, two distinct affirmations are implied, and connected; ‘The master *taught* her to write,’ and, ‘the master *taught* me to write.’ His other example, however, is pertinent: ‘*He and she* are school-fellows,’ provided the *fellowship* is intended to be confined to the two subjects of the verb; otherwise, as by adding ‘of mine,’ two affirmations may be implied.”

I believe the opinion of Lowth, Harris, and Ruddiman, in this case, is correct and consistent, and the opinion of Lindley Murray, Crombie, and Grant, erroneous, as the latter can only produce *plausible* objections to particular applications of one *solitary conjunction*, while all the other conjunctions, in their universal application, and even the solitary conjunction *and*, in its general application, connect sentences and not words. *If* the objections made by Lindley Murray, Crombie, and Grant, *were just*; yet ought not they to be considered as *exceptions*, as they are all confined to particular applications of the word *and*, and do not apply to any other conjunction?

Let us test a few of these examples, in which, according to these writers, conjunctions connect words and not sentences.

Lindley Murray:—“*The king and queen are an amiable pair*; where the affirmation cannot refer to each; it being absurd to say, that the king or queen *only* is an amiable pair.” I say, that the affirmation can and does *relate* to each of the words, *king* and *queen*. In every assertive sentence, do we not assert something of the subject of the verb? What is the subject of the verb *are*, in the sentence, *the king and queen*

*are an amiable pair?* Are not the word *king* and the word *queen*, its subject? Consequently we assert something of the word *king* and *queen*; that is, we assert something of *each* of the words, *king* and *queen*.

Let us admit Lindley Murray's position (if possible) that the affirmation does not relate to each of the words, *king* and *queen*; that is, the affirmation has no *relation* to the word *king*, and it has no relation to the word *queen*, and it has a relation to both the words, *king* and *queen*, which is truly absurd. How can it relate to *both* and not to *each*? We assert nothing of the word *king*, and nothing of the word *queen*; that is, *nothing* and *nothing are an amiable pair*, according to Lindley Murray's position. If A and B owe *twenty pounds*, according to Lindley Murray's reasoning, you cannot say that A owes any thing? Why cannot you say that A owes any thing? Because you cannot say, *he owes twenty pounds*! For the same reason, B owes nothing, that is, *A and B owe nothing*; and, at the same time, A and B owe twenty pounds! To assert that each of two persons, who jointly owe twenty pounds, at the same time owes nothing, is neither consistency nor common sense.

Lindley Murray had very little sagacity, if he could not discern that the principal thing asserted in the sentence, *the king and queen are an amiable pair*, is the *amiability* of the king and queen, and not that "the *king* and *queen* are a *pair*." We say that there is no difference in meaning between *the king and queen are amiable*, and, *the king and queen are an amiable pair*. Cannot we, with propriety, say, "the king is amiable," and "the queen is amiable?" that is, "the king and queen are an amiable pair." Who ever doubted, or wanted to be informed, that *one* and *one* are a *pair*?" In the sentence, *two and three are five*, the word *two*, and the word *three*, are evidently the subject of the assertive *are*; and that we assert something of the entire subject, is equally evident. As the assertion relates to the word *two*, and the word *three*, consequently we assert something of the word *two*, and something of the word *three*, that is, we have two assertions combined by the word *and*, but an assertion, or interrogation, is a sentence.



therefore, in the sentence, *two and three are five*, the word *and*, connects two *inseparable* sentences, or assertions, and not two words. The sentence, "The fifth and sixth volumes will complete the set of books," is bad English, and ought to be, "the fifth and sixth *volume* will complete the set of books;" which, in its corrected state, is similar in grammatical construction to the sentence, "*two and three are five*;" consequently the observations on the latter, prove that *and* connects two assertions, or sentences, in the former as well as in the latter sentence. You can say, "The fifth *volume*, and the sixth *volume*;" but cannot, without impropriety, say, "The fifth volumes and the sixth volumes."

The preceding observations show, that the word *and* connects sentences in each of the following examples:—"John *and* Mary are a handsome couple."—Crombie. "He *and* she are considered a happy couple."—Grant.

The correctness of a sentence ought to be critically investigated before any inferences that may be drawn from its construction can be received as grammatical laws. We ought not to depart from the direct, honest simplicity, which distinguishes the English language, as well as the English character, without necessity. Every periphrasis is a departure from this direct simplicity. For instance, when I can clearly express my meaning by an adjective, to employ a preposition and substantive in its stead, which do not more *clearly* indicate the meaning, is a periphrasis.

#### Examples:—

<i>He is a man of goodness</i> , instead of <i>he is a good man</i> ,		
He is a <i>man of kindness</i> ,	for	he is a <i>kind man</i> ,
He is a <i>man of wisdom</i> ,	for	he is a <i>wise man</i> ,
He is a <i>man of justice</i> ,	for	he is a <i>just man</i> ,
He is a <i>man of virtue</i> ,	for	he is a <i>virtuous man</i> ,
He is a <i>man of honesty</i> ,	for	he is an <i>honest man</i> ,
He is a <i>man of sickness</i> ,	for	he is a <i>sick man</i> ,
He is a <i>man of hunger</i> ,	for	he is a <i>hungry man</i> ,
etc., etc.		

Some persons may object, that no correct speaker says, "He *is a man of honesty*;" "he is a *man of goodness*;" "he is a

*man of kindness*; he is a *man of sickness*;" etc. What impropriety is there in saying, "He is a *man of kindness*," more than in saying, "He is a *man of wisdom*," or in saying, "He is a *man of hunger*," more than in saying, "He is a *man of virtue*." In a grammatical point of view, the one is as correct as the other.

Doctor Crombie gives the following example to show, that conjunctions sometimes connect words *only*: *A man of wisdom and virtue is a perfect character*, which, according to the foregoing observations, ought to be, "A *wise, virtuous man*, is a perfect character." Consequently, the inference drawn from the Doctor's construction, concerning the word *and*, cannot be received as a part of our grammatical code. See the extract from Crombie. His other examples are similar to those given by Lindley Murray, of which we have already taken notice. The Doctor tells us, "That conjunctions, indeed, do not couple at all, in that sense, at least, in which grammarians have understood the term, Tooke seems to have incontestably proved." If Tooke's views of the sense in which conjunctions *couple*, are the offspring of *truth*, and the views of all other grammarians are the offspring of *error*; why did not the Doctor define for his readers the sense in which conjunctions *truly couple*, or why has not he given a definition of a conjunction from which its real, or distinctive character, must appear? To prove that he has not done so, we need only refer the reader to the definitions given in the extracts:—

"A conjunction is that part of speech which connects words and sentences."—Crombie.

"Conjunctions couple words or sentences."—Grant.

"A conjunction is a part of speech that is chiefly used to connect sentences; so as out of two or more sentences to make but one. It sometimes connects only words."—Lindley Murray.

"A conjunction is a word which joins words and sentences together."—Lennie.

There is no difference in meaning between Dr. Crombie's definition of a conjunction, and any of the three other definitions of it here cited. We find a little difference in the phra-

seology, but none whatever in the sense. Each of the four authors, asserts, that conjunctions couple either words, or sentences. What does the Doctor mean, then, by saying, that conjunctions do not *couple at all*? What does he mean by the sense in which grammarians have understood them? Is not the sense in which grammarians have understood them, the sense which is expressed by Lindley Murray, Grant, Lennie, and the Doctor himself? Does the Doctor mean to say, that Horne Tooke *seems* to have *incontestably proved*, that all grammarians have false views of the sense in which conjunctions couple, and, consequently, that all grammarians have given bad definitions? That Horne Tooke himself was a grammarian, I presume, none will deny; consequently, Horne Tooke *seems* to have incontestably proved, that conjunctions do not couple in that sense in which *himself understood the term*. Is not there something inconsistent and discordant in the terms, *seems incontestably*, and *proved*? How can a *proof* be only seeming, or how can that which is *only seeming* be a proof? It must be more than *seeming* to be a *proof*. Does not the word *proof*, imply an *incontrovertible test*? Consequently, *incontestably proved*, is tautology.

Every link couples two sentences.

Every two simple sentences may be coupled by one link; consequently, there is no necessity to employ links in pairs, as some grammarians assert. Many words used as links are sometimes used for other purposes; consequently, when so employed, they cease to be links, and must be considered of the same class as the words whose duty they perform. The following examples of conjunctions used in pairs are taken from Lindley Murray's Grammar, page 203:—"She is as amiable as her sister."

The first *as* is evidently a descriptive. "*Though* he was rich, *yet* for our sakes he became poor." *Though*, in the above sentence, is superfluous, as the meaning is exactly the same without it as with it. For the same reason, *either* is superfluous in the following sentence, "I will *either* send it, or bring it myself." "Pompey was not *so* great a general as *Cesar*, nor *so* great a man."

So, in the above sentence is a descriptive, *as* and *nor* are links, because each of them couples two sentences. When two links appear to be used in coupling the same two sentences, if one of them is not superfluous, it is a sentence descriptive.

*And* is the only simple link, that is, it is the only link by which we can couple two sentences, without changing the signification of either; as, "I shall go, *and* you shall stop at home."

The meaning of the sentence, "*I shall go*," is not changed or affected by the link *and*, nor is the meaning of the sentence, "*You shall stop at home*."

*And* is grammatically what plus or the sign (+) is arithmetically, that is, the sign plus (+) implies the addition of the two numbers it couples, so does *and* imply the addition of the two assertions or interrogations which it unites.

*Because* is an index that points out an origin; as, "You are healthy, *because* you are temperate;" "I esteem you, *because* you have always been faithful and attentive."

In the first of the preceding examples, *because* points out the origin of your health; in the second example it shows the origin of my esteem.

*Because*, not only unites the two sentences, *I esteem you, you have always been faithful and attentive*; but also converts the latter sentence into a kind of sentence descriptive or adverb, which is explanatory of the cause why *I esteem you*. Therefore, *because* is not like *and*, a simple link.

*Although* is used to intimate that the thing asserted in the one simple sentence, is opposed to the natural consequences of what is asserted in the other; as, "*Although* I have overpaid him for his services, he has robbed me." "*Although* I have repeatedly succoured him, he now tries to injure me." In the preceding example, *although* links the two simple sentences, *I have repeatedly succoured him, he now tries to injure me*, and intimates that the present attempt to injure is opposed to the natural consequences of the repeated succours.

*If* combines in its signification a contingency and a contingent condition. It imparts the contingency to the sentence

that immediately succeeds it, and the contingent condition it imparts to the other of the two sentences which it unites; as, "*if he shall go, I shall stop at home.*" *If* imparts its contingency to the sentence *he shall go*, which succeeds it, and its contingent condition it imparts to the sentence, "*I shall stop at home.*" Each of the sentences, if read without the link *if*, will be found to be an independent assertive sentence; but when united by the link *if*, *he shall go* ceases to be a sentence; and becomes a kind of sentence descriptive, explanatory of the clause, *I shall stop at home.* *I shall stop at home*, ceases to be an independent sentence, and becomes a dependent clause, of which the constructive meaning depends on the clause, *if he shall go*.

Both clauses form but one contingent assertive sentence. When I say, *if he shall go, I shall stop at home*, I do not positively assert that *I shall stop at home*. I promise to stop at home under the conditional contingency which is expressed by the clause, *if he shall go.* *I shall stop at home*, is not less contingent than *if he shall go*, because my stopping at home depends on his going. How any grammarian, capable of critically investigating the truth and accuracy of a sentence, could make *shall go* a verb of the subjunctive mood, and *shall stop* a verb of the indicative, at the same time that both verbs are equally contingent, is difficult to conceive.

*Or*, implies the existence of a contingent negative condition before it, and a dependent contingent assertion after it; as, "*I shall go or send my son.*" *If I do not go*, is the contingent negative condition, and *I shall send my son*, is the dependent contingent assertion. I do not positively promise, that I shall send my son. The condition on which I promise to send him, is, *if I do not go*; consequently, *I shall send my son*, is a dependent contingent assertion.

What difference is there between *if* and *or*, as each of them implies a contingency?

*Or* is equivalent to *if not*. When two assertive sentences are connected by *or*, then there is something positively asserted; but when two assertive sentences are connected by *if*, there is nothing positively asserted; as when I say, *if he*

*will go, I shall stop at home*, there is nothing positively asserted.

I do not positively assert that *he will go*, nor do I assert positively that *I shall stop at home*. But when I say, “*I shall go, or send my son*,” I positively assert one of two things; that is, *that I shall go, or send my son*.

Each of the other links may be defined from the effect it has on the sentences which it connects.

### ON THE EXCLAMATION, OR INTERJECTION.

The exclamation is a word by which the speaker intimates that affection of his mind or feelings which arises from some circumstance or event; as, *O!* what shall become of me!” “*Alas!* fortune is not happiness.”

*O*, in the first example, is used to intimate the speaker's dread of what shall become of him.

*Alas*, in the second example, is used to intimate the speaker's desponding regret that fortune is not happiness.

The questions after the assertive ought to be here renewed, and the following new questions added:

75. What is a *sentence descriptive*?

76. Why adopt the name *sentence descriptive*, and reject the old name *adverb*?

77. What is a *requisite link*?

78. Why adopt the name *requisite link*, and reject the old name *preposition*?

79. What difference is there between a sentence descriptive and a *requisite link*?

80. What is a link?

81. Why adopt the name *link*, and reject the old name *conjunction*?

82. What difference is there between a *link* and a *requisite link*?

83. What is an exclamation?

84. Why adopt the name *exclamation*, and reject the old name *interjection*?

85. What difference is there between an exclamation and a sentence descriptive?

86. What difference is there between an exclamation and a name descriptive?

87. What is a name?

88. Why reject the old name *substantive* or *noun*?

89. What is a name substitute?

90. Why reject the old name *pronoun*?

91. How many kinds of name substitutes?

92. What is a personal substitute?

93. What substitutes indicate sex?

94. Why do not substitutes of the first or second person, or plural substitutes of the third person, indicate sex?

95. What is sex?

96. How many sexes are there?

Almost all our English grammatical writers inform us there are three *genders*, and that *gender* is the distinction of nouns with regard to sex.

97. If *gender* is the distinction of nouns with regard to *sex*, how can there be three distinctions, that is, three genders, when there are only *two things to be distinguished*?

98. What name descriptives can be varied?

99. What name descriptives can be varied by a change of termination?

100. What name descriptives can be varied in signification by prefixing the word *more* or *most*?

101. What name descriptives are invariable in termination, and do not take *more* or *most* before them?

102. What is a mutable descriptive?

103. What is an immutable descriptive?

104. Why not class the links?

105. Why not class the requisite links?

106. Why not admit articles in the English language?

107. Why not admit, or rather why have not we adjective

pronouns, pronominal adjectives, adverbial conjunctions, or conjunctive adverbs in English?

108. Why reject the singular number?

109. What necessity is there to consider, and distinguish the person of every name, and name substitute?

110. How many persons are there according to the grammatical acceptance of the term *person*?

111. What is the grammatical acceptance of the term *person*?

112. What is a subject?

113. What is a requisite?

114. How are we to know the form of the assertive that coincides with any subject, time, or transit?

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### ANSWERS TO THE PRECEDING QUESTIONS.

75. See the definition of a sentence descriptive.

76. Because the name *sentence descriptive*, is expressive of the actual use made of the word. We reject the word *adverb*, because there is no relation between it and the use we make of it. We have shown it is occasionally added to each of the different kinds of words. If it is called an adverb because it is added to a verb, consequently, we can with equal propriety, call it an *ad-adjective* when added to an adjective, and an *ad-preposition*, when added to a preposition, etc.

77. See the definition of the *requisite link*.

78. Because the name, *requisite link*, is expressive of the use made of the word employed, and we reject the name *preposition*, because there is no relation between it and the use we make of it.

79. The difference may be easily inferred by reading the definition of each.



80. See the definition of the link.

81. Because the word *link* is shorter and a more simple and familiar expression than the word *conjunction*.

82. The *requisite link* joins an explanatory requisite or an explanatory object to a simple sentence, but the link connects two sentences.

83. See the definition of the exclamation.

84. Because it is more appropriate, general, and familiar than the word *interjection*, of which the meaning is entirely confined to grammarians.

85. An exclamation intimates the effect which the thing asserted has produced on the speaker; but the sentence descriptive is explanatory of the assertion.

86. Repeat the definition of the exclamation and name descriptive, and their difference appears.

87. See the definition of a name.

88. Because the word *name* is more simple, familiar, and comprehensive than the word *substantive* or *noun*. If you ask a hundred persons who speak and write English, but who *are not grammarians*, what is a *substantive* or *noun*, ninety-nine of them will tell you, that a substantive is anything having substance; the entire of them will tell you, that they do not know what a *noun* is.

89. See the definition of a name substitute.

90. For the same reason that we reject *substantive* or *noun*.

91. There are two kinds of substitutes; namely, the personal and the name substitute. See the definition of each.

92. See the definition of a personal substitute.

93. *He, him, she, and her.*

94. Because these substitutes have no forms to denote sex.

95. See the definition of sex.

96. Two sexes.

97. As there are only two sexes, therefore every living thing must be either male or female: that is, in living things there are only two distinctions with regard to sex; namely, male and female. To consider sex where it is not, that is, in inanimate objects, is too absurd.

98. Mutable name descriptives.

99. Mutable name descriptives of one syllable. See the exceptions under the mutable descriptives.

100. Mutable descriptives of two or more syllables. See the exceptions under the mutable descriptives.

101. Immutable name descriptives.

102. A mutable name descriptive is that of which the meaning is variable.

103. An immutable name descriptive is that of which the meaning is invariable.

104. Because the classification is no advantage to the pupil, and renders parsing both tedious and complex.

105. Because there is no diversity in the use we make of them.

106. Why should we admit that which does not exist in the language? If *a* or *an* is an article, why is not *one* an article? If *the* is an article, why is not *this*, *that*, *these*, *those*, or *same*, an article?

107. Because every word in a sentence belongs to some one of the classes into which the words of the language are divided, and cannot belong to two of them at the same time.

If we admit pronominal adjectives, adjective pronouns, adverbial conjunctions, etc., we cannot say, that we have only eight or nine different kinds of words in the language; because a person admitting this cannot deny that there is a difference between an *adjective* and an *adjective pronoun*, between an *adjective* and a *pronominal adjective*, and between an *adjective pronoun* and a *pronominal adjective*. If this grammatical chymistry is admitted, we have, instead of eight or nine kinds of words, at least forty; to define each of which, and in parsing to distinguish them one from the other, has discouraged thousands of learners, and given them a fatal dislike to grammar, which can be seldom removed.

108. Because no *number* can be *singular*. One of any kind cannot make a number of that kind. If a man has but one horse, he cannot say, that he has a *number of horses*; if he has only one sovereign, how can he in truth say that he has a *number of sovereigns*? No less than two can form a collec-

tion or number; consequently one is no number, as Malcolm justly observes.

109. Because the generality of assertives and name substitutes, have forms to indicate each of the *persons*; that is, the person speaking, spoken to, or spoken of.

110. Three: first, the person speaking; second, the person or persons, thing or things, spoken to; third, the person or persons, thing or things, spoken of.

111. *Person* is the place which names or substitutes occupy in the current of conversation; which fully appears from the two preceding answers.

112. A subject is that of which we assert something, or about which we ask.

113. The explanatory object which the subject and assertive jointly require to form a definite assertion, is a requisite.

114. The form of the assertive coinciding with any *subject*, *time*, or *transit*, may be known by the exposition of the assertive. (See page 45.)

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## ON THE THIRD PART OF GRAMMAR.

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The third part of Grammar is that which teaches how to arrange words into correct sentences.

For which purpose the following Rules and Notes are the most important.

## RULE I.

Every name in a sentence is a subject, or requisite, and so is every name substitute, as, "*James* has built a *house* for *Mary*, and *she* now lives in *it*."

## Explanation.

In the preceding example, *James*, *house*, and *Mary*, are the only names, and *she* and *it* are the name substitutes. *James* is the subject of the assertive *built*; a *house* is the requisite of the subject *James*, and the assertive *built*; and *Mary* is the requisite of the requisite link *for*. *She* is the subject of the assertive *lives*, and *it* is the requisite of the requisite link, *in*.

NOTE 1.—When two names of the same thing are connected by an assertive, each is the subject of that assertive; as, "*James* is a *merchant*;" "*Henry* has become a *great man*."

In the preceding examples, *James* is the subject of the assertive *is*, and *merchant* is a name of the same subject, or person; hence, although we have two names, yet we have but one subject, because the two names are names of the same sub-

ject, or person. The same may be said of *Henry* and the *great man*.

NOTE 2. — The names connected by the assertive *to be*, when used to assert, or interrogate, are generally names of the same person or persons, thing or things, hence they are always subjects; and two substitutes connected by the assertive *to be*, are also subjects, and substitutes, for the same name; as, “*I am he* whom they invited.”

In the preceding examples, *I* and *he* are substitutes for the speaker's name. The only exceptions which appear to rule the first, are names that only serve to awake the attention of the person addressed, and explanatory names; as, “*Sir*, you are right;” “*My lord*, what shall I do?” “*William the Conqueror*.”

In the preceding examples, neither is *sir*, nor *my lord*, a subject, or requisite, because *sir* is no part of the first sentence, nor is *my lord*, a part of the second: yet, strictly speaking, they are not exceptions to rule the first, because rule the first speaks only of the names *in a sentence*; but, *sir*, or *my lord*, is not a name *in a sentence*, therefore, it cannot be justly considered as an exception. The *Conqueror* is a name explanatory of *William*.

## RULE II.

The form of the assertive used to assert or interrogate, must coincide with the *subject* and with the *time* or *transit* expressed or implied; as, “*He is writing* ;” “*they will go* next week ;” “*she wrote* yesterday.”

In the preceding examples, *am writing*, is the form of the assertive that coincides with the subject *he* and the passing transit which is implied. *Will go* is the form of the assertive coinciding with the subject *they*, and the future time, *next week*. *Wrote* is the form coinciding with the subject *she* and the detached past time, *yesterday*.

NOTE 1.—The part of a sentence before the assertive, is sometimes the subject; as, “*To study a language perfectly requires many years;*” “*to be temperate in eating and drinking, and use exercise in the open air,* are the best preservatives of health.”

In the first example, *to study a language perfectly*, is the subject of the assertive *requires*.

*To be temperate in eating and drinking* is one of the preservatives of health, or part of the subject of the assertive *are*, and *to use exercise in the open air*, is the other preservative, or part of the subject of the assertive *are*.

### RULE III.

Every subject assertive, used assertively, must have a subject expressed or implied, as, “*They sleep;*” “*she sits;*” “*go instantly,*” etc.

#### Explanation.

In the preceding examples, *they* is the subject of the assertive *sleep*. *She* is the subject of the assertive *sits*, and *you* implied, is the subject of the assertive *go*.

### RULE IV.

Every requisite assertive used *assertively*, or *interrogatively*, must have a *subject* and *requisite*, expressed or implied; as, *He wrote a letter; James sees me; she has been writing a letter*, etc.

#### Explanation.

In the preceding examples, *he* is the subject of the assertive *wrote*, and the *letter* is the *requisite*, that is, the *letter* is what the subject *he* and the assertive *wrote*, require to form a definite assertion. *James* is the subject of the assertive *sees*, and *me* is the requisite of *James sees*, that is, *me* is what the subject *James*, and the assertive *sees*, require to form a definite assertion. *She* is the subject of the assertive *has been writing*, and *a letter* is the requisite of the subject *she*, and the assertive *has been writing*; that is, the letter is what the

subject *she* and the assertive *has been writing*, require to form a definite assertion.

NOTE 1.—When a subject or requisite assertive is not used to assert or interrogate, it does not coincide in form with any subject, and is always preceded by the word *to* expressed or implied; as, I intend *to write*, thou intendest *to write*, he intends *to write*. Here the assertive *to write*, does not vary, to coincide with the indirect subject, *I, thou, or he*.

NOTE 2.—The part of a sentence that follows the subject and assertive, is sometimes used as the requisite; as, “He intends *to write a long letter*.”

In the preceding example, *to write a long letter*, is the requisite of the subject *he*, and the assertive *intends*.

NOTE 3.—An indefinite simple sentence containing a requisite, sometimes requires another requisite to limit the assertion and complete the sense; as, “They forced *me to retire*,” “she compelled *them to sign their names*.”

In the first of the preceding examples, *they forced me*, is an indefinite simple sentence, because *what* they forced *me to do* is unknown, and yet requisite to limit the assertion and complete the sense; consequently, *to retire*, which limits the sentence and completes the sense, is the requisite which the sentence, *they forced me*, requires. *To sign their names*, is the requisite which the sentence, *she forced them*, requires.

## RULE V.

Every imperfect participle derived from a requisite assertive, must have a requisite expressed, or implied; as, “He was sent to prepare the way by *preaching repentance*.”

### Explanation.

In the preceding examples, *preaching* is an imperfect participle derived from the requisite assertive *to preach*, and *repentance* is the requisite which *preaching* requires.

## RULE VI.

Every requisite *link* must have a *requisite*, expressed or implied; as, “He sits *on the chair*,” “they gave it *to me*.”

## Explanation.

In the preceding examples, *on* is a requisite link, and the *chair* is the requisite which *on* requires. *To* is a requisite link, and *me* is the requisite which *to* requires.

NOTE 1.—That part of a sentence after the requisite link; is sometimes the requisite of that link; as, “He was sent to prepare the way, *by preaching repentance*.”

In the preceding example, *preaching repentance*, which is the part of the sentence that follows the requisite link *by*, is the requisite which *by* requires.

## RULE VII.

The requisite form of a name substitute cannot be used for the subject form, nor the subject form for the requisite; as, “*Me* love *she*,” “Jane saw *he*,” which ought to be, “*I* love *her*,” “Jane saw *him*.”

## RULE VIII.

A substitute must coincide in form with the name for which it stands; as, “I have seen the children since *they* arrived;” “Henry writes well, but *he* reads badly.”

## Explanation.

In the above examples, the substitute *they*, coincides in form with the name *children*, and the substitute *he*, coincides with the name *Henry*.

The following notes may be useful to children.

NOTE 1.—When a name and its substitute are the subjects



of two assertives that follow them, the substitute is the subject of the first assertive, and the name is the subject of the second ; as, "*The boy who has brought this letter must wait for an answer.*"

In the preceding example the substitute *who*, is the subject of the assertive *has brought*, which is the first assertive, and the name, *boy*, is the subject of the assertive, *must wait*, which is the second.

NOTE 2.—If two substitutes are subjects of two assertives that follow, the last substitute is the subject of the first assertive, and the first substitute is the subject of the last assertive ; as, "*He who has insulted you shall regret it.*"

Here, *who*, which is the last substitute, is the subject of *has insulted*, which is the first assertive, and *he*, the first substitute, is the subject of *shall regret*, which is the second assertive.

## RULE IX

A sentence beginning by a link, and merely used to define the precise meaning of the other sentence connected by the same link, is a sentence descriptive ; as, "*Mary writes, as well as Jane ;*" "*if he go, I shall stop at home.*"

### Explanation.

In the preceding example, if we ask, "How does Mary write?" the answer is, "*as well as Jane,*" that is, *as well as Jane writes*, is descriptive of the sentence, *Mary writes*; consequently, as it performs the duty of a sentence descriptive, it can with as much propriety be called a sentence descriptive as a part of a sentence can be called a subject, when it performs the duty of a subject.

In the sentence, *If he go, I shall stop at home*, I do not positively and unconditionally assert, that *I shall stop at home*. *If he go*, is descriptive of the case in which I positively assert that *I shall stop at home*, that is, *if he go* is descriptive or explanatory of the signification of the sentence, *I*

*shall stop at home*; consequently, *if he go* is used as a sentence descriptive, and may with propriety be called one.

### RULE X.

Every descriptive relates to a name expressed or implied; as, “*I have seen my kind friends*;” “*few are happy*.”

#### Explanation.

In the preceding examples, *my* and *kind* relate to *friends* expressed; but the descriptives, *few* and *happy*, relate to the name *persons*, implied.

### RULE XI.

Every violation of grammar is a violation of common sense; as, “*I have written yesterday*;” “*I wrote to-day*;” “*I am the oldest of my brothers*,” etc.

#### Explanation.

As *wrote* is the form of the assertive universally appropriated by all grammarians to yesterday and to every other detached past time; consequently, to say, “*I have written yesterday*,” instead of, “*I wrote yesterday*,” is as absurd as to call a knife a table. To use *wrote* instead of *have written*, is equally nonsensical. As one person cannot be another, I cannot be one of my own brothers; consequently, to say, *I am the oldest of my brothers*, is absurd.

### RULE XII.

Every word in a sentence that does not contribute to the signification, is superfluous, vitiates the construction, and must be rejected; as, “*Give me that there book*;” “*it was I that did it*,” etc. Which ought to be, “*Give me that book*;” “*I did it*.”

### RULE XIII.

As *perspicuity*, *purity*, and *brevity* are the most important requisites in correct composition, words which do not clearly express the sense, or words not English, ought not to be used; nor should the sense be expressed by a circumlocution; as, “*The present tense represents an action*;” “*she has received a billet doux*;” “*the number of the inhabitants of Great Britain does not exceed sixteen millions*, etc.

#### Explanation.

Is not every material object contained in space; or is not space the universal container of all material objects? Do not all events occur in time; or is not time the container of events?

As you cannot say *space represents an object*, neither can you say that *time or any of its distinctions or divisions represents an action*. *Billet-doux* is pure French, and means a love letter. Why not say, *she has received a love-letter*?

None but pedants ever mix languages in this way. *The number of the inhabitants* is a circumlocution. The sentence ought to be, “*The population of Great Britain does not exceed sixteen millions*,” etc.

### RULE XIV.

Every correct sentence must be a question, or an answer to some question that can be asked; as, *Have you written to Henry? I wrote to Henry yesterday; James has broken the glass.*

#### Explanation.

*Have you written to Henry?* is a question. *I wrote to Henry yesterday*, is an answer to the question, “Did you write to Henry yesterday.” *James has broken the glass*, is an answer to the question “Who has broken the glass?”

## RULE XV.

Every assertive sentence, which is not an answer to some question that can be asked, is bad English; as, “I understood *it* to have been *them* ;” “I believe *it* to have been *her* .”

## Explanation.

I understood *it* to have been *them*, or I believe *it* to have been *her*, is not an answer to any question that can be asked; consequently, each of them is bad English by this rule and the following note.

NOTE.—The meaning of any sentence in which a substitute of the *third person* is correctly used, is not *impaired* or *changed* by rejecting the substitute, and placing the name for which it stands in its stead. What name or sentence is the substitute *it* placed instead of, in either of the two examples to the last Rule? No person can tell; that is, no person knows the meaning of either sentence.

See the observations on Sentence 133, page 205.

## RULE XVI.

In analyzing or parsing a sentence, the words which are *omitted* or *understood* must be supplied, and the natural grammatical order of the words *restored*; as, “The master taught *us* to write;” “that warm climates accelerate the growth of the human body, is reasonable to believe.”

## Explanation.

“The master taught *to us* to write.” “*To believe* that warm climates accelerate the growth of the human body, is reasonable.”

The word *to*, is implied before the word *us*, in the first example, because what the master did teach, was *to write*, or *writing*. As in the natural grammatical order of the principal parts of a simple sentence, the subject is first, the as-

sertive second, and the requisite after the assertive; consequently, as the requisite of the assertive *to believe*, is the remaining part of the sentence, *to believe* must precede its requisite; that is, *to believe* must take the lead in the sentence.

As we have given an explanation of the different kinds of words, and their accidents, and given rules for the construction and examination of a sentence, we shall here show the learner how to analyze, and after, how to apply, the preceding constructive rules in parsing.

*The learner ought not to be allowed to analyze or parse before he can read and write the following abbreviations quickly and without faults.*

The best manner of teaching the learner the use of the abbreviations after committing them to memory, is to read a few pages of the following parsing, and then write the same from dictation.

#### Abbreviations.

n.	name.	3p.	third person.
d.	descriptive.	pt.	passing transit.
f.	female.	Pt.	passed transit.
m.	male.	At.	attached passed time.
ind.	individual.	Dt.	detached passed time.
pl.	plural.	ft.	future time.
ns.	name substitute.	Ft.	future transit.
st.	subject.	fn.	female name.
a.	assertive.	mn.	male name.
r.	requisite.	fns.	{ female name substi-
ra.	requisite assertive.		tute.
sa.	subject assertive.	mns.	{ male name substi-
l.	link.		tute.
rl.	requisite link.	plns.	{ plural name substi-
R.	rule.		tute.
im.	implied.	pp.	perfect participle.
c.	coinciding	ip.	imperfect participle.
sd.	sentence descriptive.	ps.	personal substitute.
1p.	first person.	ex.	exclamation.
2p.	second person.		

When the sex of an individual name, or a name substitute of the third person is not mentioned in analyzing or parsing, the reader is to infer that it is of no sex. When the learner

first begins to analyze, or parse, he ought to be taught to modify every principal assertive that occurs without the help of auxiliaries, then to name the transit with which the first form and the time with which the second coincides. He ought to be asked, when does he use each of the participles. He ought to define each class of words, and every time, transit, and person, which he mentions in analyzing, or parsing, until he can answer quickly and correctly. He ought to vary every mutable name descriptive, etc.

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### ANALYSIS OF A SENTENCE.

To analyze a sentence is to class its words, and name their accidents.

In Mr. Lindley Murray's duodecimo grammar we find only eight sentences analyzed. We shall analyze the same eight sentences according to our system, and give his manner of analyzing two or three of them, that the reader may not only contrast the consistency of both systems, but their brevity also.

1. "Virtue ennobles us."

*Virtue* ind. n. 3p. and st. of the a. *ennobles*, *Ennobles*, ra. c. with its st. *virtue*, and the pt. im. *Us* pl. ps. 1p. r. of *ennobles*.

"*Virtue* is a common substantive, of the neuter gender, the third person, the singular number, and in the nominative case. (Decline the name.) *Ennobles* is a regular verb active, indicative mood, present tense, and the third person singular. (*Repeat the present, the imperfect tense, and the perfect participle.*) *Us* is a personal pronoun of the first person plural and in the objective case. Decline it."

We leave the brevity and comparative consistency of both systems to the impartial judgment of the reader.

2 "Goodness will be rewarded."

*Goodness*, ind. n. 3p. and st. of *will be rewarded*, which is a sa. c. with its st. and ft. im.

"*Goodness* is a common substantive, of the neuter gender, the third person, the singular number, and in the nominative case (decline it); *will be rewarded*, is a regular verb, in the

passive voice, the indicative mood, the first future tense, and the third person singular. (*Repeat the present tense, the imperfect tense, and the perfect participle.*)

3. "Strive to improve."

*Strive* ra. c. with its st. *you* im. *To improve* is the r. of *strive*.

"*Strive* is an irregular verb neuter, in the imperative mood, and of the second person singular. (*Repeat the present tense, etc.*") *To improve* is a regular verb neuter, and in the infinitive mood. (*Repeat the present tense, etc.*)

4. "Time flies fast, O! how swiftly."

*Time* ind. n. 3p. and st. of *flies*. *Flies*, sa. c. with its st. and pt. im. *Fast*, sd. *O* ex. *How* sd. *Swiftly* sd.

In Lindley Murray's grammar the analysis of the same sentence is nearly six lines.

5. "Gratitude is a delightful emotion."

*Gratitude* ind. n. 3p. st. of *is*. *Is* sa. c. with its st. and pt. im. *A* d. *Delightful* d. *Emotion* ind. n. 3p. explicative of gratitude.

In Lindley Murray's Grammar, nearly nine lines.

6. "They who forgive, act nobly."

*They* pl. ps. 3p. st. of *act*. *Who* pl. ps. 3p. st. of *forgive*. *Forgive* ra. c. with its st. and pt. im. *Transgressors* im. pl. n. 3p. and r. of *forgive*. *Act* sa. c. with its st. *they*, and pt. im. *nobly*, sd.

In Lindley Murray, eight lines.

7. "By living temperately, our health is promoted."

*By* rl. *Living* ip. *Temperately* sd. *Our* d. *Health* ind. n. 3p. st. of *is promoted*. *Is promoted* sa. c. with its st. *health*, and pt. im.

Lindley Murray parses it in eight lines.

8. "We should be kind to them who are unkind to us."

*Should* in this sentence is improperly used instead of *ought*.

*We* pl. ps. 1p. st. of *ought*. *Ought* sa. c. with its st. *we*, and pt. in. *To be* sa. *Kind* d. *To* rl. *Them* pl. ps. 3p. r. of *to*. *Who* pl. ps. 3p. st. of *are*. *Are* sa. c. with *who*, and pt. im. *Unkind* d. *To* rl. *Us* pl. ps. 1p. r. of *to*.

In Lindley Murray's Grammar there are fifteen lines.

## PARSING.

To parse a sentence, is to analyze it, and test its correctness by the constructive *Rules*.

The following seventeen sentences are parsed in Lindley Murray's Grammar. We shall parse the same sentences, according to our method, to enable the reader to contrast the two systems.

We give his manner of parsing the first two sentences, and the number of lines in which each of the others is parsed.

1. "Vice produces misery."

*Vice* ind. n. 3p. st. of *produces*. *Produces* ra. c. with its st. and pt. im. R. 2. *Misery* ind. n. 3p.r. of *produces*, by R. 4.

"*Vice* is a common substantive, of the neuter gender, the third person, the singular number, and in the nominative case. *Produces* is a regular verb active, indicative mood, present tense, and third person singular, agreeing with its nominative, *vice*, according to RULE I., which says: (*here repeat the rule*). *Misery* is a common substantive, of the neuter gender, the third person, the singular number, and in the objective case, governed by the active verb, *produces*, according to RULE II. which says, etc."

2. "Peace and joy are virtue's crown."

*Peace* ind. n. 3p. and part of the st. of *are*. *And* l. *Joy* ind. n. 3p. and part of the st. of *are*. *Are* sa. c. with its st. *peace* and *joy*, and with the pt. im., R. 2 and 16. *Virtue's* d. *Crown* ind. n. 3p. explicative of *peace* and *joy*.

"*Peace* is a common substantive. (*Repeat the gender, person, number, and case.*) *And* is a copulative conjunction. *Joy* is a common substantive. (*Repeat the person, number, and case.*) *Are* is an irregular verb neuter, indicative mood, present tense, and the third person plural, agreeing with the nominative case, *peace* and *joy*, according to RULE I. which says: (*Here repeat the Rule.*) *Virtue's* is a common substantive, of the third person, the singular number, and in the



possessive case, governed by the substantive, *crown*, agreeably to RULE X, which says, etc. *Crown* is a common substantive, of the neuter gender, the third person, the singular number, and in the nominative case, agreeably to the fourth note of RULE XI."

3. "Wisdom, or folly, governs us."

*Wisdom* ind. n. 3p. and st. of *governs*. Or 1. *Folly* ind. n. 3p. and st. of *governs*. *Governs* ra. c. with its st. *wisdom*, or *folly*, and with the pt. im. R. 2, and 16. *Us* pl. ps. 1p. and r. of *governs*, R. 4.

In Lindley Murray's nine lines and a half.

4. "Every heart knows its sorrows."

*Every* d. *Heart* ind. n. 3p. and st. of *knows*. *Knows* ra. c. with its st. *heart*, and pt. im. by R. 2, and 16. *Its* d. *Sorrows* pl. n. 3p. and r. of *knows*, by RULE 4.

In Lindley Murray's Grammar fourteen lines and a half.

5. "The man is happy who lives wisely."

*The* d. *Man*, ind. mn. 3p. and st. of *is*. *Is* sa. c. with its st. *man*, and pt. im. by RULE 2, and 16. *Happy* d. *Who* ind. ps. 3p. and st. of *lives*. *Lives* sa. c. with its st. *who*, by R. 2. *Wisely* sd.

In Lindley Murray's Grammar twelve lines and a half.

6. "Who preserves us."

*Who* ind. ps. 3p. and st. of *preserves*. *Preserves*, ra. c. with its st. *who* and pt. im. R. 2, and 16. *Us* pl. ps. 1p. and r. of *preserves*, by Rule 4.

In Lindley Murray's eight lines and a half.

7. "Whose house is that? My brother's and mine. Who inhabit it? We."

*Whose* d. *House* ind. n. 3p. and st. of *is*. *Is* sa. c. with its st. *house* and pt. im. by Rule 2, and 16. *That* d. of *house*, im. by R. 16. *My* d. of *house*, im. *Brother's* d. *And* 1. *Mine* d. *Who* pl. ps. 3p. and st. of *inhabit*. *Inhabit* ra. c. with its st. *who*, R. 2. *It* ind. ns. 3p. the r. of *inhabit*, by Rule 4. *We* pl. ps. 1p. and st. of *inhabit*, im. by Rule 16.

In Lindley Murray's Grammar twenty-eight lines.

8. "Remember to relieve the distressed."

*Remember* ra. c. with its st. *you* and ft. im. by Rule 2 and 16. *To assist the distressed* is the r. of *remember*, by Note 1, Rule 4.

In Lindley Murray's Grammar, six lines.

9. "We are not unemployed." Why not? *we are employed*.

*We* pl. ps. 1p. st. of *are*. *Are* sa. c. with its st. and pt. im. by Rule 2 and 16. *Not* sd. *Unemployed* d. of *persons*.

In Lindley Murray's five lines.

10. "This bounty has relieved you and us, and gratified the donor."

*This* d. *Bounty* ind. n. 3p. and st. of *has relieved*. *Has relieved* ra. c. with its st. and At. im. by R. 2 and 16. *You* pl. ps. 2p. and r. of *has relieved*, by Rule 4. *And* l. *Us* pl. ps. 1p. and r. of *has relieved*, im. by Rule 16. *And* l. *Gratified* pp. *The* d. *Donor* ind. n. 3p. and r. of *has gratified*. Rule 4 and 16.

In Lindley Murray's grammar nineteen lines.

11. "He will not be pardoned, unless he repent."

*He* ind. m. ps. 3p. and st. of *will be pardoned*. *Will be pardoned* sa. c. with its st. *he*, and ft. im. by Rule 2 and 16. *Not* sd. *Unless* l. *He* ind. m. ps. 3p. and st. of *repent*. *Repent* sa. c. with its st. *he* and ft. im. RULE 2 and 16.

In Lindley Murray's Grammar fifteen lines.

In the preceding sentence, *unless he repent* is used as a sd. of *he will not be pardoned*. Rule 9.

"Good works, being neglected, devotion is false."

*Good works* in the preceding sentence is an example of what, in Lindley Murray's Grammar, is called the case absolute. If *works*, in the preceding example, is in the *case absolute*, we must have four cases in English, namely, the nominative, the possessive, the objective, and the case absolute; but in page 53, we find, "In English, substantives have three cases, the nominative, the possessive, and the objective." The case absolute, like the other pretended or imaginary English cases, is a wanton deviation from the plain principles of the English language, as there is not a single instance of what they call the case absolute, that cannot be

dispensed with to advantage, which may be seen by comparing our construction with Lindley Murray's. He says, page 221, "*Good works being neglected, devotion is false.*" We say, "Their devotion is false who neglect good works." He says, page 141, "*Shame being lost, all virtue is lost. That having been discussed long ago, there is no occasion to resume it.*" We say, "They who have lost their shame, have lost their virtue. As that subject was discussed long ago, we need not resume it." In parsing the sentence, "*Good works being neglected,*" etc. He says, *Good works being neglected* is the case absolute, which is wrong; according to note the fifth, under his Rule 1, he ought to say, "*works* is in the case absolute, because it is put before a participle independently of the rest of the sentence."

13. "The Emperor Marcus Aurelius was a wise and virtuous prince."

The d. *Emperor Marcus Aurelius*, ind. mn. 3p. and st. of *was*. *Was* sa. c. with its st. and the Dt. im. — R. 2 and 16. A d. *Wise* d. *And* l. *Virtuous* d. *Prince* ind. mn. 3p. and st. of *was*, by Note 2, Rule 1.

In Lindley Murray's Grammar, thirteen lines.

14. "To err is human."

*To err* ind. n. 3p. the st. of *is*, by Note 1, Rule 2. *Is* sa. c. with its st. and pt. im., by Rule 2 and 16. *Human*, d. of *to err*.

In Lindley Murray's, six lines and a half.

15. "To countenance persons who are guilty of bad actions, is scarcely one remove from actually committing them."

"*To countenance persons who are guilty of bad actions*, is an ind. st. of the 3p. and st. of *is*; by Note 1, R. 2. *Is* sa. c. with its st. and pt. im. *Scarcely* sd. *One* d. *Remove* ind. n. 3p. and st. of *is*; by Note 1, Rule 1. *From* rl. *Actually* sd. *Committing* ip. *Them* plus, 3p. and r. of *committing*; by Rule 5. *Actually committing them*, is the r. of the rl. *from*, by Note 1, Rule 6.

In Lindley Murray's Grammar, fourteen lines and a half.

16. "Let me proceed."

*Let* is a ra. c. with its st. *you* and ft. im. by Rule 2 and 16. *Me* is an ind. ps. 1p. and r. of *let*, by Rule 4. *To proceed*, is the r. of *let me*; by Note 2, Rule 4.

In Lindley Murray's, twelve lines.

17. "Living expensively and luxuriously destroys health: by living frugally and temperately, health is preserved."

*Living expensively and luxuriously*, is the st. of *destroys*, by Note 1, Rule 2. *Destroys* ra. c. with its st. and pt. im., by Rule 2 and 16. *Health* ind. n. 3p. r. of *destroys*, by Rule 4. By rl. *Living frugally and temperately* r. of *by*, by Note 1, Rule 6. *Health* ind. n. 3p. and st. of *is preserved*. *Is preserved* sa. c. with its st. *health*, and pt. im. by Rule 2 and 16.

We cannot here state in how many lines Lindley Murray has parsed the preceding sentence, because, by some unaccountable oversight, the part, *health is preserved*, is left unparsed.

"I now see the good man coming; but, alas! he has walked with much difficulty."—Grant's Grammar, page 116.

*I* ind. ps. 1p. and st. of *see*. *Now* sd. *See* ra. c. with its st. *I* and pt. im. by R. 2 and 16. *The* d. *Good* d. *Man* ind. mn. 3p. and r. of *see*, by R. 4. *Coming*, ip. *But* l. *Alas* ex. *He* ind. m. ps. 3p. and st. of *has walked*. *Has walked* sa. c. with its st. *he* and At. im. by R. 2 and 16. *With* rl. *Much* d. *Difficulty* ind. n. 3p. and r. of *with*, by Rule 6.

Mr. Grant parses the preceding sentence in the following manner.

"*I*, is a personal pronoun of the singular number, common gender, and nominative case. (Decline it.)

"*Now*, is an adverb of time. (Mention its effects on *see*.)

"*See*, is an active transitive irregular verb, indicative mood, present tense, singular number, and first person, from *see*, *saw*, *seen*.

"*The*, is the definite article, pointing out what man.

"*Good*, is an adjective of the positive degree, joined to man, to denote his *quality*. Compared irregularly, *good*, *better*, *best*.

“*Man*, is a common noun of the singular number, masculine gender, and objective case. Its plural is *men*.

“*But*, is a conjunction or word coupling the preceding assertion with the following.

“*Alas!* is an interjection.

“*He*, is a personal pronoun of the singular number, masculine gender, and is the nominative case and third person. It stands instead of *man*. (Decline it.)

“*Has*, is an active transitive irregular verb indicative mood, present tense, singular number, and third person, from *have*, *had*, *had*.

“*Walked*, is considered as the perfect participle of the active intransitive regular verb, *walk*, *walked*, *walked*.\*

“*With*, is a preposition, a word connecting what follows it with what goes before, and indicating a relation.

“*Much*, is a definitive of quantity, or an adjective joined to *difficulty*. Compared irregularly, *much*, *more*, *most*.

“*Difficulty* is a common noun of the singular number, neuter gender, and objective case.”

The prolixity of Mr. Grant's system of parsing must appear evident to the reader, if he observes that Mr. Grant has taken twenty-six lines to parse the preceding sentence, which we have done in six.

The star after *walked* refers to the following note, p. 116.

\* “To term, in the usual way, *I have walked*, *I may walk*, *I may be walking*, *I shall walk*, etc., tenses, is not in reality parsing, but phrasing. Such words as *have*, *may*, *shall*, ought to be considered as verbs, and leading or principal verbs too, rather than auxiliaries, in present time; *be* and *walk*, as infinitives depending on the verbs; *walked* as a perfect participle, or a participial, supplying the place of a noun in the objective case, and denoting a finished action; and *walking*, an imperfect participle, referring to the nominative *I*. In *I do murder*, *I do write*, *I did murder*, *I did write*, I can consider *murder* and *write* as nothing else but verbal nouns, merely the specific names of action governed by *do* and *did*, and capable themselves of governing an accusative.”

We also find, in page 185, of his Grammar, . following note to Rule 11.

Note 2. "The perfect participle after *have* may be *considered* as the accusative of a verbal noun; thus, I have *walked*, i. e., I possess the *finished action of walking*. I *do* write, I *did* write, are constructions, we apprehend, of the same description."

Without wresting the meaning of the preceding notes, Mr. Grant evidently *denies* the propriety of taking two or more words, collectively, in parsing; he denies the existence of auxiliary verbs in the English language, he asserts, that the form of the verb generally called a perfect participle, is a noun when it follows any part of the verb, *to have*; and that the verbs, usually called auxiliaries, are principal verbs. The *justness* of the censure, which Mr. Grant insinuates when he observes, *This is not in reality parsing, but phrasing*, is very badly sustained by his own theory. Does not *shall write*, consist of the two words, *shall* and *write*; and *to write*, of the two words, *to* and *write*? If to call the two words, *shall write*, a verb, is phrasing, and not parsing, to call *to write* a verb or verbal noun, as Mr. Grant does, must also be *phrasing*. The following extract from his Grammar, proves that the inferences we have drawn from his *phrasing*, are just:—"Has the English language a passive voice, a subjunctive and a potential mood, a future tense, and similar other tenses, without definite number? The very terms indeed, would never have been introduced into English grammar, but from a servile and unwarrantable imitation of the grammars of languages widely differing from the English in their genius and structure. While, however, they assert, with propriety, that a noun or case must be one word, some of them contend, with strange inconsistency, that a mood or a tense, nay, even a verb, voice, or word, may consist of several terms. If this system of Etymology be examined, it will be found, that more than one half of them is occupied with irrelevant discussions on the nature of fictitious moods, tenses, and voices; while every necessary remark might well have been comprised in less than ha'f-a-dozen pages. The loss of time, the misdi-

rected labour, and the inculcation of an erroneous principle, arising from such a system, are in the instruction of youth no trivial consideration."—*Preface, p. 6.*

Let the reader, if he can, reconcile the opinions stated in the preceding extracts, with these in the following passages of the same work. Page 148 :—The nominative is the thing spoken of, and may be a *noun, pronoun, infinitive, phrase, or even a sentence*; generally, however, preceded by the word *that*, 'used as a demonstrative.'

Page 70. "Auxiliary verbs."

"The auxiliaries are, *be, am, do, have, may, can, shall, will*, to which may be added *ought*, with their variations; and *let* and *must*, used without variation."

Here *may, can, shall*, etc., are auxiliaries; in page 116 they are not!

Page 151. "The infinitive mood, or some other word in a clause, or a part of a sentence, is often the nominative to a verb; as, *To err*, is human; 'i. e. error is human; '*his being* from home, occasioned the delay,' i. e. his absence."

Page 9. "Gender, *number* and *case*, are termed the accidents of a noun."

Page 16. "A case is a variation in the termination of a noun or pronoun."

"That, *sententially*, or *substantially* considered, a clause or a sentence may be the subject or object, is very probable; but I am inclined to think, that generally, in a *grammatical* point of view, the infinitive, or one word, is to be regarded as a noun. Thus, when Lindley Murray (Rule I, Note 1) adduces, '*To see the sun is pleasant*,' as an example in which the infinitive is the nominative to the verb, he is perfectly correct. But can his next example, '*A desire to excel others in learning and virtue is commendable*,' be considered as one in which the infinitive mood, or part of a sentence, is put as the nominative case to the verb? Certainly not; the word *desire* is the grammatical nominative. Even in this example, '*That warm climates should accelerate the growth of the human body, and shorten its duration, is very reasonable to believe*,' either the representative *it*, understood, is the nominative to *is*, or the representative *that*, or rather some word understood to it, such as, *thing, circumstances, assertion*."

Let the reader reconcile the grammatical opinions given in the preceding extracts, if he can.

In page 6 of the Preface, it is asserted, with propriety, “that *case* must be *one word*.”

In page 9 of Etymology, *case* is an *accident of a noun*.

In page 16, *case* is a *variation in the termination of a noun or pronoun*.

In page 148, the nominative *case* may be a *phrase*, that is, two or more words, or it may be a whole sentence.

If *case* is *one word*, how can *case* be the *variation in the termination of a word*, or how can one word or the variation in the termination of a word, be the *infinitive mood*, a *clause*, or a *whole sentence*? Does not the infinitive mood, a clause, or a sentence, consist of two or more words? How, then, can one word, or the variation in the termination of a word, be two or more words; that is, how can the infinitive mood, a clause, or sentence, each of which is two or more words, be one word, or a variation in the termination of a word? If to take the words, *shall write*, as one verb, and to assert that it denotes future time, is phrasing, to take a clause, or an entire sentence, collectively, and call it a noun, must also be phrasing, which Mr. Grant is obliged to do before he can say, it is in the nominative case, as *case* is a *variation in the termination of a noun or pronoun*. If phrasing is a crime, is not Mr. Grant as guilty as others?

He who detects or exposes errors in works published for the instruction of youth, insures the esteem and gratitude of all philanthropists; but he who misquotes an author, or wrests the evident signification of an author's words to support his own blind theory, undoubtedly merits and insures their censure and contempt.

Mr. Grant remarks, page 60, that:—“Murray and others observe, that the nature of *mood* consists in the change which the verb undergoes, to signify *various intentions of the mind* and *various modifications, etc., of action*; and yet, after this explanation, contend, that the infinitive is strictly a mood, although they define it to be a word, expressing a thing in a general and unlimited manner, without any distinction of



*number or person.* Surely, if *person* be excluded, *intention* must be inadmissible. Either the definition, or the example, is improper."

The substance of the preceding extract from Grant's Grammar is, by no means, calculated to establish his justice or acuteness. In the clause, "*Although they define it to be a word, expressing a thing in a general and unlimited manner, without any distinction of number or person,*" if we ask Mr. Grant, who defines it to be a *word*, etc.? he must answer, Murray and others define it to be a *word*, etc., and if we ask him, what do Murray and others define? he must answer, they define the infinitive mood to be a *word*, etc. Who the other writers are, to whose works Mr. Grant alludes, we do not know; nor can we know how they define the infinitive mood; but we do know how Murray defines it, and we also know, that Mr. Grant has, in this instance, *misquoted Murray's Grammar*. This fact throws a painful suspicion on Mr. Grant's *love of justice*. Is not the most scrupulous care to be taken, and the strictest rectitude to be observed, when we assume the prerogative of judging *that* upon which the *fame, happiness, and prosperity* of an author depend?

Murray's definition is:—"The infinitive mood expresses a thing in a general and unlimited manner, without any distinction of number or person; as, 'to act;' 'to speak;' 'to be feared.'"

How can Mr. Grant assert, that Murray defines the infinitive mood, *to be a word*, etc.? Why has not Mr. Grant given Murray's definition correctly? Why has not he given Murray's examples of the infinitive mood with the definition? From what part of Murray's definition can we infer, that the infinitive consists only of *one word*? Murray gave three examples to illustrate the definition, namely, *to act, to speak, to be feared*, each of which consists of two or more words; hence the inference, that the infinitive mood is a *word*, or that Murray defines it to be a *word*, cannot be drawn from his definition or examples.

How can Mr. Grant's readers judge the propriety or impropriety of Lindley Murray's definition, when Mr. Grant *only presents them with his own corrupt version of it, without even*

an example? Let us suppose, for argument sake, that the definition here given is *proper*; then, according to Grant, the example is *improper*. If we ask the reader, what example is improper? He certainly cannot tell. Why cannot he tell? *Because Mr. Grant has given no example whatever.* Where, then, can we find the improper example which Mr. Grant alludes to, when he says, "Either the *definition*, or *example*, is improper?" If Mr. Grant thinks his readers will condemn Murray's Grammar before they see or hear the evidence against it, he must have a very indifferent opinion of their justice. Mr. Grant says, "Surely, *if person* be excluded, *intention* is inadmissible." We say, that *person is not excluded*; that the only thing excluded is the *distinction* of number and person. Mr. Grant must know, that there is a great difference between *excluding persons*, and excluding the *distinction of persons*.

Mr. Grant says, "Thus, when Lindley Murray (Rule 1, Note 1) adduces, 'to see the sun is pleasant,' as an example in which the infinitive is the nominative to the verb, he is perfectly correct."

We insist, that *to see the sun*, is the subject of the verb *is*, and not *to see*, and consequently, that Lindley Murray and Grant are *both wrong*. "As a tree is known by its fruit," so is the truth or falsehood of an author's theory known, by the truth or falsehood of the results to which his theory leads. When we see, we must see something, and it is *that thing* which we see, that renders the act of *seeing* pleasant, unpleasant, melancholy, or heart-rending, etc.: as, "*To see the sun is pleasant*;" "*to see your property destroyed is unpleasant*;" "*to see man's indifference to his own salvation is melancholy*;" "*to see your country desolated and your dearest friends slain is heart-rending*." If to ascertain the subject of the verb, *is*, in each of the four preceding assertions, we ask, what is pleasant? what is unpleasant? what is melancholy? what is heart-rending? According to Mr. Grant's views, *to see*, *without its adjuncts*, that is, *to see* is pleasant: *to see* is unpleasant; *to see* is melancholy: *to see* is heart-rending. If *to see* is pleasant, how can *to see* be unpleasant? or, if *to see*

is pleasant, how can *to see* be heart-rending? If I ask what is heart-rending? Let the reader judge which of the two answers; "*To see our dearest friends slain is* heart-rending," or, "*To see is* heart-rending," is more consistent. Any English reader knows as well as Mr. Grant, or any grammarian, that the first is correct and the second absurd.

Doctor Crombie *wilfully* misquoted Lowth's Grammar.

Let the reader judge whether the following extracts fully prove this charge or not. Crombie's Grammar, page 96:— "Now, in parsing, every word should be considered as a distinct part of speech; whether, therefore, we admit *pleased* to be a perfect participle or not (for this point I shall afterwards examine), it is obvious that on the principle now laid down, and acknowledged by Doctor Lowth, *am pleased* is not a present passive, nor has the author himself *parsed it* in this manner."

We insist that *pleased* is a perfect participle, and that Lowth *parsed am pleased as a present passive*.

In Lowth's Grammar, page 37, "This participle represents the action as complete and finished; and being subjoined to the auxiliary, *to have*, constitutes the perfect times; I call it, therefore, the perfect participle. The same subjoined to the auxiliary, *to be*, constitutes a *passive verb*; and in that state, or when used without the auxiliary in a passive sense, is called the passive participle."

In page 168, in parsing the sentence, *This is my beloved son, in whom I am well pleased*: he says, "*Pleased*," the passive participle of the verb *to please*, making with the auxiliary verb, *am*, a *passive verb*, in the indicative mood, *present time*, first person singular, agreeing with the nominative case, *I*." Let the reader now judge whether Doctor Crombie was guilty of *misquoting* Lowth or not.

We shall parse the following sentences, to prove that our Rules for the construction of sentences are as comprehensive as those given by any other writer on the subject, although we have not written one fourth as many.

"Our Father, who art in heaven, hallowed be thy name; thy kingdom come; thy will be done on earth as it is in hea-

ven; give us this day our daily bread; and forgive us our trespasses as we forgive them who trespass against us; and lead us not into temptation; but deliver us from evil: Amen."

*Our* is d. *Father* ind. n. 2p. and st. of *give*. *Who* ind. ps. 2p. and st. of *art*. *Art* sa. c. with its st. *who*, and pt. im. *In* rl. *Heaven* ind. n. 3p. and r. of *in*, by Rule 6. *Be hallowed*. sa. c. with its st. *name*, and ft. by R. 2. *Thy* d. *Kingdom* ind. n. 3p. and st. of *come*. *Come*, sa. c. with its st. *kingdom*, and ft. by Rule 2. *Thy* d. *Will* ind. n. 3p. and st. of *be done*. *Be done* sa. c. with its st. *will*, and ft. im. by Rule 2. *On* rl. *Earth* ind. n. 3p. r. of *on*, by Rule 6. *As it is in Heaven* sd. of *thy will be done on earth*. *Give*, ra. c. with its st. *Father* and ft. im. by R. 2. *Us* pl. ps. 1p. and r. of *to*, im. by R. 6. *This* d. *Day* ind. n. 3p. and the r. of *on*, im. *Our* d. *Daily* d. *Bread*, ind. n. 3 p. and r. of *give*, by Rule 4. *And* l. *Forgive* ra. c. with its st. *thou*, im. by Rule 2. *Us* pl. ps. 1p. and r. of *to*, im. by Rule 6. *Our* d. *Trespasses* pl. n. 3p. and r. of *forgive*, by Rule 4. *As we forgive them that trespass against us* sd. of *forgive us our trespasses*, by Rule 9. *And* l. *Lead* ra. c. with its st. *thou*, im. by Rule 2. *Us* pl. ps. 1p. and r. of *lead*, by Rule 4. *Not* sd. *Into* rl. *Temptation* ind. n. 3p. and r. of *into*, by Rule 6. *But* l. *Deliver* ra. c. with its st. *thou*, im. by Rule 2. *From* rl. *Evil* ind. n. 3p. and r. of *from*, by Rule 6. *Amen* ex.

"The master taught us to write."

*The* d. *Master* ind. mn. 3p. and st. of *taught*. *Taught* ra. c. with its st. *master*, and Dt. im. by Rule 2. *Us* pl. ps. 1p. and r. of *to* im. by Rule 6. *To write* is the r. of *taught*, by Note 1, Rule 4.

"I once saw a young girl tie a string to a poor bird's leg, and pull it through the yard; but it could not go so fast as she did. She ran, and it went hop, hop, to try to keep up with her; but it broke its poor leg, and there it lay on the hard stones. Its head was hurt, and the poor bird was soon dead. So I told her maid not to let her have birds if she was to use them so ill; and she has not had one since that time."

*I* ind. ps. 1p. and st. of *saw*. *Once* sd. *Saw* ra. c. with its st. *I*, and Dt. im. *A* d. *Young* d. *Girl* ind. fn. 3p. and

r. of *saw*, by Rule 4. *To tie a string to a poor bird's leg, and to pull it through the yard* r. of *I saw a young girl*, by Note 2, R. 4. *But* l. *It* ind. ns. 3p. and st. of *could go*. *Could go* sa. c. with its st. *it*, and Dt. im. by Rule 2. *Not sd.* *So fast as she did go* sd. of *it could not go*, by Rule 9. *She* ind. fps. 3p. and st. of *ran*. *Ran* sa. c. with its st. *she*, and Dt. im. by Rule 2. *And* l. *It* ind. ns. 3p. and st. of *went*. *Went* sa. c. with its st. *it*, and Dt. im. by Rule 2. *Hop, hop* sd. *To try* ra. *To keep up with her* is the ra. of *to try*, by Rule 4. *But* l. *It* ind. ns. 3p. and st. of *broke*. *Broke* ra. c. with its st. *it*, and Dt. im. *Its* d. *Poor* d. *Leg* ind. n. 3p. and r. of *broke*, by Rule 4. *And* l. *There* is redundant. *It* ind. ns. 3p. and st. of *lay*. *Lay* sa. c. with its st. *it*, and Dt. im. *On* rl. *The* d. *Hard* d. *Stones* pl. n. 3p. and r. of *on*, by Rule 6. *And* l. *Its* d. *Head* ind. n. 3p. and st. of *was hurt*. *Was hurt* sa. c. with its st. *head* and Dt. im. by R. 2 and 16. *And* l. *The* d. *Poor* d. *Bird* ind. n. 3p. and st. of *was*. *Soon* sd. *Dead* d. of *bird*, by Rule 10. *So* l. *I* ind. ps. 1p. and st. of *told*. *Told* ra. c. with its st. *I*, and Dt. im. *Her* d. *Maid* ind. fn. 3p. and r. of *to* im. by Rule 6. *Not to let her have birds if she used them so ill* r. of *told*. *And* l. *She* ind. f. ps. 3p. and st. of *has had*. *Has had* ra. c. with its st. *she*, and At. im. by Rule 2. *Not sd.* *One*, d. of *bird*, im. which is the r. of *she has had*. *Since* rl. *That* d. *Time* ind. n. 3p. and r. of *since*, by Rule 6.

“The miser who hoards up his gold,  
Unwilling to use or to lend,  
Himself in the dog may behold—  
The ox in his indigent friend.”

By Rule 16, the above sentence runs thus:—

“The miser, who hoards up his gold and who is unwilling to use it, or to lend it, may behold himself in the dog, and he may behold the ox in his indigent friend.”

*The* d. *Miser* ind. mn. 3p. and st. of *may behold*. *Who* ind. ps. 3p. and st. of *hoards*. *Hoards* ra. c. with its st. *who*, and pt. im. Rule 2. *Un* sd. *His* d. *Gold* ind. n. 3p.

and r. of *who hoards*. And l. *Who* ind. ps. 3p. and st. of *is*. *Is* sa. c. with its st. *who*. *Unwilling* d. relating to person im. *To use* ra. *It* ind. ns. 3p. and r. of *to use*. Or l. *To lend* ra. *It* ind. ns. 3p. and r. of *to lend*. *May behold* ra. c. with its st. *miser* and ft. im. *Himself*, ind. m. ps. 3p. and r. of *may behold*. In rl. *The* d. *Dog* ind. mn. 3p. and r. of *in*. And l. *He* ind. m. ps. 3p. and st. of *may behold*. *May behold* ra. c. with its st. *he*, and ft. im. *The*, d. *Ox* ind. mn. 3p. and r. of *may behold*. In rl. *His* d. *Indigent* d. *Friend* ind. mn. 3p. and r. of *in*, by R. 6.

“ THE BLIND BOY.

1.

O say, what is that thing called light,  
Which I *can* ne'er enjoy? [must  
What are the blessings of the sight?  
O tell your poor blind boy!

2.

You talk of wond'rous things you see;  
You say the sun shines bright;  
I feel *his* heat, but how can he, [him warm  
*For you* make day and night? [or make it

3.

My day and night myself I make,  
Whene'er I sleep or play;  
*If I can* always keep awake, [And could I always keep  
*I shall* have constant day. [With me'twere always

4.

With heavy sighs I often hear  
You mourn my hapless woe;  
*Surely* with patience I can bear [But sure  
A loss I ne'er can know.

5.

Then let not what I cannot have,  
My *cheerfulness* destroy: [cheer of mind  
While thus I sing, I am a king,  
Although a poor blind boy.”

We have taken the liberty to substitute the words in italics.

for those opposite in the margin; the reader may judge if we have injured the verse or sense.

By Rule 16, the first verse runs thus :

O say you, what thing is that thing which is called light, which light I can never enjoy. O tell you, to your poor blind boy, what blessings are the blessings of the sight.

*O* ex. *Say* ra. c. with its st. *thou*, and ft. im. Rule 2. *You* pl. ps. 2p. and st. of *say*. *What is that thing which is called light*, is the r. of *say* you. *What* d. *Thing* ind. n. 3p. and st. of *is*. *Is* sa. c. with its st. *thing* and pt. im. by Rule 2. *That* d. *Thing* ind. n. 3p. and st. of *is*, by Note 1, Rule 1. *Which* d. relating to *thing*, im and st. of *is* called. *Is called* sa. c. with its st. *thing*, and pt. implied by Rule 2. *Light* ind. n. 3p. and st. of *is* called. *Which* d. *Light* ind. n. 3p. and r. of *I can enjoy*. *I* ind. ps. 1p. and st. *can enjoy*. *Can enjoy* ra. c. with its st. *I*, and ft. im. by Rule 2. *Never* sd. *O* ex. *Tell* ra. c. with its st. *you* and ft. im. by Rule 2. *You* pl. ps. 2p. and st. of *tell*. *To* rl. *Your* d. *Poor* d. *Blind* d. *Boy* ind. mn. 3p. and r. of *to*. *What blessings are the blessings of the sight* r. of *you* tell, or tell you, by Rule 4. *What* d. *Blessings* pl. n. 3p. and st. of *are*. *Are* sa. c. with its st. *blessings*, by Rule 2. *The* d. *Blessings* pl. n. 3p. and st. of *are*. *Of* rl. *The* d. *Sight* ind. n. 3p. and r. of *of*.

By Rule 16, the 2nd verse runs thus : " You talk of wond'rous things which you see : You say the sun shines brightly, I feel his heat, but how can he make day and night for you."

*You* pl. ps. 2p. and st. of *talk*. *Talk* sa. c. with its st. *you*, and pt. im. *Of* rl. *Wond'rous* d. *Things* pl. n. 3p. and r. of *of*. *Which* d. of *things*, im. *Things* pl. n. 3p. and r. of *you* see. *You* pl. ps. 2p. and st. of *see*. *See* ra. c. with its st. *you* and pt. im. *You* pl. ps. 2p. and st. of *say*. *Say* ra. c. with its st. *you*, and pt. im. By rule 2, *the sun shines brightly* r. of *you* say. *I* ind. ps. 1p. and st. of *feel*. *Feel* ra. c. with its st. *I*. and pt. im. *His* d. *Heat* ind. n. 3p. and r. of *feel*, by Rule 4. *But* l. *How* sd. *Can make* ra. c. with its st. *he* and ft. im. by Rule 2. *He* ind. m. ps. of 3p. and st. of *can make*. *Day* ind. n. 3p. and r. of *can make*, by Rule 4. *And*

1. *Night* ind. n. 3p. and r. of *can make*, by Rule 4. *For* rl. *You* pl. ps. 2p. and r. of *for*, by Rule 6.

By Rule 16, the third verse runs thus:—

“I **make** my day and night myself, whenever I sleep or play. If I can always keep myself awake, I shall have constant day.”

*I* ind. ps. 1p. and st. of *make*. *Make* ra. c. with its st. *I* and pt. im. by Rule 2. *My* d. *Day* ind. n. 3p. and r. of *make*, by Rule 4. *And* l. *Night* ind. n. 3p. and r. of *I make*, by Rule 4. *Myself* ind. ps. 1p. and st. of *make*. *When*-*ever* l. *I* ind. ps. 1p. and st. of *sleep* and *play*. *Sleep* sa. c. with its st. *I* and pt. im. *Or* l. *Play* sa. c. with its st. *I* and pt. im. *If* l. *I* ind. ps. 1p. and st. of *can keep*. *Can keep* ra. c. with its st. *I* and pt. im. by Rule 2. *Myself* ind. ps. 1p. and r. of *can keep*, by Rule 4. *Always* sd. *Awake* d. of *myself*. *I* ind. ps. 1p. and st. of *shall have*. *Shall have* ra. c. with its st. *I* and Pt. im. by Rule 2. *Constant*, d. *Day* ind. n. 3p. and r. of *should have*, by Rule 4.

By Rule 16, the fourth verse runs thus:—

“I often hear you mourn for my hapless woe, with heavy sighs. Surely I can bear with patience a loss which loss I never can know.”

*I* ind. ps. 1p. and st. of *hear*. *Often* sd. *Hear* ra. c. with its st. *I* and pt. im. by Rule 2. *You mourn my hapless woe with heavy sighs* r. of *hear*, by Note 1, Rule 4. *You* pl. ps. 2p. and st. of *mourn*. *Mourn* sa. c. with its st. *you* and pt. im. *For* rl. *My* d. *Hapless* d. *Woe* ind. n. 3p. r. of *for*, by Rule 6. *With* rl. *Heavy* d. *Sighs* pl. n. 3p. and r. of *with* by Rule 6. *Surely* sd. *I* ind. ps. 1p. and st. of *can bear*. *Can bear* ra. c. with its st. *I* and ft. im. by Rule 2. *With* rl. *Patience* ind. n. 3p. and r. of *with*, by Rule 6. *A* d. *Loss* ind. n. 3p. and r. of *can bear*, by Rule 4. *Which* d. *Loss* ind. n. 3p. and r. of *can know*. *I* ind. ps. 1p. and st. of *can know*. *Never* sd. *Can know* ra. c. with its st. *I* and ft. imp. by Rule 2.

By Rule 16, the fifth verse runs thus:—

“Let not what I can not have destroy my cheerfulness.”



While I sing thus, I am a king, although I am a poor blind boy."

*Let destroy* ra. c. with its st. *what* and ft. im. by Rule 2. *What*, a double substitute, put for the st. of *let destroy*, and r. of *I can have*. (See the explanation of the word *what*, in page 24.) *I* ind. ps. 1p. and st. of *can have*. *Can have* ra. c. with its st. *I* and ft. im. by Rule 2. *Not* sd. *My* d. *Cheerfulness* ind. n. 3p. and r. of *let destroy*, by Rule 4. *While* l. *I* ind. ps. 1p. and st. of *sing*. *Sing* sa. c. with its st. *I* and pt. im. by Rule 2. *Thus* sd. *I* ind. ps. 1p. and st. of *am*, by Rule 1. *A* d. *King* ind. mn. 3p. explicative of *I* by Note 1, Rule 1. *Although* l. *I* ind. ps. 1p. and st. of *am*. *Am* sa. c. with its st. *I* and pt. im. by Rule 2. *A* d. *Poor* d. *Blind* d. *Boy* ind. mn. 3p. explicative of *I*, by Note 1, Rule 1.

The word *then*, in the beginning of this verse is superfluous in prose, as *it adds nothing* to the sense.

The importance of the rules we have given for the construction of sentences will appear from their application to the following sentences, taken from the *Key* to Lindley Murray's Exercises. When a writer on grammar, by way of instruction, corrects the faults of others, we may naturally conclude, that the corrected sentences are good English. Let the public judge the perspicuity, precision, and purity of the following sentences, taken from his *Key*, page 29.

1. "Disappointments sink the heart of man; but the renewal of hope gives consolation."

Disappointments deject man, but revived hope consoles him. R. 13.

2. "The smiles that encourage severity of judgment, hide malice and insincerity."

He who by smiles encourages injustice, is malicious and deceitful. Rule 13.

3. "He dares not act in opposition to his instructions."

He dares not oppose his instructions. R. 13.

4. "The number of the inhabitants of Great Britain and Ireland does not exceed twenty-three millions."

The population of Great Britain and Ireland does not exceed twenty-three millions. Rule 13.

5. "Nothing but vain and foolish pursuits delight some persons."

Vain and frivolous pursuits only, delight some persons.

6. "So much both of ability and merit is seldom found."

This sentence is so vague, that you can only guess its meaning. *Perhaps* it may be, Seldom has one person possessed so much ability and merit.

7. "He is a more methodical writer than Plutarch or any other that writes lives too hastily."

He is a more methodical writer than Plutarch or than any other over-hasty biographer. R. 13.

8. "I am sorry to say *it*, but there were more equivocators than one."

I am sorry there were more equivocators than one. Rule 12.

To employ *it*, without necessity, as in the last example, is one of the most common faults in composition.

9. "Let *it* be remembered, that *it* is not the uttering or the hearing of certain words, that constitutes the worship of the Almighty."

Remember, that uttering or hearing certain words does not constitute divine worship. R. 12 and 13.

10. "There are many occasions in life, in which silence and simplicity are true wisdom."

Silence and artlessness are often true wisdom. Rule 12 and 13.

11. "The generous never recount minutely the actions they have done; nor the prudent, those they will do."

The generous never recount their kind actions; nor do the prudent those they intend. R. 12 and 13.

12. "The business that relates to ecclesiastical meetings, matters, and persons, was to be ordered according to the king's direction."

Ecclesiastical matters were to be regulated by the king's direction. R. 12 and 13.

13. "In him was happily blended true dignity with softness of manners."

He possessed a happy mixture of suavity and dignity. R. 12 and 13.

The propriety of *soft manners*, or *softness of manners*, is very doubtful.

14. "The support of so many of his relations, was a heavy tax upon his industry; but thou knowest, he paid it cheerfully."

You know he cheerfully supported so many relations, as heavily taxed his industry. R. 12 and 13.

15. "What avails the best sentiments, if persons do not live suitably to them?"

The best sentiments avail little, without good actions. Rule 13.

16. "And the fame of this person, and his wonderful actions, was diffused throughout the country. K. p. 31." We cannot begin a sentence by *and*.

This person's fame and wonderful actions were known throughout the country. R. 12 and 13.

17. "The variety of the productions of genius, like that of the operations of nature, is without limit."

The various productions of genius, like nature's operations, are infinite. R. 12 and 13.

18. "Thou, who art the author and bestower of life, canst doubtless restore it also: but whether thou wilt please to restore it or not, that thou only knowest."

Author and bestower of life, thou canst restore it also: but whether thou wilt or not, thou only knowest. Rule 12 and 13.

19. "To do unto all men, as we would that they, in similar circumstances, should do unto us, *constitutes* the great principle of virtue.

To do unto others, as we would that they should do unto us, fulfils our social duty. R. 12 and 13.

"To do unto all men, etc.," does not *constitute* the principle of virtue, but is the effect of it. R. 13.

20. "From a fear of the world's censure, to be ashamed of the practice of precepts which the heart approves and embraces, marks a feeble and imperfect character." K. p. 32.

From fear of censure, not to practise precepts which the heart approves, marks a weak character. R. 12 and 13.

Is not a feeble character imperfect? consequently, a *feeble* and *imperfect* character is tautology.

21. "The erroneous opinions which we form concerning happiness and misery, give rise to all the mistaken and dangerous passions that embroil our life."

Our erroneous opinions of happiness and misery are the origin of all the dangerous passions that embroil our *lives*. Rule 13.

If we can say *our life*, we can say *our heart*, *our hand*, *our person*, which no grammarian will assert.

22. "To live soberly, righteously, and piously, is required of all men."

God requires that man should live piously. R. 13.

Can a man live piously without living soberly and righteously?

23. "That it is our duty to promote the purity of our minds and bodies, to be just and kind to our fellow-creatures, and to be pious and faithful to him that made us, admits not of any doubt in a rational and well-informed mind."

The rational and well-informed doubt not, that to practise and promote true religion, is our duty. R. 12 and 13.

24. "To be of a pure and humble mind, to exercise benevolence towards others, and to cultivate piety towards God, are the sure means of becoming peaceful and happy."

To be truly religious, is a sure means of becoming happy. R. 12 and 13.

25. "It is an important truth, that religion, vital religion, the religion of the heart, is the most powerful auxiliary of reason, in waging war with the passions, and promoting that sweet composure which constitutes the peace of God."

That pure religion is the most powerful means of restraining the passions, and promoting our happiness, is an important truth. R. 12 and 13.

26. "The possession of our senses entire, of our limbs uninjured, of a sound understanding, of friends and companions, is often overlooked; though it would be the ultimate wish of many, who, as far as we can judge, deserve it as much as ourselves."

To possess the perfect use of all our limbs and faculties, and to have kind friends and companions, are blessings which we do not sufficiently appreciate, although ardently desired by many who may be as deserving as we are. R. 12 and 13.

27. "All that makes a figure on the great theatre of the world, the employments of the busy, the enterprises of the ambitious, and the exploits of the warlike; the virtues which form the happiness, and the crimes which occasion the misery of mankind, originate in that silent and secret recess of thought which is hidden from every human eye."

The mind is the origin of every thing that makes a figure on the great theatre of the world, namely, busy employments, ambitious enterprises, military exploits, and the crimes which occasion human misery.

None but an infidel could assert, that the mind is the origin of the virtues which form human happiness, or that the virtues which form human happiness, originate in the mind. Is not God the origin of every virtue?

28. "If the privileges to which he has an undoubted right, and which he has long enjoyed, should now be wrested from him, it would be flagrant injustice." K. p. 33.

To wrest from him his just privileges, which he has long enjoyed, will be a flagrant injustice.

29. "Such is the constitution of men, that virtue, however it may be neglected for a time, will ultimately be acknowledged and respected."

Such is the nature of virtue, that, although neglected for a time, it must ultimately be acknowledged and respected. K. 13.

30. "The crown of virtue are peace and honour."

This sentence is pure nonsense. First—As you may have peace and honour, without virtue, how can peace and honour be the crown of virtue? Secondly—Can you with propriety say, *the crown are*? Thirdly—If *peace* and *honour* are the subject of the assertive *are*, why not say, "*Peace and honour are* the crown of virtue?" The sentence is bad English. Perhaps the following may be the meaning intended to be expressed:—*Peace and honour pursue virtue*; or, "peace and honour are the temporal rewards of virtue."—R. 13.

31. "Wisdom, virtue, happiness, dwell with the golden mediocrity."

Wisdom, virtue, *and* happiness, dwell in the golden mediocrity.

32. "In unity consists the welfare and security of every society."—K. p. 34.

The welfare and security of every society depend on unity.—R. 13.

33. "His politeness and good disposition were, on failure of their effect, entirely changed."

His politeness and kindness ceased when they proved ineffectual.

34. "Humility and knowledge, with poor apparel, excel pride and ignorance under costly attire."

Humility and knowledge in humble array, are better than pride and ignorance richly attired.

35. "The planetary system, boundless space, and the immense ocean, affect the mind with sensations of astonishment."

To contemplate the planetary system, boundless space, and the immense ocean, excites our admiration and astonishment.

36. "Humility and love, whatever obscurities may involve religious tenets, constitute the essence of true religion."

When religion is divested of obscurities, its essence is humility and love.—R. 13.

37. "Religion and virtue, our best support and highest honour, confer on the mind principles of noble independence."

Religion and virtue, our best support and highest honour, impart noble and independent principles. R. 13.

38. "Pride and self-sufficiency stifle sentiments of dependence on our Creator: levity and attachment to worldly pleasure, destroy the sense of gratitude to him."

Satan destroys our trust in the Creator by pride and self-sufficiency; and our gratitude, by levity and a love of worldly pleasure. R. 13.

39. "The following treatise, together with those that accompany it, was written, many years ago, for my private satisfaction." K. p. 35.

These treatises were written, many years ago, for my own

private satisfaction. R. 13. *Together with*, ought to be *and*. *Were not they all written for his satisfaction?*

40. "That great senator, in concert with several other eminent persons, was the projector of the revolution."

That great senator, and several other eminent persons, were the projectors of the revolution.

Was not every eminent person in *concert* with the great senator, a projector as well as the great senator himself?

41. "The religion of these people, as well as their customs and manners, was strangely misrepresented."

The religion, customs, and manners of these people, were strangely misrepresented. R. 12 and 13.

41. "Virtue, joined with knowledge and wealth, confers great influence and respectability. But knowledge with wealth united, if virtue is wanting, has very limited influence, and is often despised."

Virtue, knowledge, and wealth, confer great influence and respectability; but knowledge and wealth, without virtue, have a very limited influence, and are often despised. R. 12 and 13.

43. "The buildings of the institution have been enlarged, the expense of which, added to the increased price of provisions, renders it necessary to advance the terms of admission."

The dearness of provisions, and the cost of enlarging the buildings of the institution, increase the terms of admission. R. 12 and 13.

44. "One added to nineteen make twenty." Better thus : "One and nineteen make twenty."

One and nineteen are twenty. R. 13.

If the second sentence is better English than the first, the first cannot be good English. Why give it?

45. "Thou, and the gardener, and the huntsman, must bear the blame of this business amongst you."

The gardener, huntsman, and you, must bear the blame of this business. R. 12 and 13.

46. "My sister and I, as well as my brothers, are daily employed in our respective occupations."

My sister and I have daily occupations, as well as my brothers. R. 12, 13.

As we cannot have daily occupations without employment, it is tautology to say, "We are employed in our occupations."

47. "Man is not such a machine as a watch or clock, which moves merely as it is moved."

As voluntary actions are not mechanical, man is not such a machine as a watch or clock. R. 12 and 13.

*Is a watch or clock moved as it moves?*

48. "Despise no infirmity of mind or body, nor any condition of life; for it is, perhaps, to be your own lot." K. p. 36.

Despise no infirmity or condition, which may yet be your own lot.

49. "Speaking impatiently to servants, or any thing that betrays unkindness or ill-humour, is certainly criminal."

To speak impatiently to servants, or to say any thing unkind or ill-humoured, is certainly culpable. R. 12 and 13.

50. "There are many faults in spelling, which neither analogy nor pronunciation justifies."

Many faults in spelling are not justified by either analogy or pronunciation. R. 12 and 13.

51. "When sickness, infirmity, or reverse of fortune affects us, the sincerity of friendship is proved."

Adversity, danger, or disease, tests the sincerity of friendship. R. 12 and 13.

52. "Either thou or I am greatly mistaken, in our judgment, on this subject."

One of us judges the matter erroneously. R. 12 and 13.

53. "I or thou art the person who must undertake the business proposed."

You or I must undertake the proposed business. R. 12 and 13.

54. "Some parts of the ship and cargo were recovered; but neither the captain nor sailors were saved." K. p. 37.

Some parts of the ship and cargo were recovered, but the captain and sailors perished. R. 12 and 13.

55. "Whether one person, or more than one person, were concerned in the business, does not yet appear."



Whether one or more were concerned in the business is unknown. R. 12 and 13.

56. "The deceitfulness of riches, or the cares of this life, have choked the seeds of virtue in many a promising mind."

Deceitful riches, and temporal cares, have extinguished the dawning virtue of many promising minds." R. 12 and 13.

57. "The people rejoice in that which should give them sorrow."

The people rejoice at what they ought to grieve. R. 12 and 13.

58. "The flock, and not the fleece, is, or ought to be, the object of the shepherd's care."

The shepherd ought to take more care of the flock than *the fleece*.

The fleece *ought not* to be an object of the shepherd's care, according to Lindley Murray's Key.

59. "The court has just ended, after having sat through the trial of a very long cause."

The court has just risen, after a long trial. R. 12 and 13.

60. "In the days of youth, the multitude eagerly pursue pleasure as their chief good."

Most youth eagerly pursue pleasure as their chief good. R. 12 and 13.

61. "When the nation complains, the rulers should listen to its voice."

Rulers ought to listen to national complaints.

62. "These people draw near to me with their mouth, and honour me with their lips, but their heart is far from me." K. p. 38.

These people pretend to love and honour me, but their hearts are far from me. R. 12 and 13.

63. "The committee were divided in their sentiments, and they have referred the business to the general meeting."

The committee disagreed, and referred the business to a general assembly. R. 12 and 13.

64. "The committee was very full when this point was decided, and its judgment has not been called in question."

The decision, in full committee, on this point, has not been questioned. R. 12 and 13.

65. "The remnant of the people was persecuted with great severity."

Those who remained were cruelly persecuted. R. 12 and 13.

66. "Never was any people so much infatuated as the Jewish nation."

No nation was so infatuated as the Jewish. R. 12 and 13.

67. "The shoal of herrings was of immense extent."

The herring shoal was immense. R. 12 and 13.

68. "The exercise of reason appears as little in these sportsmen, as in the beasts which they sometimes hunt, and by which they are sometimes hunted."

These sportsmen evince as little reason as the beasts they sometimes hunt and by which they are sometimes hunted. R. 12 and 13.

69. "The male among birds seems to discover no beauty, but in the colour of his species."

A male bird seems to discover no beauty but in his species. R. 12 and 13.

70. "Rebecca took goodly raiment which was with her in the house, and put it upon Jacob" K. p. 39.

Rebecca clothed Jacob in goodly raiment she had by her. R. 12 and 13.

71. "The fair sex, whose task is not to mingle in the labours of life, have their part assigned them to act."

The duties assigned to the fair sex are not the fatiguing labours of life. R. 12 and 13.

72. "The mind of man cannot be long without some food to nourish the activity of its thoughts."

The mind requires frequent exercise to sustain its activity. R. 12 and 13.

73. "I do not think any one should incur censure for being tender of his reputation."

No one ought to be censured for eagerness to defend his reputation. R. 13.

74. "Disappointments and afflictions, however disagreeable, often improve us." K. p. 40.

Disappointments and afflictions, however painful, often improve us. R. 12 and 13.

Are not afflictions more than disagreeable?

75. "Humility is one of the most amiable virtues that we can possess."

Humility is a most amiable virtue. R. 12 and 13.

*What is the virtue which we cannot possess?*

76. "The men and things that he has studied have not improved his morals."

His studies have not improved his morals. R. 12 and 13.

77. "In what light soever we view him, his conduct will bear inspection."

In whatever light we view his conduct, it bears examination. R.

78. "On which side soever they are contemplated, they appear to advantage."

On whatever side we view them, they appear to advantage.

Either the word, *side*, or the assertive, *are contemplated*, is misapplied.

79. "How much soever he might despise the maxims of the king's administration, he kept a total silence on the subject."

Whatever contempt he had for the king's administrative maxims, he concealed. R. 12 and 13.

80. "None more impatiently suffer injuries, than they who are most forward in doing them." K. p. 4.

Forward aggressors are the most impatient sufferers.

81. "I acknowledge that I am the teacher, who adopt that sentiment, and maintain the propriety of such measures." K. p. 43.

I am the teacher who adopts that sentiment, and maintains the propriety of such measures." R. 12 and 13.

82. "Thou art a friend that has often relieved me, and that has not deserted me now in the time of peculiar need." K. p. 43.

Your friendship has often relieved me, and you do not now desert me, in my peculiar need. R. 12 and 13.

83. "Religion raises men above themselves; irreligion sinks

them beneath the brutes; this binds them down to a poor pitiable speck of perishable earth; that opens to them a prospect to the skies." K. p. 45.

Irreligion binds man down to a miserable speck of earth, and makes him inferior to the brutes; but pure religion raises him above this world, and insures him celestial and eternal bliss. R. 13.

84. "Rex and Tyrannus are very different characters. The one rules his people by laws to which they consent; the other, by his absolute will and power: that is called freedom, this tyranny."

Rex and Tyrannus are opposite characters. Rex rules his people by laws to which they consent, which is called freedom; Tyrannus rules only by his absolute will and power, which is called tyranny. R. 13.

85. "Each of them in his turn receives the benefits to which he is entitled."

Each of them, consecutively, receives his just benefits. R. 12 and 13.

86. "My counsel to each of you is, that he make it his endeavour to come to a friendly agreement."

Try each of you to settle amicably. R. 11 and 13.

87. "Every person, whatever his station, is bound by the duties of morality and religion."

No one is exempt from the duties of morality and religion. R. 12 and 13.

88. "Every man's heart and temper are productive of much inward joy, or bitterness."

Every man's heart and temper produces much joy, or bitterness. R. 12.

The word *inward* is redundant, as every joy is inward; its effects *only* are outward.

89. "Every man and every woman was numbered." K. p. 46.

Every man and woman was numbered. R. 12.

Lindley Murray gives the following note after the last example.

"The copulative conjunction, in this instance, makes no

difference with regard to the verb. All men and women are referred to separately and individually: the verb must, therefore, have the same construction as it has in the following sentence:—Every one of the men and women was numbered.”

“This construction forms an exception to the second rule of syntax.”

Lindley Murray’s consistency in using *are* in one of the preceding sentences, and *was* in the other is very doubtful.

Are not *all the hearts and tempers* separately and individually referred to as well as *all the men and women*? Why use *are* in one case, and *was* in the other?

90. “When benignity and gentleness reign within, we are always least in hazard from without: every person and every occurrence is beheld in the most favourable light.”

When we act benignly and mildly we have little to fear. Every person and occurrence is beheld in the most favourable light. R. 12 and 13.

91. “He was extremely prodigal, and his property is now nearly exhausted.”

His extreme prodigality has nearly exhausted his property. R. 12 and 13.

92. “They generally succeeded, for they lived conformably to the rules of prudence.”

They generally succeeded, because they lived prudently. R. 13.

93. “We may reason very clearly, and exceeding strongly without knowing that there is such a thing as a syllogism.”

We can reason very strongly without knowing what a syllogism is. R. 12 and 13.

As we cannot reason very strongly without reasoning clearly, the word *clearly* is redundant.

94. “The amputation was exceedingly well performed, and saved the patient’s life.” K. p. 47.

The amputation was well performed, which saved the patient’s life. R. 12.

95. “He came agreeably to his promise, and conducted himself suitably to the occasion.”

He came according to promise, and behaved himself well. R. 12 and 13.

96. "They rejected the advice, and conducted themselves exceedingly indiscreetly."

They rejected the advice, and conducted themselves very indiscreetly. R. 13.

97. "He is a person of great abilities, and exceedingly upright, and is likely to be a very useful member of the community."

He is very talented and upright, and likely to become a useful member of the community. R. 13.

98. "The conspiracy was the more easily discovered, from its being known to many."

The conspiracy was the more easily discovered, as it was known to many. R. 13.

99. "Not being fully acquainted with the subject, he could not affirm more strongly than he did."

His imperfect knowledge of the subject could not justify a stronger affirmation. R. 13.

100. "Conformable to their vehemence of thought was their vehemence of gesture."

Their violent gesture truly portrayed their agitated minds. R. 13.

101. "We should implant in the minds of youth, such seeds and principles of piety and virtue as are likely to take the earliest and deepest root."

We ought first to instruct youth in those principles of piety and virtue which make the earliest and most durable impressions. Rule 13.

Is not *to sow seeds* more agreeable to general usage than *to plant seeds*, or *implant seeds*?

102. "The tongue is like a race-horse which runs the faster the less weight it carries." K. p. 48.

The tongue, like a race-horse, runs faster the less weight it carries. R. 13.

103. "The nightingale sings; hers is the sweetest voice in the grove."

The nightingale is the sweetest warbler of the grove.

104. "Virtue confers supreme dignity on man, and should be his chief desire."

As virtue superlatively dignifies man, it ought to be his chief desire. R. 13.

105. "His assertion was better founded than that of his opponent, nay, the words of the latter were not true."

His assertion was true, but his opponent's was false. R. 12 and 13.

106. "A talent of this kind would, perhaps, prove the likeliest of all to succeed."

This sentence is pure nonsense. If we ask the likeliest of *all what* to succeed? The answer must be, the likeliest talent of all talents, which is absurd. How can a *talent* of a class, or kind, prove more likely to succeed than another of the *same kind*? K. p. 50.

The sentence may be thus written:—

A talent of this kind may succeed better than any other. R. 13.

107. "He has been much censured for conducting himself with little attention to his business." K. 48.

He has been much censured for neglecting his business. R. 12 and 13.

108. "So bold a breach of order called for a little severity in punishing the offender." K. p. 50.

The offender's open disobedience deserved no lenity. R. 13.

109. "His error was *accompanied* with so little contrition and candid acknowledgment, that he found few persons to intercede for him."

He showed so little regret and candour after his misconduct, that he found few to intercede for him. R. 13.

Contrition and acknowledgment do not accompany either crime or error, they follow it; consequently the word *accompanied* is misapplied.

110. "There were so many mitigating circumstances attending his misconduct, particularly that of his open confession, that he found a few friends who were disposed to interest themselves in his favour."

His misconduct was followed by so many mitigating circumstances, particularly his open confession, as disposed a few *friends* to intercede for him. R. 12 and 13.

111. "The fear of shame, and the desire of approbation, prevent many bad actions."

Shame, and love of approbation, prevent many bad actions.  
R. 12.

112. "They slew Varus—him that was mentioned before."  
K. p. 51.

They slew the *said* Varus. R. 13.

113. "They slew Varus, who was he that I mentioned before."

They slew Varus, whom I mentioned before. R. 13.

114. "It was the men, women, and children's lot to suffer great calamities."

The men, women, and children, suffered great calamities.  
R. 12 and 13.

115. "Peter, John, and Andrew's occupation was that of fishermen." K. p. 52.

Peter, John, and Andrew were fishermen. R. 12 and 13.

116. "This measure gained the king's, as well as the people's approbation."

The king and people approved of this measure. R. 12 and 13.

117. "This palace had been the Grand Sultan Mahomet's."  
This *was* the Grand Sultan Mahomet's palace.—See Dt.

118. "I will not, for David, thy father's sake."

I will not for thy father David's sake.

119. "It was necessary to have the advice both of the physician and surgeon."

The physician's and the surgeon's advice were necessary.  
R. 13.

120. "What can be the cause of the parliament's neglecting so important a business." K. p. 53.

Why does the parliament neglect so important a business. R. 13.

121. "Much depends on this rule being observed."

Lowth's Grammar, Lindley Murray's, and almost all the English Grammars published since Lowth's time, teach this unmeaning circumlocution, which ought to be:

"Much depends on observing the rule." R. 13.

122. "The time of William's making the experiment, at length arrived."



William's time for making the experiment at length arrived. R. 13.

123. "If we alter the situation of any of the words, we shall presently be sensible of the melody's suffering. K. p. 54. *The melody's suffering* is too bad.

If we change the arrangement, we injure the melody.

124. "Such will ever be the effect of youth's associating with vicious companions."

The association of youth with vicious companions will ever produce similar effects. R. 13.

125. "Though he now takes pleasure in them, he will one day repent of indulgences so unwarrantable. K. p. 55.

He will yet regret the unwarrantable indulgences in which he now delights. R. 13.

126. "It will be very difficult to make his conduct agree with the principles he professes."

To reconcile his conduct and avowed principles, is very difficult. R. 13.

127. "To ingratiate themselves with some, by traducing others, marks a base and despicable mind."

His mind is base, who ingratiates himself by traducing others. R. 13.

If we ask what mind is base and despicable, we must answer, the *mind* of the persons who ingratiate themselves, which is a palpable inconsistency, because we cannot say the *mind of persons*; we must say the *minds* of persons.

128. "If such maxims and such practices prevail, what is become of decency and virtue?"

Decency and virtue cannot be cherished if these maxims and practices prevail. R. 13.

129. "The mighty rivals have now at length agreed."

The mighty rivals, now at length, agree.

*Now* is the passing transit, consequently we must use the form of the assertive corresponding to it, and not that corresponding to the attached past time. See Rule 2.

130. "I am come according to the time proposed; but I am fallen upon an evil hour."

*I am here* at the appointed time, which is an evil hour. R. 13.

131. "He had entered into the connexion before the consequences were considered."

Is not the time before the consequences were considered, a detached passed time? consequently, by Rule 2nd, we must say, *he entered*, and not *he had entered*.

132. "I cannot tell who has befriended me, unless it is he from whom I have received many benefits." K. p. 56.

I cannot tell who has befriended me, unless he, from whom I have received many benefits. R. 12.

133. "He so much resembles my brother that, at first sight I took it to be him."

He resembles my brother so much, that, at first sight, I took him for my brother.

There are two errors in the preceding sentence, as it is given in Lindley Murray's Grammar, and in many others.

First, *it* is improperly substituted for a person.

Second, the assertive *to be*, is improperly used instead of the word *for*. This careless application of the assertive *to be*, has led to that absurd rule, or remark, in so many English Grammars, namely: "The verb *to be*, through all its variations, has the same case after it as that which next precedes it." To illustrate which Lindley Murray gave the following examples:—"I understood *it* to be *him*. I believe *it* to be *them*. We, at first, took *it* to be her, but were afterwards convinced that *it* was not she. She is not now the woman whom they represented her to have been. Whom do you fancy him to be?" By these examples, (says Lindley Murray) "it appears that this substantive verb has no government of case, but serves, in all its forms, as a conductor to the case, so that the two cases which, in the construction of the sentence, are the next before and after it, must always be alike. Perhaps this subject will be more intelligible to the learner by observing that the words in the cases preceding, and following, the verb *to be*, may be said to be in apposition to each other. Thus, in the sentence, 'I understood it to be him,' the words *it* and *him* are in apposition, that is, 'they refer to the same thing, and are in the common case.'"

From this rule, its examples, and the observations on it, we

can infer, first, that both the nouns and pronouns coupled by the assertive *to be*, must be subjects, or objects; secondly, that the assertive *to be*, has no government; thirdly, that the nouns, or pronouns, coupled by *to be*, always relate to the same person, or thing; and, fourthly, that both the nouns, or pronouns, coupled by the assertive *to be*, are of the same gender and number; and, lastly, that *it* can be used for a person's name.

We insist, first, that the assertive *to be*, when correctly used, can never couple two objects, or (as Lindley Murray says, two nouns or pronouns, in the objective case;) secondly, that the nouns, or pronouns, coupled by the assertive *to be*, in some of the examples which he gives, do not relate to the same person, or thing; thirdly, that the word *it* can in *no case be substituted* for the *name of a person*; fourthly, that he contradicts himself by saying the verb *to be*, has no government; fifthly, that some of the examples given are bad English; and, lastly, that the verb *to be*, is misapplied in some of the examples given.

If in the sentence, "*I understood it to him*," the word *it* and *him* are in apposition, that is, if they relate to the same person, or thing, consequently, by his fifth Rule in Syntax, namely, "Pronouns must always agree with their antecedents and the nouns for which they stand, *in gender and number*;" *it* and *him* are pronouns of the same *gender*, which Lindley Murray himself contradicts in page 61, where he tells us, "Gender has respect only to the third person singular of the pronouns, *he, she, it*." *He* is masculine, *she* is feminine, and *it* is neuter. Can *it* be of the same gender as *him*? If they relate to the same person, or thing, by rule fifth they must be of the same gender, that is, *it* must be masculine, or *him* must be neuter, which is absurd by the quotation from page 61, namely *he* is masculine, *she* is feminine, and *it* is neuter. How ridiculous must the grammarian appear who, in parsing the sentence, "*I understood it to be him*," makes *it* a personal pronoun, third person *singular, masculine gender*, or who would make *him* a personal pronoun, third person singular, *neuter gender*. If *it* and *him*, in the sentence, "*I understood it to be him*," relate to the same person, or thing.

*it* and *them* must also relate to the same person, or thing, in the sentence, *I believe it to have been them*; consequently, by Lindley Murray's fifth rule of Syntax, *it* and *them* must be of the same number, that is, *it* must be plural, or *them* must be singular, which is as absurd as to make *it* masculine, and *him* neuter; hence *it* and *him* do not relate to the same person or thing, nor do *it* and *them*. Lindley Murray's Grammar here informs us that the verb *to be* has no government, but the first remark under rule the tenth, in the same Grammar, declares, that the verb *to be*, does govern. Which are we to believe? in the sentence, *Pompey contended with Cæsar, who was the greatest general of his time*, he observes, that the word *general*, is in the nominative case, governed, by note fourth under rule the 11th. According to this remark, the verb *to be* governs, and, according to the observations on the fourth remark, under Rule 11th, it does not govern, which is as absurd as any of the inferences we have already correctly drawn from the combined inconsistencies of remark the fourth, under Rule the 11th, and the observations attached to it. Could any man who perfectly understood his subject write such nonsense as we have here exposed? What ought the public to think of the Rev. Father Mathew, at the same time he was preaching temperance, if he made so free with the bottle as to render himself unable to stand steadily? This is similar to what Lindley Murray did, when he wrote his Grammar to teach others to write correctly, he, in many parts of that Grammar, and the Key, wrote nonsense, of which, *I took it to be him*, and *I understood it to have been them*, are striking examples See our 13th and 14th Rule.

To use the verb *to be*, invariably without a subject, in all the examples given to show that it connects two objects, is very strange. Why should a verb in its primitive form admit an object after it, if the same verb, when used assertively or interrogatively, can never admit it? Let the advocates of remark the 4th, under Rule the 11th, answer this question. Let them show what name the word *it* is substituted for in the first three examples we have given. Let them eject the word *it*, from each of the examples, and substitute the name in

its stead. If after so doing, the sentences are good English, we shall acknowledge our ignorance of grammar. See our 15th Rule and the note under it.

Lindley Murray in every example given to show that the verb *to be*, connects two objects, was actually obliged, either to write examples without meaning, as in the first three examples; namely, *I understood it to be him, I believe it to be them; We at first took it to be her*, but were afterwards convinced that it was not she. Or to write bad English to accord with this absurd note, as in the two last examples; namely, *She is not now the person whom they represented her to have been; Whom do you fancy him to be?* Which ought to be "She is not now the person *who* they represented her to have been;" "Who is he?"

134. "Whom do you think him to be?"

Who is he? R. 12 and 13.

135. "Who do the people say that we are?"

Who do the people say we are?

136. "Whatever others do, let thee and me act wisely."

Whatever others do, let us act wisely. R. 13.

137. *It is better to live on a little, than to outlive a great deal.*"

To live on a little, is better than to outlive a great deal. Rule 12.

138. "It is very probable that this assembly was called, to clear some doubt which the King had, about the lawfulness of the *Hollanders' throwing off* the monarchy of Spain, *and withdrawing*, entirely, their allegiance to that crown."

This assembly was probably called to clear the King's doubt about Holland's right to throw off the monarchy of Spain, and withdraw its entire allegiance from that crown. R. 12 and 13.

139. "It is a great support to virtue, when we see a good mind maintain its patience and tranquillity, under injuries and affliction, and cordially forgive its oppressors." K. p. 139.

To see a good mind maintain its patience and tranquillity under injuries and affliction, and cordially forgive its oppressors, is a great support to virtue. R. 12.

140. "We should not be like many persons, who depreciate the virtues they do not possess." K. p. 57.

We ought not, like others, to depreciate the virtues we have not. R. 12 and 13.

141. "By observing truth, you will command esteem as well as secure peace." K. p. 62.

By observing truth, you command esteem and secure peace. R. 12.

142. "He prepared them for this event, by sending to them proper information."

He prepared them for this event, by timely information. R. 12.

143. "Nothing could have made her so unhappy, as marrying a man who possessed such principles." K. p. 63.

Nothing could have made her so unhappy, as to marry a man of such principles. R. 12.

144. "The changing of times and seasons, the removing and setting up of kings, belong to Providence alone."

To change times and seasons, and to remove and set up kings, belong to God alone. R. 12 and 13.

145. "Pliny, speaking of Cato the Censor's disapproving of the Grecian orators, expressed himself thus." K. p. 64.

Pliny expressed himself thus, in speaking of Cato the Censor's disapprobation of Grecian oratory. R. 13.

146. "Propriety of pronunciation is the giving of that sound to every word, which the most polite usage of the language appropriates to it."

To pronounce every word according to the most approved usage, constitutes correct pronunciation. R. 13.

147. "Not attending to this rule is the cause of a very common error."

A very common error arises from inattention to this rule. R. 12 and 13.

148. "There will be no danger of their spoiling of their faces, or of their gaining of converts."

That they will spoil their faces, or gain converts, is unlikely. R. 12 and 13.

149. "For avoiding of that precipice, he is indebted to his friend's care."

His friend's care rescued him from that precipice. R. 12.

150. "It was from our misunderstanding of the directions, that we lost our way."

We lost our way by mistaking the directions. R. 14.

151. "In tracing his history, we discover little that is worthy of imitation."

We find little to imitate in his history. R. 12.

152. "By reading books, written by the best authors, his mind became highly improved." K. p. 63.

He improved his mind highly by reading the best authors. R. 12.

153. "By too eager pursuit, he ran a great risk of being disappointed."

He risked his success by too much eagerness. R. 12 and 13.

154. "He had not long enjoyed repose, before he began to weary of having nothing to do."

He did not long enjoy repose, before want of employ wearied him. R. 13.

155. "If some events had not fallen out very unexpectedly, I should have been present."

Unexpected events occasioned my absence. R. 12 and 13.

156. He returned the goods which he had stolen, and made all the reparation in his power."

He has returned the goods which he stole, and has made very possible reparation. R. 11.

157. "The bread that has been eaten, is soon forgotten."

Eaten bread is soon forgotten. R. 12.

158. "The cloth had no seam, but was woven throughout."

The cloth was seamless. R. 12. *What cloth is not woven?*

159. "His resolution was too strong to be shaken by slight opposition."

Slight opposition could not shake his resolution. R. 12.

160. "He writes as the best authors would have written, had they written on the same subject." K. p. 66.

He writes as the best authors would have written on the same subject. R. 12.

161. "He was not often pleasing, because he was vain."

*He was seldom pleasing, because he was vain.* R. 12.

162. "William acted nobly, though he was unsuccessful."

William acted nobly, but unsuccessfully. R. 13.

163. "We may live happily, though our possessions are small."

We may live happily on small possessions. R. 13.

164. "It cannot, therefore, be impertinent, or ridiculous, to remonstrate." *This is only a clause.*

To remonstrate, therefore, cannot be impertinent, or ridiculous. R. 12.

165. "He offered an apology, which not being admitted, he became submissive."

As his apology did not satisfy, he submitted. R. 12 and 13.

166. "It is impossible to be at work continually." K. p. 67.

To work continually is impossible. R. 12 and 13.

167. "It is too common with mankind to be totally engrossed, and overcome, by passing events."

Passing events too often engross and overcome us. R. 12 and 13.

168. "When the Romans were pressed with a foreign enemy, the women voluntarily contributed all their rings and jewels to assist the government."

When the Romans were pressed by a foreign enemy, the ladies voluntarily contributed all their rings and jewels to assist the government. R. 12 and 13.

169. "If some persons' opportunities were ever so favourable, they would be too indolent to improve them."

Some persons are too indolent to profit by the best opportunities. R. 12 and 13.

170. "His follies had reduced him to a situation in which he had much to fear, and nothing to hope." K. p. 68.

His follies left him alarming fears, and no hope. R. 12 and 13.

171. "It is reported that the prince will come hither to-morrow."

That the prince will come hither to-morrow, is reported. R. 12.

172. "I am resolved not to comply with the proposal, either at present, or at any other time."

I shall never comply with the proposal. R. 12.



173. "There cannot be anything more insignificant than vanity."

Nothing is more insignificant than vanity. R. 12.

174. "I have received no information on the subject, either from him, or from his friend." K. p. 69.

He or his friend has not informed me on the subject. R. 12.

175. "Neither precept nor discipline is so forcible as example."

Example is more forcible than precept or discipline. R. 12.

176. "We are all accountable creatures, each for himself."

Each of us is accountable for himself. R. 12.

177. "They willingly, and of themselves, endeavoured to make up the difference."

They of themselves endeavoured to make up the difference. R. 12.

178. "He laid the suspicion upon somebody, I know not upon whom, in the company."

He suspected somebody in company; I know not whom. R. 12.

179. "I hope it is not I with whom he is displeased."

I hope I'm not the object of his displeasure. R. 12.

180. "To poor us, there is not much hope remaining."

We are poor, without much hope. R. 12.

How a writer on grammar could sully his work by the vulgar English of the preceding sentence, is incomprehensible.

Is the word *us*, a name? Of what name is the word *poor*, descriptive?

181. "It was not with him that they were so angry."

He is not the person with whom they were so angry. R. 13.

182. "It is not with me he is engaged."

He is not engaged with me. R. 12.

183. "From whom did he receive that intelligence?"

Who gave him that intelligence? R. 13.

184. "To have no one to whom we heartily wish well, and for whom we are warmly concerned, is a deplorable state." K. p. 70.

His condition is deplorable who sincerely wishes no one well. R. 12 and 13.

185. "I have frequently desired their company, but have always hitherto been disappointed of that pleasure."

I have not yet had the pleasure of their company, for which I have so often wished.

186. "Many ridiculous practices have been brought into vogue "

Many ridiculous practices have been fashionable. R. 13.

187. "It is my request, that he will be particular in speaking on the following points." K. p. 71.

I request that he will be particular in speaking on the following points. R. 13.

188. "The Saxons reduced the greater part of Britain under their power."

The Saxons conquered the greater part of Britain. R. 13.

189. "His deportment was adapted to conciliate regard."

His conduct was conciliatory.

190. "The politeness of the world has the same resemblance to benevolence that the shadow has to the substance." K. p. 72.

Politeness resembles benevolence as a shadow does a substance.

*What politeness is not of the world?*

191. "When we have had a true taste of the pleasures of virtue, we can have no relish for those of vice."

Those who like virtuous pleasures, cannot relish vice. R. 12 and 13.

192. "How happy is it to know how to live at times with one's-self, to leave one's-self with regret, to find one's-self again with pleasure! The world is then less necessary to us."

How happy are they who can occasionally live in solitude, leave it with regret, and return to it with pleasure. They are more independent of the world than others. R. 12 and 13.

The three repetitions of *one's-self* are inelegant, and disagreeable.

193. "Civility makes its way with every kind of persons." Civility is the safest guide in society.

194. "To be moderate in our views, and to proceed tem-

perately in pursuit of them is the best way to ensure success." K. p. 73.

The best way to ensure success is to pursue it temperately and prudently. R. 12 and 13.

195. "It is difficult for him to speak three sentences successively." K. p. 84.

He finds a difficulty in speaking three successive sentences. R. 12.

196. "By this expression I do not mean what some persons annex to it." K. p.

I do not use this expression in the same sense that some do.

197. "The refreshment came in seasonably before they had lain down to rest."

The refreshments were fortunately sent before they lay down to rest. R. 13. *Did the refreshment come?*

198. "It is six months since I paid a visit to my relations." I have not visited my relations these six months. R. 13.

199. "If I were to give a reason for their looking so well, it would be, that they rise early."

They look well because they rise early.

200. "I hope this is the last time of my acting so imprudently."

I hope this is my last imprudence. R. 12.

The reader will see by the references to the pages in the Key to Lindley Murray's Exercises, that we have taken 194 of the preceding sentences from 36 pages only. At this rate, how many sentences may be corrected in the entire Key?

As numerous violations of grammar can be found in every English book, *no precedent can be received* as a test of the correctness of a sentence. What proof have we, that the precedent, if received, is not one of these errors?

The present English law, and the English law two hundred, a hundred, or even fifty years ago, differ, consequently, the legality of any act, condemnation, or acquittal, or the justness of any claim or defence, can only be legally tested by the law that now exists, and not by that which did exist. Much less *can it be tested* by the laws of any other country.

Horne Tooke observes, page 121, Vol. I: "I must, however, do Mr. Harris and Dr. Lowth the justice to acknowledge, that the *Hermes* of the former has been received with universal approbation, both at home and abroad; and has been quoted as undeniable authority on the subject, by the learned of all countries. For which, however, I can easily account; not by supposing that its doctrine gave any more satisfaction to their minds who quoted it than to mine; but because, as judges shelter their knavery by precedents, so do scholars their ignorance by authority; and when they cannot reason, it is safer and less disgraceful to repeat that nonsense at second hand, which they would be ashamed to give originally as their own."

How ridiculous must the English grammatical author appear, who is so silly as to imagine that by quoting precedents, or the laws of other languages, he proves the truth of his own grammatical views?

The following sentences show the grammatical fallibility of English writers, as well as the imprudence of receiving precedents as authority. I shall first test the preceding sentence from Horne Tooke; namely, "I must, however, do Mr. Harris and Doctor Lowth the justice to acknowledge, that the *Hermes* of the former," etc.

First—As that cannot be universal, to which there is any exception, Horne Tooke misapplied the word, *universal*, in the preceding sentence; because *Horne Tooke himself was a learned man* who did not receive *Hermes* with *approbation*; as appears from several parts of the "Diversions of Purley," of which we shall only quote two instances.

Page 265. "I say that a little more reflection and a great deal less reading, a little more attention to common sense, and less blind prejudice for his Greek comment, would have made Mr. Harris a much better grammarian, if not, perhaps, a philosopher."

Page 275. "Mr. Harris *logical ignorance* most happily deprived him of a sense of his misfortunes. And so little, good man, did he dream of the danger of his situation, that whilst all others were acknowledging their successful, though

indefatigable labours, and lamenting their insuperable difficulties, he prefaces his doctrine of the connectives, with this singularly confident introduction :—What remains of our work is a matter of less difficulty ; it being the same here as in some historical picture : when the principal figures are once formed, it is an easy labour to design the rest.”

The approbation with which Horne Tooke received *Hermes*, may easily and positively be gleaned from these two quotations, and from many others, which may be cited from the “Diversions of Purley.” The first quotation, which we have given from his “Diversions of Purley,” was an insult to *the learned of all countries*. He affirmed that *they* received *Harris’s Hermes* with universal approbation ; that they quoted it as *undentable authority* : and yet that its doctrine gave *no more satisfaction to their minds*, than to *his own*. Lest the two preceding quotations do not sufficiently show *his satisfaction*, we shall cite a third. In page 6, vol. I, he gives Dr. Lowth’s opinion of *Hermes* ; namely, “Those who would enter more deeply into this subject, will find it fully and accurately handled with the greatest acuteness of investigation, perspicuity of explication, and elegance of method, in a treatise entitled *Hermes*, by James Harris, Esq., the most beautiful and perfect example of Analysis that has been exhibited since the days of Aristotle.”

Horne Tooke, in allusion to Lowth’s recommendation, said, see page 7 : “The recommendation no doubt is full, and the authority great ; but I cannot say that I have found the performance to correspond ; nor can I boast of any acquisition from its perusal, except, indeed, hard words and frivolous, or unintelligible distinctions. And I have learned from a most excellent authority, that ‘*Tout ce qui varie, tout ce qui se charge de termes douteux et enveloppés, a toujours paru suspect ; et non-seulement frauduleux, mais encore absolument faux : parce qu’il marque un embarras que la vérité ne connaît point.*’ ”

1st. If what Horne Tooke asserted in the preceding extracts was true, what were the learned of all countries then ? If false, what was Horne Tooke himself ? If true, Horne Tooke was

the only *learned, candid, honest man in the world*; all the others were contemptible knaves, who sheltered their *pretended learning* by Harris's *hard words*, and *frivolous, unintelligible distinctions*. *If false*, he richly deserved the contempt of every learned man then living.

2ndly. What justice was it to Doctor Lowth that *Hermes* was received with universal approbation?

3rdly. How could that be received with universal approbation which gave *no satisfaction*?

4thly. The clause, *at home and abroad*, is superfluous, in consequence of the word *universal*.

5thly. *By the learned of all countries*, is superfluous for the same reason.

6thly. The manner in which Horne Tooke accounts why Harris's *Hermes* was received with universal approbation and quoted as undeniable authority by the rest of the learned world, will never satisfy any honourable mind.

He attributes their acts to the most unworthy motives, and only *justifies* himself by an absurd and insulting *supposition*.

7thly. The colon after the word *authority*, ought to be a period.

8thly. *And*, after the word *authority*, is unnecessary.

9thly. *When they cannot reason*, ought to commence by a capital.

10thly. *At second hand*, ought to be, as second hand.

Finally, we pay more respect to common sense, and the economy of words, by writing it thus.

I must do Mr. Harris the justice to acknowledge, that his "*Hermes*" has been received with universal approbation, and quoted as undeniable authority by the learned. His doctrine has given no more satisfaction to them than to me; but when they cannot reason, to quote the *nonsense* of others, is safer and less disgraceful than to assert *their own*. Authority screens a scholar's ignorance, as precedents do a judge's knavery.

In this extract from Horne Tooke, there are 550 letters, and in our version of it only 340; consequently, we have economised 210 letters, or more than four lines in 13, which in writing and printing, is considerable.

The introduction, page 1, begins thus :

" THE mystery is at last unravelled. I shall *no more* wonder now that you engross his company at Purley, whilst his other friends can scarce get a sight of him. This, you say, was President Bradshaw's seat. That is the secret of his attachment to the place. You hold him by the best security, his political prejudices and enthusiasm. But do not let his veneration for the memory of the ancient possessor pass upon you for affection for the present."

1. The word *the* is misapplied, because the person addressed, or the reader, has *no* pre-acquaintance with the name to which it relates.

2. This circumstance leaves the reader in total ignorance of the signification of the sentence, and consequently, condemns it. *No more*, ought to be *no longer*.

3. The word *unveil* is more applicable to the word *mystery*, than the word *unravel*. We unveil what is concealed or hidden, and unravel that which is entangled.

4. I shall wonder *now*, is as absurd as, I shall wonder *yesterday*.

*Shall* can only be properly applied to future time, and *now* only to the passing transit; consequently, *shall* and *now* can never be employed in the same member of a sentence.

5. *That you engross*, ought to be, why you have engrossed.

6. *The best security*, ought to be, the best securities, because there are two, namely, his political prejudices and his enthusiasm.

7. The last sentence is a periphrasis.

8. The order of the sentences obscures and confuses the meaning of the entire extract, which may be more explicitly written thus :—

Purley, you say, was President Bradshaw's seat; which is the secret of Horne Tooke's attachment to *it*. You hold him by the best securities, his political prejudices and enthusiasm.

This unveils the mystery why he has neglected his other friends, and you have engrossed his company at Purley. Do not take his veneration for the memory of the old possessor as affection for the present.

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We shall next examine the sentence taken from Lowth's Grammar, namely, "Those who would enter more deeply into this subject, will find it fully and accurately handled, with the greatest acuteness of investigation, perspicuity of explication, and elegance of method, in a treatise entitled *Hermes*, by James Harris, Esq. the most beautiful and perfect example of Analysis, that has been exhibited since the days of Aristotle."

1. "Those who *would* enter," ought to be, "those who wish to enter."

2. *Handled*, ought to be, *treated*.

3. "To handle a subject *with acuteness of investigation*," "To handle a subject *with perspicuity of explication*;" or, "To handle a subject *with elegance of method*," is an unmeaning, ostentatious bubble, which can never be admitted into correct composition. You may treat, or handle, a subject *acutely*, but you cannot *with acuteness of investigation*. To say, "he handled the subject with the greatest *perspicuity of explication*," is not common sense.

The sentence may be thus written: Those who wish to study the subject more profoundly, will find it fully and acutely treated by James Harris, Esq. whose perspicuous explications and elegant method, render his *Hermes* the most perfect and beautiful example of analysis that has been exhibited since the days of Aristotle.

Lindley Murray's Grammar, page 18:—

"W and Y are consonants when *they* begin a word or syllable, but in every other situation they are vowels."

According to this observation W and Y are always vowels, because no English word begins by WY or YW; hence *they* can never begin a word, or syllable, or be consonants.

He should have said, "W or Y is a consonant when *it* begins a word, or syllable, but in every other situation it is a vowel;" or, "Initial W or Y is a consonant, but W or Y in all other situations is a vowel." (See the observations on W and Y, in the first part of this Grammar.)

"All that regards the study of composition merits the higher attention upon this account, that it is intimately con-



nected with the improvement of our intellectual powers. For I must be allowed to say, that when we are employed, after a proper manner, in the study of composition, we are cultivating the understanding itself. The study of arranging and expressing our thoughts with propriety, teaches to think, as well as to speak accurately."—Blair, quoted by Lindley Murray.

1. *All*, in this sentence relates to things (implied),
2. consequently the assertive, *regards*, ought to be *regard*, otherwise *all* must be changed into *every thing*, as, every thing that regards. 3. *Upon this account*, is a periphrasis, and ought to be, *because*. 4. *That*, in the clause, *that is intimately connected*, is superfluous. By Rule 13.
5. *With the improvement of our intellectual powers*, is also a periphrasis, and ought to be, with our intellectual improvement, because improving the intellectual powers, is certainly improving the intellect itself.
5. *For I must be allowed to say, that*, adds nothing to the sense, and consequently is redundant. Rule 12.
6. *When we are employed, after a proper manner, in the study of composition*, is an extravagant circumlocution, and ought to be, "when we study composition properly."
7. *The study of arranging*, etc., ought to be "learning to arrange and express," etc.
8. *Us* ought to be expressed after *teaches*. The extract may be as forcibly, perspicuously, and more correctly written thus :—

Every thing that tends to improve composition merits the highest attention, because it is intimately connected with our intellectual improvement. When we are studying composition properly, we are cultivating the understanding itself. Learning to arrange and express our thoughts accurately, teaches us to think correctly.

Compare the meaning, perspicuity and brevity, of this and the original.

The following extracts fully illustrate the truth, that Cobbett "could see a mote in another's eye, but not a beam in his

own," and that he was as grammatically blind as any of the individuals whose diction he *so mildly censured*. He says of Lord Castlereagh's despatch:—"There is in the nonsense of Castlereagh a *frivolity* and *foppery* that give it a sort of liveliness, and that now and then elicit a smile: but in the productions of his correspondent there is nothing to relieve—all *is vulgar, all clumsy, all dull, all torpid inanity*."

There are many exemptions from rigid criticism. What can be more absurd than to expect, that every sentence in *discussions, exhortations, speeches*, or in *hasty and confidential correspondence*, will stand the test of severe criticism? Every man's style depends more on the society in which he has usually moved, and on the books which he has read, than on his grammatical knowledge; but judicious criticism depends almost exclusively on the justness of our grammatical and philosophical views.

The following is the first sentence in Cobbett's grammar:—

"MAY IT PLEASE YOUR MAJESTY.

"A work having for its object to lay the solid foundation of literary knowledge amongst the labouring classes of the community; to give practical effect to the natural genius found in the soldier, the sailor, the apprentice, and the plough-boy; and to make that genius a perennial source of wealth, strength, and safety to the kingdom; such a work naturally seeks the approbation of your Majesty, who, amongst all the Royal Personages of the present age, *is* the only one that appears to have justly estimated the value of the people."

1. Mr. Cobbett, though a bold reformer, has here improperly used the old form of *supplication*, in which the word it is misapplied, for the more direct, English-like, and dignified address, MOST GRACIOUS MAJESTY.—

2. A *work* cannot have an *object*, but every author has.

3. *Of the community* is redundant, because all labouring classes are of the community. Rule 12.

4. As Mr. Cobbett's soldier, sailor, apprentice, and plough-boy, can be of no use to the community without the gunsmith, ship-builder, smith, rope-maker, miner, etc., we should not be doing justice to Mr. Cobbett's republicanism to assume,

that he intended to exclude the latter from those amongst whom he wished to lay the foundation of literary knowledge. Instead, then, of the sailor, soldier, apprentice, plough-boy, gunsmith, ship-builder, etc., he should have said *commonalty* which includes all those amongst whom he wished to lay the foundation of literary knowledge.

5. *Of the present age*, is a plough-boy's blunder, as any thing that *is* cannot be passed, or future.

6. Your Majesty, *who is*, ought to be your Majesty *who are*, because *who* is substituted for the person addressed, or second person plural. If *your Majesty who is*, is correct, *your Lordship were apprised*, must be incorrect. Cobbett used the latter form in his 24th letter, lesson the 5th.

7. *To have justly estimated the value of the people* is a periphrasis, and ought to be, *justly appreciated the people*. The sentence may be written thus:—

MOST GRACIOUS MAJESTY,

An author whose dearest object is to lay the solid foundation of literary knowledge for the *commonalty*, to give practical effect to their natural genius, and to make that genius a perennial source of *wealth*, *strength*, and *safety* to the kingdom, naturally seeks the approbation of the only *Royal personage* who justly appreciates the people. R. 12 and 13.

“The nobles and the hierarchy have long had the arrogance to style themselves the pillars that support the throne. But, as your majesty has now clearly ascertained, royalty has, in the hour of need, no efficient supporters but the people.”

1. *Your Majesty has* ought to be *your Majesty have*.

2. *Supporters*, the requisite of *royalty* and *has*, is detached from them without necessity, which confuses and obscures the sentence.

3. The period after the word *throne*, ought to be a semi-colon.

4. The word *now* is superfluous, as it adds nothing to the sense. R. 12.

The sentence ought to be written thus:—

Your Majesty have clearly ascertained, that royalty in the hour of danger, has no efficient supporters but the people;

although the nobles and the hierarchy have long had the arrogance to style themselves the pillars that support the throne.

“ During your Majesty’s long, arduous, magnanimous, and gallant struggle against matchless fraud and boundless power, it must have inspired you with great confidence to perceive the wonderful intelligence and talent of your millions of friends ; while your Majesty cannot have failed to observe, that the haughty and insolent few who have been your enemies, have, upon all occasions, exhibited an absence of knowledge, a poverty of genius, a feebleness of intellect, which nothing but a constant association with malevolence and perfidy could prevent from being ascribed to dotage or idiocy.”

The bombast, in the last sentence, proves that Mr. Cobbett could sacrifice even consistency and common sense to his ambition for effect.

He represents her Majesty’s struggle against *matchless fraud and boundless power*, to be *long, arduous, magnanimous, and gallant*. Against whose matchless fraud, and boundless power, did her Majesty, who had *millions of talented and intelligent friends*, make this *long, arduous, magnanimous, and gallant struggle*? Against a *few enemies* who have on all occasions, and consequently in this struggle, exhibited an *absence of knowledge*, a *poverty of genius*, and a *feebleness of intellect*, which nothing could prevent us from ascribing to *dotage*, or *idiocy*, but their constant association with malevolence and perfidy.

If her Majesty’s enemies were *few*, and if *they* upon all occasions, exhibited an *absence of knowledge*, a *poverty of genius*, and a *feebleness of intellect*, how could their *fraud* be *matchless*, or their *power boundless*? Or how could her Majesty’s struggle against this *contemptible enemy*, be *long, arduous, magnanimous, and gallant*? What value can we set upon the friendship of her millions of *wonderfully intelligent and talented* friends whose ignoble supineness permitted the good queen’s *long and gallant struggle*?

We form no judgment of the queen’s merit or demerit, we only investigate Mr. Cobbett’s composition.

1. In the clause, "it must have inspired you with great confidence to perceive the wonderful intelligence and talent of your millions of friends;" the word *it* is redundant, and the natural order of the members is inverted. Mr. Cobbett should have said, "To perceive the wonderful intelligence and talent of your millions of friends, must have inspired you with great confidence."

2. *Cannot have failed to observe*, ought to be, must have observed.

3. *And*, ought to be expressed after the word *genius*.

4. *Which nothing but a constant*, ought to be, which their constant.

5. *Could prevent*, ought to be, prevent us.

6. *From being ascribed*, ought to be, from ascribing.

Better thus:—

"To perceive the wonderful intelligence and talent of your millions of friends during your Majesty's long, arduous, magnanimous, and gallant struggle against matchless fraud and boundless power, must have inspired you with great confidence; while your Majesty must have observed, that the haughty and insolent few who have been your enemies, have always exhibited an absence of knowledge, a poverty of genius, and a feebleness of intellect, which their constant association with malevolence and perfidy prevents us from ascribing to dotage, or idiocy."

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The following is the first paragraph of Doctor Crombie's Preface to the second edition of his Etymology and Syntax.

"The success with which the principles of any art or science are investigated, is generally proportioned to the number of those whose labours are directed to its cultivation and improvement. Inquiry is necessarily the parent of knowledge; error itself proceeding from discussion, leads ultimately to the establishment of truth."

1. This paragraph consists of three independent assertions,

and, consequently, ought to be three sentences, and not two. The truth of each of the three assertions we deny.

2. The first assertion, namely, the success with which the principles of any art, or science, is investigated, is generally proportioned to the number of those whose labours are directed to its cultivation and improvement. The success with which the principles are investigated by no means depends on the number of those whose labours are directed to the cultivation and improvement. It exclusively depends on the competency of the investigators; consequently it is not proportioned to the number of those, etc., as the Doctor asserts.

3. As the existence of the principles must have preceded the investigation, whose labours *are directed*, ought to be, *have been directed*.

4. The second assertion, namely, *inquiry is necessarily the parent of knowledge*, is as absurd as the first assertion. He might have said that inquiry is the offspring of ignorance, because they who inquire want information, or, *are ignorant*, and this ignorance leads to inquiry, consequently inquiry is the offspring of ignorance, or he might have said in a *limited sense*, *instruction* and *study* are generally the parents of knowledge. That he ought to have said, *discussion necessarily leads to knowledge*, can be easily gleaned from the assertion which follows it, namely, *error itself, proceeding from discussion, leads ultimately to the establishment of truth*.

How a reverend doctor could assert, that *error* proceeding from discussion, or from any other cause, ultimately leads to the establishment of truth, we cannot conceive. Cannot we, as truly and consistently assert, that *vice* ultimately leads to the establishment of *virtue*, or that *hatred* ultimately leads to the establishment of *affection*, as he can assert, that *error* leads to the establishment of *truth*? The Doctor did not, certainly, mean to insult religion and common sense. His error, we hope, was a verbal oversight, and not a mental corruption.

He ought to have said, that the discussion, even of error itself, must ultimately lead to the establishment of truth.

5. The semicolon after *knowledge*, ought to be a period according to the Doctor's diction, because there is no con-

nexion, or dependence, existing between the last two simple sentences.

Better thus :—

“The success with which the principles of any art or science are investigated, depends on the competency of the investigators. Discussion is the enemy of error, even the discussion of error *itself*, must ultimately lead to the establishment of truth.” Rule 12 and 13.

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The following sentences are the first and second sentence in the Preface to Mr. Grant's English Grammar.

“It can hardly be necessary to demonstrate the importance of the English language as a study. Too much attention, surely, cannot be devoted to a subject, which not only forms the vehicle of thought, but is, in a certain degree, the instrument of invention.”

1. Mr. Grant has unnecessarily introduced the ill-used *it* into the first sentence in his Preface. Rule 12.

2. *Can be*, ought to be, *is*.

3. The harmony of this sentence is injured by misplacing the word *surely*, which ought to commence the sentence.

4. He ought to have used the word *language*, instead of the word *subject*.

5. *Which forms the vehicle*, ought to be, *which is the vehicle*, because it does not form the vehicle, but is the vehicle itself.

6. *But is, in a certain degree, the instrument of invention*, ought to be, which is, in a certain degree, the expositor of invention.

Better thus :—

“To demonstrate the importance of the English language as a study, is hardly necessary. Surely, too much attention cannot be devoted to language, which is not only the vehicle of thought, but also the expositor of invention.”

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The following is the first paragraph in the Preface to Lennie's Grammar.

"It is probable that the original design and principal motive of every teacher, in publishing a school-book, is the improvement of his own pupils. Such, at least, is the immediate object of the present compilation; which, for brevity of expression, neatness of arrangement, and comprehensiveness of plan, is perhaps, superior to any other book of the kind. My chief end has been to explain the general principles of grammar as clearly and intelligibly as possible. In the definitions, therefore, easiness and perspicuity have been sometimes preferred to logical exactness."

Before we make any observation on the preceding, we shall, for the reader's satisfaction, here state two of Mr. Lennie's Rules.

RULE 25. *The comparative degree, and the pronoun, other, require than after them, and such requires as; as—Greater than I;—No other than he;—Such as do well.*

RULE 33. All the parts of a sentence should correspond to each other, and a regular and dependent construction throughout be carefully preserved.

1. *It*, the first word in the Preface, is improperly used, because we only want *substitutes*, in the absence of their *antecedents*. As the antecedent of *it*, is expressed in the same member of the sentence; consequently, the substitute *it* is redundant. Ask the question, what is probable? The answer is, *that the original design, etc., is probable*. Why not say so?

2. Are not the nouns, *design* and *motive*, the subject of the second *is* in his first compound sentence? Let the reader ask the question, *what is* the improvement of his own pupils? The answer evidently is, "The *original design* and *principal motive is*, which is bad English by his 4th Rule; namely, *Two or more singular nouns, coupled with AND require a verb and pronoun in the plural; as, "James and John are good boys; for they are busy."*

Are not *design* and *motive* coupled by *and*? Where is the



*plural verb* which they require by his 4th Rule? No critic would write, "The *original design* and *principal motive* is the improvement."

3. Until the first design was changed, the word *original* was inapplicable to it, and after it was changed, you cannot say *it is*: you must say *it was*; consequently, "The *original design* is the improvement of his own pupils, is absurd and ungrammatical.

Has he "observed a regular and dependent construction throughout the second sentence in his Preface? What dependence or relation is there between the first part of this sentence; namely, "*Such at least, is the immediate object of the present compilation*, and the *pedantic puffing* that forms the remainder of it, *which for brevity of expression, neatness of arrangement, and comprehensiveness of plan, is, perhaps, superior to any other book of the kind.*"

Could not Mr. Lennie safely confide the estimate of his *merit* to the British public? Perhaps he has introduced the second part of this sentence to teach his pupils *modesty and good taste*!!

4. As the word *such*, requires the word *as*, after it, by his 25th Rule; consequently, Mr. Lennie has misapplied it in the second sentence. 5. *At least*, is redundant, and must be rejected by our 12th Rule. 6. Mr. Lennie, in imitation of Mr. Cobbett, tells us, that his Grammar *has an object*. No inanimate thing has an object. Mr. Lennie had the object which he attributes to his Grammar.

7. *My chief end*, ought to be, my chief object, or my chief aim. Is not the word *therefore*, a conjunction according to his Grammar?—See the list of his conjunctions. - What two sentences does it connect? Can a conjunction form part of a *simple and independent sentence*? We say it cannot.

8. The word *therefore*, is misapplied and redundant, and must be rejected by our 12th Rule. If Mr. Lennie commenced the preceding sentence by the word *As*, and used a colon after the word *possible*, he might then correctly use the word *therefore*. As we cannot prefer one thing without rejecting another, Mr. Lennie sometimes rejected logical exactness: every

page in his Grammar proves this truth. The sense of this paragraph is (if possible) more objectionable than the language in which it is expressed, because it does not contain one idea that can interest the reader or enhance the author.

The following may be less objectionable in expression :—

The author's immediate object in publishing the present compilation is the improvement of his own pupils: that a similar object was the original design and principal motive of every teacher in first publishing a school-book, is probable. As his chief aim has been to explain the general principles of grammar as clearly and intelligibly as possible, perspicuity has naturally attracted his constant and special attention.

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## THE FOURTH PART OF GRAMMAR.

*The fourth part of Grammar comprises punctuation, the use of capitals, and miscellaneous observations.*

### ON PUNCTUATION.

PUNCTUATION is the art of correctly placing certain dots or marks in written composition.

These dots or marks are made and named thus :—

. The period,	- The hyphen,
: The colon,	§ The section,
; The semicolon,	¶ The paragraph,
, The comma,	" " The quotation,
? The note of interrogation,	 The hand,
! The note of exclamation,	} The brace,
() The parenthesis,	* The star,
^ The caret,	— The dash, or ellipsis.

### ON THE PERIOD.

1. The period is used immediately after the last word of every complete and independent sentence ; as, *He studies with delight. Love God. The absence of evil is a real blessing.*

2. The period ought to be used after every abbreviated word ; as *M. P.* Member of Parliament. *Co.* Company. *O. S.* Old Style, etc. and so forth. *N.B.* Nota bene, take notice, mind, etc., etc.

The 389th page of Lindley Murray's 8vo. Grammar, volume the first, informs us, that, "A period may sometimes be admitted between two sentences, though they are joined by a disjunctive or copulative conjunction. For the quality of the point does not always depend on the connective particle, but on the sense and structure of the sentence ; as ; 'Recreations,

though they may be of an innocent kind, require steady government to keep them within a due and limited province. But such as are of an irregular and vicious nature, are not to be governed, but to be banished from every well-regulated mind.'

"He who lifts himself up to the observation and notice of the world, is, of all men, the least likely to avoid censure. For he draws upon himself a thousand eyes, that will narrowly inspect him in every part."

We have already observed, that the correctness of a sentence ought to be strictly examined before any inferences drawn from its construction are admitted into our grammatical code.

The two instances here given, of a period between two sentences connected by a conjunction, are improper, and each of the sentences bad English. A period can never be properly placed between any two sentences *connected by a conjunction*.

The first of the preceding examples ought to be:—

Innocent recreations require constant vigilance to protect them; but vicious and unbecoming recreations are not to be governed, but suppressed.

The 2nd ought to run thus:—

He who elevates himself to public notice has the least chance of avoiding censure; because he exposes himself to thousands, who will minutely inspect him. See R. 12 and 13.

To find so many ill chosen and unnecessary words in a *few lines* in Lindley Murray's Grammar, will astonish many. We have written in less than six lines, the same meaning which in his Grammar occupies nine.

If a period is sometimes properly used between two sentences connected by a conjunction, can it be used between every two sentences so connected? If not, how is the learner to know when to use it? *Why did not Lindley Murray tell him?* Is not every conjunction either copulative or disjunctive? What necessity was there for saying, *Though they are joined by a disjunctive or copulative conjunction?* Is not the meaning as well expressed by saying, *Though they are joined by a conjunction?* Does the word *disjunctive*, or

the word *copulative*, add any thing to the sense? Certainly not. *Why were they used?*

*For the quality of the point does not always depend on the connective particle*, ought to be, *For the point to be used does not always depend*, etc. The point has no qualities, it only has form.

### ON THE COLON.

The colon is used between two *members* of a sentence, when the one is a perfect independent sentence, and the other only slightly depending on it; as, “Nature felt her inability to extricate herself from the consequences of guilt: the Gospel reveals the plan of divine interposition and aid.

“In faith and hope the world will disagree;  
But all mankind’s concern is charity:  
All must be false that thwart this one great end;  
And, all of God, that bless mankind or mend.”

The conjunction *but*, is understood between guilt and Gospel.

The following observations and examples show how much writers on grammar respect authority, and how little they regard consistency and common sense.

“The colon is commonly used when an example, a quotation, or a speech, is introduced; as, ‘The Scriptures give us an amiable representation of the Deity in these words: God is love.’ ‘He was often heard to say: I have done with the world, and I am willing to leave it.’

“When a member of a sentence is complete in itself, but followed by some supplemental remark, or further illustration of the subject; as, ‘Nature felt her inability to extricate herself from the consequences of guilt: the Gospel reveals the plan of divine interposition and aid.’ ‘Nature confesseth some atonement to be necessary: the Gospel discovers that the necessary atonement is made.’

“The propriety of using a colon, or a semicolon, is sometimes determined by a conjunction’s being expressed, or not expressed; as, ‘Do not flatter yourselves with the hope of per-

fect happiness: there is no such thing in the world.' 'Do not flatter yourselves with the hope of perfect happiness; for there is no such thing in the world.'"—Lindley Murray's 8vo. Grammar, vol. I. page 388.

"The colon is used when the preceding part of a sentence is complete in itself; but is followed by some additional remark or illustration, naturally arising out of the foregoing part, and, generally, depending upon it with respect to the clear import and sense; thus, 'Virtue is too lovely to be concealed in a cell: the world is her scene of action.' 'There is no greater monster in being than a very bad man of great talents: he lives like a man in a palsy, with one side of him dead.'

"When, in such instances, the latter member begins with a conjunction, the connection is rendered closer in construction, if not in sense, and a semicolon may then be preferable. The colon, or the semicolon, is commonly used before the formal introduction of an example, a quotation, or a speech."—J. Grant's Grammar, page 343.

"The colon is used when the preceding part of the sentence is complete in sense and construction; and the following part is some remark naturally arising from it, and depending on it in sense, though not in construction; as, 'Study to acquire the habit of thinking: no study is more important.'

"A colon is generally used before an example, or a quotation; as, 'The Scriptures give us an amiable representation of the Deity in these words: God is love.' 'He was often heard to say: I have done with the world, and I am willing to leave it.'

"The *colon* is generally used when the conjunction is *understood*; and the semicolon when the conjunction is *expressed*."—Lennie's Grammar, page 162.

The observation is wrong.

1. Lindley Murray has expressed it badly; instead of saying, "The colon is commonly used when an example, a quotation, or a speech is introduced," he ought to have said, as Lennie has; A colon is generally used before an example or a quotation. See R. 13.

2. The two examples given by Lindley Murray and Lennie, to illustrate this observation, are bad English.

The first ought to be, "The Scriptures give us this amiable representation of the Deity, *God is love*;" which shows that the clause, *in these words*, is redundant. Rule 13.

The second is a circumlocution, and ought to be, "*He often said*, I have done with this world, and am willing to leave it." Rule 13.

3. The two examples are *badly chosen* and *badly punctuated*, according to Lindley Murray and Lennie.

4. That Lindley Murray, who has almost invariably placed a colon between every Rule and the examples given to illustrate it, should say, that the *colon is commonly used when an example or quotation is used*, will surprise none; but that Lennie, who has not *once used a colon* between a Rule and its examples, in his *thirty-six Rules of Syntax*, should have blindly copied Lindley Murray, to condemn his own (Lennie's) punctuation, is inconceivable. If a colon is *properly* used before an example or quotation, why has Lennie throughout his Grammar *improperly used* a semicolon?

5. If a colon is generally used when the conjunction is *understood*, and the semicolon when the conjunction is *expressed*; why has Lindley Murray in his Grammar invariably used the colon before his examples when the conjunction *as*, is *expressed*?

Lindley Murray has been as blind in copying this Rule or observation, as Lennie in copying the other. Each of them, by his own Rule, condemns his own punctuation.

That the principal parts of a simple sentence, namely, the subject, the assertive, and the requisite or object, cannot be properly separated by a colon, is evident.

In the sentence, "He was often heard to say: I have done with this world, and I am willing to leave it; what is the object of the assertive *to say*? Is not the sentence which follows it, the object? Why separate the *assertive* and its *object* by a colon? When the object of an assertive immediately follows it, a comma is the only point properly used or required.

As the omission of words can only be properly allowed where they are *evidently* understood ; consequently the meaning or grammatical construction of a sentence cannot be changed by that omission. Why change the punctuation when the meaning and construction are the same ? When a link is understood, we ought to punctuate the same as when it is expressed.

Lindley Murray almost invariably used a *colon* between a definition or rule, and the examples given to illustrate it ; as, "A verb must agree with its nominative case, in number and *person* : as, 'I learn,' etc."

Grant and Lennie as invariably use a semicolon in the same situation ; as, "A verb agrees with its nominative in number and *person* ; as, 'I read,'" etc.—Grant.

"A verb must agree with its nominative in number and *person* ; as, 'Thou readest,' etc."—Lennie.

In the preceding examples, Doctor Crombie uses only a comma ; as, "A verb agrees with its nominative in number and *person*, as, 'We teach,' etc."

Is not this striking contrast, in the opinion and practice of these authors, very strange ?

### ON THE SEMICOLON.

1. The semicolon is used after any assertion, of which the truth is illustrated by subsequent examples, or explanation ; as, "*There are two sexes ; namely, male and female.*" "*Jesus said, Somebody hath touched me ; for I know that virtue is gone out from me.*" "*We must live virtuously or viciously ; because there is no middle state.*"

### ON THE COMMA.

The comma is used :

1. After a *name* or *title* merely used to attract the attention of the person ; as, "*Sir*, I am happy to see you ; "*My Lord*, what shall I do ?"

2. Between three or more words of the same



kind; as, “He was *learned, courageous, and generous*,” she *reads, writes, and declaims* well;” “he spoke *kindly, discreetly, and eloquently*.”

3. Between the subject and the assertive, when the subject is accompanied by explanatory adjuncts; as, “Judas Iscariot, *one of the twelve*, went to the chief priests to betray him to them.” St. Mark, c. xiv. v. 10, etc.

4. All other pauses necessary in the body of a sentence, except those which we have already shown, must be marked by a colon or semicolon.

#### ON THE NOTE OF INTERROGATION.

The note of interrogation is used when a question is asked; as, “Whom have you seen?” “What are you doing?”

“To whom can riches give repute or trust,  
Content or pleasure, but the good and just?”

#### ON THE NOTE OF EXCLAMATION.

The *note of exclamation* is used after expressions of sudden emotion, surprise, joy, grief, admiration, etc.; as, “Bless the Lord, O my soul! and forget not all his benefits!”

“Oh! had we both our humble state maintained,  
And safe in peace and poverty remained!”

In some cases, to distinguish an interrogative from an exclamatory sentence is difficult; but a sentence in which any wonder or admiration is expressed, and to which no answer is expected, may be always properly followed by a note of exclamation; as, “How much vanity in the pursuits of men!”

The interrogation and explanation note mark an elevation of the voice.

#### ON THE PARENTHESIS.

A parenthesis is used to enclose some incidental

remark in the body of a sentence ; as, “ To gain a posthumous reputation, is to save four or five letters (for what is a name besides?) from oblivion.” “ If I grant this request (and who could refuse it?) I shall secure his esteem and attachment.”

Better thus,

“ To gain a posthumous reputation, is only to save four or five letters from oblivion, as a name is no more than this.”

“ If I grant this request, I shall secure his esteem and attachment. Who would not?”

Good modern writers seldom use the parenthesis.

### ON THE CARET.

The caret is used to indicate the omission, either of words or letters. The caret is made immediately under the line *where* the words or letters are omitted, and the words or letters are inserted above the line ; thus,

I shall give him <sup>the</sup> book.  
A

### ON THE HYPHEN AND OTHER MARKS.

A hyphen is employed in connecting compound words ; as, lap-dog, tea-pot, to-morrow, etc.

It is also used when a word is divided, and the former part is written or printed at the end of one line, and the latter part at the beginning of another. In this case, it is placed at the end of the first line, but not at the beginning of the second.

*The Section* (§) is used to divide a discourse, or chapter, into portions.

*The Paragraph* (¶) is used to denote the beginning of a new subject.

*Crotchets*, or *brackets* ([ ]), are used to enclose explanatory words or sentences.

The *Apostrophe* (') is used to show that some letter has been

suppressed. Inverted commas and apostrophes are also used as *Quotation Marks* (" "), to inclose a phrase or passage, borrowed by an author from another work; as,

" Envy will merit as its shade pursue,

But like the shadow, proves the substance true."

If the passage borrowed is long, the inverted commas are sometimes placed before every line of it, and two apostrophes after the last word.

*The Index, or Hand*, () points out a remarkable passage, or something that requires particular attention.

*The Brace*, { is used in poetry at the end of a triplet, or three lines which have the same rhyme. Braces are also used to connect a number of words with one common term, and are introduced to prevent a repetition in writing, or printing.

*The asterisk, or little star*, (\*) directs the reader to some note in the margin, or at the bottom of the page. Two or three stars generally denote the omission of some letters in a word, or of some bold or indelicate expression, or some defect in the manuscript.

*The Dash, or Ellipsis* (—) is also used when some letters, in a word, or some words in a verse are omitted, "The k—g," for "the king."

*The Obelisk*, which is marked thus (†), and *parallels* thus (||), are used as references to the margin, or bottom of the page. The letters of the alphabet, and arithmetical figures, are used for the same purpose.

In English the accentual marks are chiefly used in spelling-books and dictionaries, to mark the syllables which require a particular stress of the voice in pronunciation. The stress is laid on both long and short syllables. In order to distinguish the one from the other, some writers of dictionaries have placed the grave accent on the former, and the acute on the latter; as, Finely, fīn'ish, rūdely, ru'dder, etc.

The proper mark to distinguish a long syllable is this (˘), as, Rōsy, and a short one this (˙); as, fōlly.

This last mark is called a breve.

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## ON THE USE OF CAPITALS.

1. The first letter in every written composition.
2. The first in every complete simple or compound sentence.
3. The first letter in any word implying God; as, *Jehovah, Messiah, Jesus, the Lord, Deity, etc.*
4. The first letter in the name of any particular person, country, place, street, mountain, river, ship, or regiment; as, England, Bristol, Maria, Duke Street, the Alps, the Thames, the Royal George, the Cold Stream Guards, etc.
5. The first letter in the name of every religion; as, the Protestant Religion, the Catholic Religion, the Quaker Religion, etc.
6. The first letter in any descriptive derived from the name of a place, or person; as, English, Newtonian, etc.
7. The first letter of the title of any man, or book; as "Colonel Pringle," "Paradise Lost."
8. The first letter in every line in poetry.
9. The substitute *I*, and the exclamation *O*.

## ON SYLLABIC ACCENT.

Syllabic accent is the peculiar stress we lay on a certain syllable of a word to distinguish it from the rest; as, *prepare, amend, etc.*

In the preceding examples we give a certain importance to the syllable *pare* and *mend*, by the comparative force of the voice with which we pronounce them.

As the eye is delighted by the diversity of colours, and beautiful objects, so is the ear by the changes of modulation.

Every English word of more than one syllable, has one of them distinguished by *accent*.

Derivative dissyllables generally have the accent on the primitive, as, *childish*, *kingdom*, *actest*, *toilsome*, *bessem*, etc.

Dissyllabic assertives, when used as names, are generally exceptions to the preceding rule, as they are mostly accented on the first syllable; as, *présent*, *préface*, etc.

Every dissyllable ending in *y*, *our*, *ow*, *le*, *ish*, *ck*, *ter*, *age*, *en*, or *et*, (except *allow*, *avow*, *endow*, *below*, *bestow*, has the accent on the first syllable; as, *any*, *favour*, *widow*, *able*, *prudish*, *fabric*, *mutter*, *dotage*, *written*, *ticket*, etc.

Dissyllabic names ending in *er*; as, *farmer*, *baker*, etc., have the first syllable accented.

Dissyllabic names in which we distinctly hear a diphthong in the last syllable, commonly have the accent on that syllable; as, *applaud*, *compound*, etc.

A dissyllable in which two vowels meet, of which one is heard in each syllable, has the accent on the first; as, *lion*, *riot*, *liar*, etc.

### ON TRISYLLABIC ACCENT.

Trisyllables formed by adding a termination, or prefixing a syllable, have the accent on the same syllable as the primitive word; as, *loveliness*, *tenderness*, *contemner*, *wagoner*, *physical*, *bespatter*, *commenting*, *assurance*, etc.

Those ending in *ous* and *al*, have the accent on the first; as, *arduous*, *capital*, etc.

Those ending in *es*, *ent*, and *ate*, have the accent on the first; as, *countenance*, *continence*, *armament*, *propagate*, etc., unless they are derived from dissyllables accented on the last; as, *connivance*—or unless the middle syllable has a vowel before two consonants; as, “*promulgate*,” etc. Those ending in *y*, generally have the accent on the first; as, *cruelty*, *vanity*, etc.

Those ending in *re*, or *le*, have the accent on the first; as, *Legible*, *theatre*, except *disciple*, and some words of which

the first syllable is an inseparable preposition; as, *Inclosure*, *departure*, etc. Those ending in *ude*, commonly have the accent on the first; as, *Plenitude*, *habitude*, *rectitude*, etc.

Those ending in *ator*, have the accent on the second; as, *Spectator*, *Creator*, etc.; except *orator*, *senator*, *barrator*, and *legator*.

Those which have a diphthong in the middle syllable, have the accent on that syllable; as, *endeavour*, *endearment*, etc.

### ON THE ACCENTUATION OF POLYSYLLABLES.

A derivative polysyllable has the accent on the same syllable as its primitive; as, *Arrogating*, *commendable*, *communicable*, etc.

Those ending in *ator*, generally have the accent on the penultimate; as *Emendator*, *gladiator*, *equivocator*, etc.

Those ending in *le*, generally have the accent on the first; as, *Amicable*, *despicable*, etc., unless the vowel in the second syllable is followed by two consonants; as, *Combustible*, *condemnable*, etc.

Those ending in *cal*, *ous*, and *ty*, generally have the accent on the antepenultimate; as, *Hypocritical*, *victorious*, *activity*, etc.

The local pronunciation or manner of speaking that distinguishes the natives of any particular *shire*, or *county*, is also called accent; as, an *Irish accent*, a *Scotch accent*, a *Derbyshire accent*, etc.

### ON QUANTITY.

The quantity of a syllable is the exact *time* in which it is properly pronounced. Quantity is either *long* or *short*.

The quantity is long when the accent is on a vowel; as, *Mâte*, *fâte*, *cîte*, etc., and short when the accent is on a consonant; *Mat'*, *fat'*, *sit'*, etc.

The long quantity is double the short; that is, we take twice as much time to pronounce the syllable *mâte*, as the syllable *mat*.

1st. All vowels under the principal accent, before the ter-

mination *ia*, *io*, and *ion*, preceded by a single consonant, are pronounced long; as, Regalia, folio, adhesion, explosion, confusion, etc.; except the vowel *i*, which, in that situation, is short; as, Militia, punctilio, decision, contrition. The only exceptions to this rule seem to be, Battalion, gladiator, national, and rational.

2nd. All vowels that immediately precede the termination *ity*, or *ety*, are pronounced long; as, Déity, piety, spontanéity. If a single consonant precedes either of these terminations, it has the accent on it, and consequently the vowel before this single consonant is short: as, Polárity, sévérity, divloity, curiosíty, etc., except *u*, as in the word impúnity.

*U*, before two consonants, is short; as, Cúrvity, tacitúrnity,

### ON EMPHASIS.

Emphasis is the *long, strong, serious, or peculiar tone* by which the speaker pronounces any word of a sentence, to convey his meaning more accurately.

The emphatic word in any assertive sentence, can only be positively ascertained by the emphatic word in the *question*, to which that assertive sentence is a correct answer.

If the emphatic word in any question is a *name*, the emphatic word in the answer must also be a *name*, or name substitute; if the emphatic word in a question is a name substitute, the emphatic word in the answer must be either a name *substitute*, or *name*; if it be an assertive in the one, it must be an assertive in the other, etc, as,, “Has *Henry* paid you?” “*He* has paid me.” “Has Henry paid *you*?” “He has paid *me*.” “*Who* has paid you?” “*William* has paid me,” etc.

The same may be said of questions and answers having more than one emphatic word; that is. if the emphatic words in the question are a *sentence descriptive*, and an *assertive*, the emphatic words in the answer must be a *sentence descriptive*, and an *assertive*, etc.

### EXAMPLE.

“Have you *positively* paid him? I *positively* paid him yesterday, etc.

## ON COMPOSITION.

The beauties of Composition are *perspicuity*, *brevity*, and *accuracy*, which only require that appropriate words should be correctly arranged.

We have here reduced grammar to its narrowest limits, namely, to the choice of words, and their arrangement.

## ON THE CHOICE OF WORDS.

Perspicuity requires that our words must clearly convey our meaning.

Brevity rejects every word that adds nothing to the sense, and condemns the use of two or more words, of which the meaning can be expressed by one.

Accuracy condemns the use of all words that express more or less than the speaker's meaning, if others can be found to express it exactly.

If two or more words express the meaning more clearly than one, perspicuity and accuracy require the rejection of that word, and the substitution of those which convey the meaning more completely.

The Sixteen Rules and the few notes in the third part of Grammar show the arrangement of words.

## ON FIGURATIVE LANGUAGE.

Figurative language is that which is dignified and enriched by rhetorical ornaments and *figures*, which elevate it above the familiar style used by relatives, sincere friends, and intimate acquaintances. As these ornaments give strength, beauty, and dignity to composition, some knowledge of them is indispensable to the admirers of *refined*, *luxuriant*, and *dazzling* eloquence.

The *passing* notice we here take of some of them can, by no means, supersede the important study of Rhetoric. He



*visited the different parts of Europe to ascertain the actual and comparative condition of the inhabitants of each state, is a simple and familiar statement which the great Burke, in eulogising the philanthropic Howard, rhetorically embellishes, thus:—*

“He has visited all Europe,—not to survey the sumptuousness of palaces, or the stateliness of temples; not to make accurate measurements of the remains of ancient grandeur, nor to form a scale of the curiosity of modern art; nor to collect medals, or collate manuscripts: but to dive into the depths of dungeons; to plunge into the infection of hospitals; to survey the mansions of sorrow and pain; to take the gauge and dimensions of misery, depression, and contempt; to remember the forgotten, to attend to the neglected, to visit the forsaken, and compare and collate the distresses of all men, in all countries.” The figure used in the preceding sentence is *Contrast*, which always has the effect of making each of the contrasted objects appear in stronger light. White, for instance, never appears so bright as when it is opposed to black, and both viewed together.

“Men naturally began language by giving names to the surrounding objects which were most useful to them. The stock of words was then small; but as men's ideas multiplied, and their acquaintance with objects increased, their stock of names and words also increased. Yet, to the vast variety of objects and ideas, no language is so copious as to afford a separate word for each. They naturally sought to avoid the necessity of constantly multiplying words. They, to lay less burthen on their memories, made one word, which they had already appropriated to a certain idea or object, stand also for some other idea or object, between which and the primary one, they found some relation. The names of sensible objects were first introduced; and were, by degrees, extended to those mental objects of which men had more obscure conceptions, and to which they found it more difficult to assign distinct names. They borrowed, therefore, the name of some sensible idea, where their imagination found some affinity. Thus, we *speak of a piercing judgment, and a clear head; a soft or a*

*hard heart*, and a *strong* understanding. We say, *inflamed* by anger, *warmed* by love, *swelled* with pride, *melted* into grief; and these are almost the only significant words which we have for such ideas.

“Rhetorical figures frequently give us a much clearer and more striking view of the principal object, than we could have, if it were expressed in simple terms, and divested of its necessary idea. By a well-chosen figure, even conviction is assisted, and the impression of a truth upon the mind made more lively and forcible than it would otherwise be. We perceive this in the following illustration of Young:—‘When we dip too deep in pleasure, we always stir a sediment that renders it impure and noxious;’ and in this instance—‘A heart boiling with violent passions will always send up insatiating fumes to the head.’ An image that presents so much congruity between a moral and sensible idea, serves, like an argument from analogy, to enforce what the author asserts.”

A METAPHOR is a figure by which we dignify, enrich, or strengthen a sentence, by imparting to one thing the attributes of another; as, “*Demosthenes* was the *bulwark* of Athens.”

#### EXPLANATION.

In this example the metaphor is formed by giving *Demosthenes* the attributes of a *bulwark*, which are to fortify, defend, and render a place impregnable; consequently, when we say *Demosthenes* was the *bulwark* of Athens, the meaning evidently is, that Demosthenes fortified, defended, and rendered Athens impregnable by his eloquence.

The following beautiful metaphor, spoken and explained by Christ, is taken from St. John, chap. xv., verse 5.

“*I am the vine, you the branches.*”

#### EXPLANATION.

“As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself, unless it abide in the vine, so neither can you, unless you abide in me.”—St. John, chap. xv. v. 4. “He that abideth in me, and ~~in~~

him, the same beareth much fruit : for without me you can do nothing."—St John, chap. xv. v. 5.

"The metaphor is one of those figures which give the greatest ornament, strength, and grandeur to discourse. The most exquisite sentences are generally metaphorical, and derive all their beauty from imparting to one person or thing, the attributes of another. Indeed it has the peculiar advantage, according to Quintilian's observation, of shining by its own brilliancy in the most celebrated pieces. It enriches a language by an infinity of expressions : it throws a great variety into composition ; it raises and aggrandises the most minute and common things ; it gives us great pleasure by the ingenious boldness with which it strikes out in quest of foreign expressions, instead of the natural ones which are at hand ; it is an agreeable deception that shows one thing for another. In fine, it gives a body to the most spiritual things, that almost make them the objects of hearing and sight by the sensible images it delineates to the imagination. — Rollin's Method of teaching the Belles Lettres, p. 142.

"Metaphors," says an ingenious and judicious author, "abound in all writings : from Scripture, they may be produced in vast variety. Thus, our blessed Lord is called a *vine*, a *lamb*, a *lion*, etc. Thus men, according to their different dispositions, are styled *wolves*, *sheep*, *dogs*, *serpents*, etc. And, indeed, metaphors not only abound in the sacred writings, but they overspread all language ; and the more carefully we examine authors, not only poets but philosophers, the more shall we discover their free and large use of metaphors, taken from the arts and sciences, the customs of mankind, and the unlimited fields of nature."

AN ALLEGORY is a cluster or chain of metaphors ; as, "His virtues made him known to the public, and produced that first flower of reputation, which spreads an odour more agreeable than perfumes, over every part of a glorious life."—ROLLIN.

"Of all the flowers that embellish the regions of eloquence,

\* Gibbon's Rhetoric, p. 24.

there is none that rises to such an eminence, that bears so rich and beautiful a blossom, that diffuses such a copious and exquisite fragrance, or that so amply rewards the care and culture of the poet, or the orator, as the metaphor." — GIBBON'S *Rhetoric*, p. 27.

A **SIMILE** is a description formed from the resemblance of one thing to another, or from the similarity of one passage or circumstance to another.

We take the following example from Cicero's first oration against Catiline: "If in so dangerous a rebellion, this parricide alone should be exterminated, we may, perhaps, for a short time, seem to be relieved from anxiety and terror: but the danger will be wholly shut up in the veins and bowels of the commonwealth. As men grievously sick, when they are in the burning heat of a raging fever, upon taking a draught of cold water, seem at first to be refreshed by it, but afterwards, are more heavily and violently attacked by their distemper; in like manner this disease, under which the public labours, will gain a respite by the extinction of Catiline, but will afterwards, as the rest of his accomplices still survive, return upon us with redoubled fury."

"In Similes, the understanding is concerned much more than the fancy; and, therefore, the rules to be observed, with respect to them are, that they be clear and useful; that they tend to render our conceptions of the principal object more distinct; and that they do not lead our view aside, and bewilder it with any false light. We should always remember that similes are not arguments. They only elucidate the writer's sentiments, but do not prove their truth."

The following quotation, besides presenting a striking view of the points of resemblance, conveys additional gratification by the beauty of the landscape which they form. While Homer's main object is only to illustrate the situation of the Grecian camp after a battle, he introduces a most charming night scene.

"The troops, exulting, sat in order round,  
And beaming fires illumined all the ground."

As when the moon, resplendent orb of night,  
 O'er heaven's pure azure sheds her sacred light;  
 When not a cloud o'ercasts the solemn scene,  
 And not a breath disturbs the deep serene;  
 Around her throne the vivid planets roll,  
 And stars unnumber'd gild the glowing pole;  
 O'er the dark trees a yellow verdure spread,  
 And tip with silver ev'ry mountain's head.  
 Then shine the vales, the rocks in prospect rise,  
 A flood of glory bursts from all the skies.  
 The conscious swains, rejoicing in the night,  
 Eye the blue vault, and bless the useful light.  
 So, many flames before proud Ilion blaze  
 And lighten glimmering Xanthus with their rays. "

**PERSONIFICATION** is a rhetorical figure by which we *animate* inanimate objects, by addressing them, or by what we relate of them; as, "The ground *thirsts* for rain; the earth *smiles* with plenty; *restless* ambition; a *deceitful* disease."

*The personification of Pride, Pope's Essay on Man.*

"Ask for what end the heavenly bodies shine,  
 Earth for whose use: Pride answers, 'Tis for mine.  
 For me kind nature wakes her genial pow'r,  
 Suckles each herb and spreads out ev'ry flow'r.  
 Annual for me the grape, the rose renew  
 The juice nectareous, and the balmy dew;  
 For me the mine a thousand treasures brings,  
 For me health gushes from a thousand springs;  
 Seas roll to waft me, suns to light me rise,  
 My footstool Earth, my canopy the Skies.' "

**METONYMY** is a figure formed by putting the cause for the effect, the effect for the cause, the container for the contained, or the sign for the thing signified; as "Pope delights me," that is, *Pope's works*; here the cause is put for the effect,

*i. e.* Pope, for his works. “Gray hairs ought to be respected,” that is, old age; here *gray hairs*, *the effect*, is put for old age, the cause. “He spilled the glass,” that is, the contents of the glass; which is putting the container for the contained, etc.

IRONY is a figure formed, by asserting the greatest contrast to our real meaning, in a significant voice, and with peculiar emphasis; as, “Cromwell was *kind, mild, and merciful*.” “Henry the Eighth was a *model of all the virtues*,” etc.

VISION is a figure formed, by representing absent or distant objects actually present; as,

“What beck’ning ghost, along the moonlight shade,  
Invites my steps, and points to yonder glade?  
’Tis she—but why that bleeding bosom gor’d,  
Why dimly gleams the visionary sword?  
O ever beauteous, ever friendly, tell,  
Is it in Heav’n a crime to love too well?  
To bear too tender, or too firm a heart,  
To act a lover’s, or a Roman’s part?  
Is there no bright reversion in the sky  
For those who greatly think or bravely die.”

*Pope’s Elegy to the Memory of an Unfortunate and Esteemed Lady.*

No composition can require (says Walker in his Rhetorical Grammar,) a more animated pronounciation than this passage; if the reader does not repeat it nearly as if he saw a ghost beckoning to him, he cannot be said to deliver it properly; the words would contradict the action.

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